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ABSTRACT
Most Sunbelt cities reflect the suburbanization that characterized urban growth and development
over the past forty years. Given this dispersion, these cities often contain large areas of
strategically located land that once was fully-developed, but is now either vacant or dramatically
under-utilized. This condition is particularly prevalent in the older center city areas. In general,
planners and government officials view these under-developed sites as having a claim on some
locational advantage; they have actively worked to successfully redevelop such locations. Private
sector developers, however, have mixed responses to this hypothesis, generally ignoring such
under-developed older locations. This thesis examines the nature of urban under-development in
Sunbelt communities, organizing the field into an explanatory matrix based on typological, causal
and situational factors. The work builds on the premise that inner-city environments represent
untapped competitive advantages, and addresses the roles of both the public and private sectors in
realizing the potentials represented by these under-developed properties.
To date, formalized responsibility for urban redevelopment has been predominantly in the hands of
the public sector. However, as financial, economic and regulatory roles change, the private sector
will increasingly be called upon to help advance public agendas. Can the strengths of the private
sector be brought to bear on these under-developed properties, thereby helping advance the public
sector's social and economic programs, while still meeting the private sector's financial returns?
The challenge in the upcoming decades will be to economically and profitably redevelop the myriad
parcels of land that litter the city centers. Because the public moneys to do so are not available, the
financing, direction and operational energy for such projects will have to come from the private
sector. The goal for the cities in such instances, will be to streamline the process of redevelopment,
and to provide the organizational, regulatory and legal framework within which private sector
developers can profitably exploit the largely untapped potentials of these in-town locations. This
thesis documents four examples of urban neighborhood redevelopment efforts, and compares and
contrasts them for elements that might be fruitfully applied to future redevelopment efforts.
Thesis Supervisor: Gary Hack
Title: Professor of Urban Design, School of Architecture & Urban Planning
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Introduction
Neighborhoods and properties falter when the conditions that supported their initial economic
purpose are no longer valid, and functional or contextual factors create a situation in which no
viable alternative can be found. A factory shuts down and no new use can be found for the old
facility. It falls into disrepair. Residents of the area who used to work at the factory leave in
search of other jobs and no buyers can be found for their houses. These are let or sold at a loss, or
possibly abandoned. Economic value declines. Large and small variations on this theme abound in
this country's urban history.
A neighborhood, an institution, or a parcel of property is re-developed -brought back into
productive use, at enhanced value- through an infusion of external resources, generally capital.
For neighborhoods or single properties, this imported capital comes primarily from the private
sector or the public sector, including non-profit organizations. Private sector redevelopment can be
internally generated -the citizens of a neighborhood make a concerted effort to revitalize their
surroundings-but typically not without some influx of outside capital. Private redevelopment can
be externally generated, spurred by myriad new individual owners and entrepreneurs;
gentrification. Redevelopment can also be the work of a single private-sector source; a developer
takes over an old building and provides the capital to fix it up and the resources to create new
productive purposes. From a private-sector perspective, therefore, redevelopment involves: a)
perception of untapped value; b) access to external resources (such as banks for financing,
architects for design, contractors for construction, etc.); c) the ability to apply the resources to the
problem at hand; d) the capacity to follow through on a long-term endeavor; and ultimately, e) an
end-user for the completed project.
The public sector can also provide capital and resources for redeveloping real estate and
neighborhoods. A great deal of the redevelopment efforts in the United States after the Second
World War were initiated, funded and fueled by public sector dollars, often coming directly from
the federal government. Today, however, such initiatives are few and far between; more and more,
the private sector is being called upon to provide the impetus and energy for regenerating and
reinvigorating once-thriving but now under-developed projects and environments. However, while
the aforementioned factors are ostensibly the same for both public and private resources, there are
significant differences between the overall goals, the processes, and the end results. This thesis
addresses some of these differences, with a particular focus on the newly emerging, fast-growing
cities of the Sunbelt.
These medium- and large-sized cities are predominantly located in the newer, less urbanized
regions of the United States, and generally define the older central cores of rapidly expanding
metro areas. In many of these cities, the Central Business Districts have received considerable
focus in recent decades, in part because of a perceived loss of position and power, and, in part due
to actual deterioration and decay. The CBD of a Sunbelt city generally lacks the vitality it had at
an earlier time, but most are economically viable. In general, however, the older neighborhoods
surrounding the city centers tend to be under-developed. Previously active mixed-use
neighborhoods are denuded; shopping streets lie empty; large tracts of land remain vacant or
abandoned. Yet, within the metro area as a whole, growth continue apace, predominantly at the
fringes where virgin sites are turned into shopping centers, office parks and subdivisions. Why
should one part of a metro area strain under the stresses of growth, while another, ostensibly better
suited area, lies fallow? Under what conditions can some of that growth be captured by these in-
town areas?
Given a burgeoning awareness of the potential value of older, under-developed environments, what
factors currently inhibit their re-development, and how might these factors be mitigated and
overcome? Given the current professional antipathy to "sprawl" development, how can these
unused in-town environments be brought back to productive use? Who are the potential audiences
for these in-town locales, and how might they be induced to invest? Are there "highest and best"
uses for areas that might otherwise appear to have no utility at all?
The thesis will approach a range of under-developed conditions typically found in Sunbelt cities.
These conditions will be structured typologically and examined for both causality and current
opportunity. The focus of this study is not be the traditional downtown cores or Central Business
Districts of these cities. Rather, it examines the older, often residential, neighborhoods and
environments that surrounded the traditional commercial core. In most cities, these commercial
centers have been the subject of public and private redevelopment efforts, which have met with
varying degrees of success. While positing a symbiosis between the city center and its immediately
adjacent in-town neighborhoods, the thesis will focus on these latter environments, accepting as a
given, some level of commercial and civic concentration within the downtown cores.
The general bounds of this study are provided by the two dozen or so suburbanized metro areas
that can be described as Sunbelt cities. The particular context of the study is the State of Florida,
a focus selected in order to adequately address the general issues within the allotted time and space,
to optimize the author's familiarity with specific issues, and to unify the examples within a single
state's regulatory and financial framework.
Figure 1: Map of the United States Indicating the Location and Range of the "Sunbelt"
(Source: Fink, "Toward a Sunbelt Urban Design Manifesto.")
Specific examples highlighting general issues will be drawn from the City of Tampa on Florida's
Gulf Coast. Tampa works well as a case city because of the author's familiarity with it and
because, in numerous ways, it is representative of many post-War, Sunbelt "suburban" cities. The
features of Tampa that will be described in detail are similar to features found in cities such as
Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, Orlando, Atlanta, Albuquerque and on. In many ways, Tampa is
somewhat more advanced than other places in addressing issues of urban redevelopment; City
officials are regularly invited to other cities to present and discuss Tampa's approaches and results.
Organization of the Document
The thesis begins with a brief overview of the problem of under-development, looking at it from
fiscal, demographic, aesthetic, economic and urban vantages. General discussions are bolstered
with specific examples from the City of Tampa.
The thesis then presents the first in a series of organizational typologies, describing the physical
and functional presence of under-development. In general, under-developed properties in our late-
20th century cities can be divided into (at least) four major categories: a) left-over space; b)
obsolete commercial strips; c) abandoned institutions; d) bypassed neighborhoods. These
categories are presented, first as a general condition, then with specific illustrations from Tampa.
The thesis asks why these sites and properties are under-developed. What historical factors led to
the deterioration of the original uses to create the currently vacant or under-developed conditions?
Issues to be discussed include: the loss of the original economic justification for development and
the lack of a replacement; poorly applied or ossified zoning regulations; the practice of land-
banking for future speculation; environmental factors; real and perceived safety factors; and the
general cyclical nature of urbanization. Again, where applicable, issues are highlighted by
examples from Tampa.
Next, the thesis looks at the current factors that inhibit re-development. Issues examined within
this framework include the nature of the development process, financial incentives and
disincentives, micro- and macro-economic factors of supply and demand, physical issues,
ownership issues, and myriad regulatory issues.
Given this overview of the factors affecting the conditions of under-development, the thesis then
examines a range of approaches to rectifying such conditions. Touching very briefly on the history
of previous organized efforts at revitalization, the thesis takes the position that future re-
development efforts will, of necessity, have to be true working partnerships between public and
private sectors. While refraining from a whole-hearted adoption of Porter's position that inner-city
development can be made to work almost entirely from within the private sector, the thesis full
acknowledges the increasingly limited tools available to the public sector. These limitations,
coupled with the public sector's rather checkered record in past redevelopment efforts, leads to the
aforementioned conclusion: future efforts must incorporate, as efficiently and effectively as
possible, the respective strengths and assets of both sectors.
To a degree, the closer contemporary re-development efforts can be made to fall within the general
parameters of private-market, for-profit, real estate development, the more likely their chances of
initiation. To the extent that, in the future, the public sector can refrain from attempting,
ineffectively, to imitate the private sector, and look instead to work within its capacities to set the
stage for private sector developers to carry out redevelopment efforts, the opportunities for success
increase dramatically. On the other hand, one must acknowledge the ultimate difference between
public and private sector agendas. Public sector responsibilities extend beyond mere economic
viability and private sector profits; to what degree can public sector social and economic goals be
met within a framework that promotes private-sector re-development?
The sixth section of the thesis highlights, compares, and contrasts four examples of redevelopment
drawn from the City of Tampa, and uses these cases to examine the viability of some of the
previously reviewed alternatives.
Finally, the thesis closes with some concluding comments on the nature of in-town redevelopment -
the operational factors, the opportunities, the stumbling blocks-within our fast-growing Sunbelt
metro areas.
Chapter I: Sunbelt Development
Florida: Archetypal Sunbelt Environment
For whatever reason, five and one-half Americans migrated from the
Northeast and Midwest to the sunbelt regions during the 1970s. The Florida Story
is especially dramatic. In the late 1980s, more than one thousand people move (sic)
to the state of Florida every day of the year. With about twelve million people in
1987 and growing more than twice as fast as the national population, Florida is
already 85 percent urban and continues to urbanize more rapidly than any other
large state. Five of the nation's ten fastest-growing metropolitan areas are now
located in Florida. Demographers have projected Florida's population at over
twenty-two million by the time the post-war baby-boomers reach retirement age in
the early twenty-first century. Florida has become the quintessential urban state of
the post-industrial age.'
The thesis begins with the premise that patterns of growth and development found in the post-War
"Sunbelt" cities are dramatically different from those typifying the older, pre-War Northeastern
and Midwestern cities, and advances the proposition that the factors affecting re-development in
these newer cities might also be different than those found in older cities.
Within the Sunbelt, three or four states predominate: southern California, Texas and Florida, with
recent focus on Arizona. Since 1970, the State of Florida has grown from a population of
approximately 6,000,000 to a current population of 14,000,000; it is the fourth most populous
state in the country and is expected to vault into third by the end of the century.
However, unlike many other fast-growth states, Florida has very stringent development regulations
on record. The 1985 Growth Management legislation2 has been viewed throughout the country as
I Mohl, Raymond A. "Transformation of Urban America," in Essays on Sunbelt Cities and Recent Urban
America, Fairbanks, Robert B. and Kathleen Underwood, editors. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M
University Press, 1990), page 20.
It should be noted that Mohl wrote this paragraph in 1989. In the intervening years, the
population growth of Florida has slowed somewhat, and communities like Las Vegas NV and the
Research Triangle area of North Carolina have become the hot-spots for sunbelt urbanization.
Nonetheless, Florida continues to increase in population at over 2% per year, a rate that will put its total
population well past 20 million by the year 2020.
2 The Growth Management Act passed by the Florida legislature in 1985 mandated that all city and
county governments formulate new comprehensive plans that were designed to regulate growth. The act,
as well as the regulations issued by the state's Department of Community Affairs (DCA), included
guidelines on the elements that were to be included in the plan. They also enumerated some specific goals
regarding the type of growth that was to be fostered by the plan. One of the noteworthy goals was to
a model growth ordinance, and it has been copied, in part, by other states, including Vermont, New
Jersey, and Georgia, in fashioning their own growth policies. As early as the 1970s, Florida moved
to enact some level of growth regulations. Even at this date, business leaders, politicians and
residents recognized the fragility of the state's environment and ecology. While the state has
always relied very heavily on tourism and immigration for revenues, it was acknowledged that a
lack of regulation could easily destroy the benefits that made the state a desirable venue to visit or
to live. The goal, therefore, has always been to figure out how to tiptoe a tight path between
under-regulation with the attendant over-development and environmental damage that would occur,
and over-regulation with its presumed resulting decrease in development that would depress the
state's economy.
Additional factors were also considered; the very growth and development that was making Florida
a booming place to live was negatively affecting the state's desirability as a tourist destination.
Surveys conducted in the early 1990s indicated that Florida's allure to tourists, particularly for
visitors from within the USA, was diminishing, especially as alternative venues in states like
Georgia, North and South Carolina, Alabama, New Mexico, Arizona and Nevada emerged. The
generally low quality of suburban development found throughout the state combined with
increasing transportation problems, a weak economy, and negative publicity due to concerns about
crime and safety have noticeably diminished tourism in many parts of the state.
As a state, Florida is clearly entering a very important period in its maturation. The amenities that
it once proffered as a come-on to both tourists and potential residents are less evident: crime,
pollution, traffic congestion and environmental degradation are widespread. 3 While the state is still
very low on per-capita taxation [45 out of 51], resident taxes are kept low at the expense of
extremely high tourist taxes and development fees, and municipality after municipality has begun
to face increasing fiscal pressures, particularly for infrastructure development. 4
discourage sprawl, the growth pattern that typified Hillsborough County's development during the
previous three decades. Another was the "concurrency provision" mandating that all development was to
proceed concurrent with the provision of public facilities, thereby protecting communities from suffering
the problems that Hillsborough County faced with its overloaded wastewater facilities. Kerstein, Robert.
"Suburban Growth Politics in Hillsborough County," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 3, September
1993, page 623.
3 Tampa Tribune report, Friday 12 July 1996.
4 Recent studies indicate that Florida's attempts to maintain its position as a low-tax environment may
be having deleterious effects on its business strength. As reported in the Tampa Tribune (12 July 1996):
The environmental ramifications of thirty years of intense development are widespread ranging
from the ongoing depletion of the Everglades to salt-water creep, endangered animal species and
increasing concern with stormwater pollution. Additional concerns have emerged in the aftermath
of Hurricane Andrew which, in a twenty-four hour period in August of 1992, wreaked over $20
billion of havoc across Southeast Florida. Dozens of smaller insurance companies were put out of
business by these losses, and today, in an emergency stop-gap measure, the State itself, is the
second-largest home property underwriter in Florida, with over 900,000 clients.5 Should a second,
Andrew-type hurricane strike, many experts fear that it will bankrupt the State government.
By no means, however, is there consensus on the direction and path the state should take in the
upcoming years. While concurrency requirements ostensibly help guarantee that future
developments will provide the necessary infrastructure, there are still many large-scale projects that
have been grandfathered into the original 1986 legislation. Two serious theoretical debates have
been taking place throughout the state over the past twenty years: how much growth should occur,
and, in what form. Even as Florida achieved the ranking of the fastest growing State during the
decade of the 1980s, this status was far from uniformly well received.
In some jurisdictions, the sides have been sharply divided: pro-growth factions versus those in
favor of no-growth at all. In Sarasota County, as recently as 1991, this debate went to a public
referendum, with one side looking to curtail any and all development activity for a period of two
years, during which time the community would work to come up with a universally agreed-upon
strategy for specific future growth. While the proposal lost by almost a three-to-one margin, it
galvanized the community and was widely regarded as a warning of events to come.
Florida's economy is among the nation's leaders in creating new jobs, but is at the
bottom in wage growth and employer-paid health insurance coverage.
It received an F and two D's from an economic issues think tank for its bleak
economic performance, lack of business vitality and failure to encourage competitive
strengths through investment in schools and roads.
The state has, since last year, gotten worse in nearly every way in the rankings
released Thursday by the Corporation for Economic Development.
The rankings show that Florida's jobs are among the lowest in wage growth
(43r) and health benefits (45th), its businesses can't compete on the national stage (49h),
its has abysmally low high school graduation rates (47th) and a tax structure that favors
the rich over the poor.
5 Scism, Leslie & Martha Brannigan. "Florida Homeowners Find Insurance Pricey, If They Find It at
All," Wall Street Journal, 12 July 1996, page Al, A6.
In addition to being in the vanguard as to the "growth/no growth" debate, Florida also serves as a
case study of the on-going debate as to how exactly growth should "best" occur. The "compact
versus sprawl" debate may have originated in California, but it is clearly the predominant
theoretical development discussion in Florida at this time. As the title implies, a decision in
preference of one position over the other has enormous implications for efforts at urban
redevelopment. The converse is also true; the success or failure of ongoing efforts at revitalizing
once-developed in-town locations into productive uses will impact the overarching debate as to the
best way to focus development throughout the state.
Today, Florida, along with California, is at the vanguard in addressing issues that impact all of the
Sunbelt communities and states. The importance of these issues is heightened in Florida by the
sheer size and extent of the development surge, the fragility of the state's environment and ecology,
the tenuous nature of the state's economy, and the cultural and political weight that have shifted to
the state over the past twenty years. Other states and jurisdictions around the country are watching
Florida to see how it responds to these pressures; the success or failure of efforts at compact
development hinge to some degree on the ability to redevelop previously developed areas in a
financially viable way.
The Rise of the Suburbanized City
While the term "Sunbelt" implies a division created along strictly climatic lines, loosely applied,
this term covers any of the fast-growth metro areas in the United States. In general, these cities are
in the Southeast and Southwest. Several boom communities, however, are not. These include
Denver, Sacramento, Seattle and Portland. Outside of the geographic dichotomies, these cities all
fit within the general criteria that define the post-War Sunbelt metropolis.
Within the "Sunbelt" category, the "city" proper generally describes only a small percentage of the
larger metropolitan area. In some instances, the cities have grown rather starkly in the past thirty
or forty years, typically through annexation and physical growth rather than increases in
population density. Only rarely are the boundaries of the economic catchment area -the
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA)-congruous with political boundaries.
Generally, the region that defines a single economic unit comprises dozens of separate
municipalities as well as vast amounts of unincorporated area.6
In rather stark contrast to their 19 century antecedents, these new "cities" often have several
dominant focal points or "centers." This thesis, therefore, takes as a given, the polynucleated
model of the metropolitan region, as contrasted with the monocentric model that historically
typified most older cities. Several fundamental differences distinguish post-War cities from their
predecessors. These distinctions render many of the approaches to redevelopment that were taken
in cities such as Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore less relevant to cities such as Atlanta,
Orlando, Tampa and Phoenix. Nearly all of these older cities originated around a dominant center
--typically the "downtown"- and such centers still hold enormous significance today. Often, the
dominance of the center was enhanced by "hub-and-spoke" mass transit systems. Post-War cities,
by contrast, also have older centers, but these are generally just one of several focal points within a
more dispersed metro region. In his 1990 text, Joel Garreau identified these non-downtown centers
"Edge Cities," a name that has since entered the common parlance of planning and development.7
In keeping with their polynucleated structure, newer cities tend to be organized around automobile
mobility as opposed to pedestrian or mass-transit based movement systems. This creates cities
with lower overall densities and greater dispersion. The "critical mass" that defines many
neighborhoods and downtowns in older cities is often missing in these newer environments. In
addition, designing for characteristics of the car, both in motion and as stationary objects, have
become critical urban design and development criteria for these newer cities.
The street as the conveyor of vehicular traffic is the central focus of the
Sunbelt city. It defines neighborhoods and unifies the city. J. B. Jackson, the first
editor of Center, stated: "The street ... has taken the place of architecture as the
basic visual element, the infrastructure of the city." Sunbelt cities, he asserts, must
be explored by car. "They stretch for miles and miles -street after street of one-
story, single-family houses." The typical Sunbelt city takes Manhattan's two mile
by thirteen mile grid and extends it over ten times the area.8
6 Recently, an increasing number of authors have pointed out some of the inherent inefficiencies of such
a setup. One of the most lucid, comprehensive and well-stated outline of such a position can be found in
David Rusk's book Cities Without Suburbs (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993).
In this thin, readable text, Rusk argues that today's "city" includes the entire metropolitan area, and that
artificial political boundaries simply foster racial, economic and ethnic divisions that are bad not only for
the host municipality, but for the region as a whole.
7 Garreau, Joel. Edge Cities. NY: Harper & Row, 1990.
8 Fink, Marc. "Toward a Sunbelt Urban Design Manifesto," Journal of the American Planning
Association, Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer 1959, page 322.
1950 1990
% 1950 1990 % density density %
City 1950 1990 change (sq. mi.) (sq. mi.) change (per sq. mi.) (per sq. mi.) change
Sunbelt cities
Las Vegas 25,000 258,000 932 14 83 495 1,786 3,100 74
Phoenix 107,000 983,000 819 17 420 2,356 6,290 2,340 -63
Tucson 45,000 405,000 800 10 156 1,528 4,688 2,590 -45
Albuquerque 97,000 385,000 297 48 132 176 2,020 2,910 44
El Paso 130,000 515,000 296 26 245 859 5,078 2,100 -59
Austin 132,000 466,000 253 32 218- 579 4,130 2,140 -48
San Diego 334,000 1,111,000 233 99 324 226 3,370 3,430 2
Orlando 52,000 165,000 217 14 67 375 3,710 2,460 -34
Raleigh 66,000 208,000 215 11 88 701 6,000 2,360 -61
Charlotte 134,000 396,000 196 30 174 481 4,470 2,270 -49
Houston 596,000 1,631,000 174 160 540 237 3,730 3,020 -19
Dallas 434,000 1,007,000 132 112 342 206 3,880 2,940 -24
San Antonio 408,000 936,000 129 70 333 379 5,830 2,810 -52
Tampa 125,000 280,000 124 19 109 472 6,580 2,580 -61
Los Angeles 1,970,000 3,485,000 77 451 469 4 4,370 7,430 70
Miami 249,000 359,000 44 34 36 4 7,320 10,080 38
Atlanta 331,000 394,000 19 37 132 257 8,970 2,990 -67
Fringe citiesa
Denver 416,000 468,000 13 67 153 129 6,210 3,050 -51
Seattle 468,000 516,000 10 71 84 19 6,590 6,150 -7
Cities not in Sunbelt
Milwaukee 637,000 628,000 -1 50 96 92 12,740 6.540 -49
San Francisco 775,000 724,000 -7 45 47 5 17,220 15,470 -10
New York 7,892,000 7,323,000 -7 315 309 -2 25,050 23,700 -5
Baltimore 950,000 736,000 -23 79 81 3 12,030 9,100 -24
Chicago 3,621,000 2,784,000 -23 208 227 9 17,410 12,250 -30
Philadelphia 2,071,000 1,586,000 -23 127 135 6 16,310 11,740 -28
Washington, DC 812,000 607,000 -25 61 61 0 13,220 9,890 -25
Boston 801,000 574,000 -28 48 48 1 16,690 11,860 -29
Detroit 1,850,000 1,028,000 -44 140 143 2 13,250 7,190 -46
Cleveland 915,000 506,000 -45 . 75 77 3 12,200 6,570 -46
Pittsburgh 677,000 370,000 -45 54 56 3 12,540 6,660 -47
St. Louis 857,000 397,000 -54 61 62 1 14,050 6,410 -54
a. Abbott (1981) includes these cities in the Sunbelt, while Bernard and Rice (1983) do not.
Source: U.S. Census 1950; 1971; 1991.
Figure 2: Population and Land Area Growth for Selected Cities
(Source: Fink: "Toward a Sunbelt Urban Design Manifesto.")
In their rapid expansion in the past several decades, these Sunbelt communities have grown in both
size and population, but have generally declined in density. This implies both increasing suburban-
type development and the increasingly marginalized role of non-suburban prototypes. In short, the
rapid growth of these newer metro areas was often accompanied by the neglect and eventual
decline of the traditional pre-War urban cores.
Different communities, however, have approached growth from different standpoints. The
different approaches stem as much from different philosophical and political attitudes towards
growth as from site-specific geographic and environmental factors, or from specific factors related
to the timing of the growth. While no community has turned its back on economic growth and
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development, cities have responded to such growth and development on markedly different terms.
To some extent, a city's general position towards growth and economic development will have a
positive or negative impact on both public and private efforts for redevelopment of real property.
Four cities can be used to generically highlight some of the differences in the approaches to growth.
Three of the four -Orlando, Tampa, and St. Petersburg-are located in Florida. The fourth -
Portland, OR-represents a unique approach, but one that may become more prevalent as federal
and state support for highway and suburban infrastructure development diminishes further.
St. Petersburg FL, a city of 245,900 (1994) people, occupies much of the southern part of Pinellas
County on Florida's Gulf Coast. Located due west of Hillsborough County, across Old Tampa
Bay from the City of Tampa, Pinellas is the most densely populated county in the state of Florida.
The 1994 population of 870,722 occupies a land area of 280 square miles, for a gross population
density of 3,110 persons per square mile. Similarly, St. Petersburg's population occupies just over
58 square miles, for an gross population density of 4,240 persons per square mile. (In Florida,
only Miami, with its strong Latin American influence, has a higher population density.)
St. Petersburg's form, organization and density derive from its history as a 1920s retirement and
winter-time community, and from its geography. The city's location at the tip of a peninsula has
effectively turned it into a development "island." It cannot expand to the east, south or west, and to
the north it is bounded by smaller municipalities. 9 Growth, if it is to occur in St. Petersburg, will
be internal. On the other hand, while the city is land-locked, development is not precluded within
the county, nor is it limited only to the county limits. Most of the recent growth in Pinellas has
been occurring in the northern reaches of the county; the city's population has actually decreased
slightly since 1970. Considerable development, however, all of it suburban in nature, is occurring
in Pasco County, immediately north of the Pinellas County limits.
Like St. Petersburg, Portland OR, with a population of approximately 440,000, is also effectively
a development "island," except that the island is a convenient fiction, with boundaries that are self-
imposed, flexible, and regionally agreed-upon. Oregon was one of the first states to adopt the
"urban growth boundary" as a planning device, requiring in 1973 that all of the state's major cities
create an effective limit within which all future growth must be accommodated. As the largest city
in the state, Portland became the focus in the implementation of this concept; unexpectedly large
growth during the 1980s, including a large number of Californians disenchanted with that state's
rapid development, revealed the full character and utility of the concept.
Given fixed external boundaries and a purposeful focus on mass-transit in lieu of auto-transit,
Portland established numerous incentive and opportunities for in-town redevelopment. In the
1960s, for example, the city rejected Federal funds to build a waterfront highway through its
downtown, and instead used grant funds to remove an existing waterfront artery and replaced it
with a park and a (now successful) mixed-use development, Riverplace. In the 1970s, the City
placed a cap on downtown parking, essentially freezing the number of parking spaces available
within the city core, while at the same time heartily endorsing further commercial development
there. At the same time, the City provided incentives for developers and non-profit groups looking
to create residential options within the core and in the immediately adjacent neighborhoods.
If St. Petersburg represents the case of a city that will, of necessity, have to turn inward to find
future growth opportunities, and Portland represents the case of a city that voluntarily organized
its planning and growth policies to optimize the exploitation of these opportunities, Tampa FL
represents a city in which in-town growth will only occur within the context of a competitive
market. If Tampa's under-developed in-town neighborhoods are to be revitalized, they must be
able to provide the amenities and facilities that the market demands, in direct competition with
developers at the fringes of the metro area.
With a population of 285,000 people, Tampa is the dominant center of both Hillsborough County
(population 900,000) and the entire Tampa Bay SMSA, a metro area that includes St. Petersburg
and comprises nearly 2 million people. As a city, however, Tampa's population growth has been
stagnant since the late 1960s.10 Recent population growth has occurred only through the practice
9 With few options for annexation, St. Petersburg represents what David Rusk refers to as an "inelastic"
municipality.
10 Kerstein, Robert. "Growth Politics in Tampa and Hillsborough County," Journal of Urban Affairs,
Vol. 13, No. 1, pages 57-58.
Tampa included 124,683 citizens in 1950 and jumped to 274,970 in 1960, primarily due
to a major annexation in 1953. Its population then rose slowly to 277,735 in 1970 and
of annexing large master-planned suburban communities that were originally constructed in the
unincorporated county and have come to rely on the City for provision of services. Thus, while
population as a whole has been gradually creeping upwards, so too has the overall size of the city;
population density, in fact, has been steadily diminishing."1
While both the current and previous administration have been whole-hearted advocates of in-town
redevelopment, substantial redevelopment efforts have focused primarily on the relatively compact
Central Business District. In fact, historically private sector developers attempting to renovate
older properties or revitalize areas of the city have complained about the lack of public sector
support for their efforts. Their complaint was that taxes, high rates, building impact fees and
permit fees, all worked against in-town redevelopment; builders in the unincorporated county, they
argued, had a much easier time of it.
Orlando FL, population 189,000, represents a cross between Tampa and Portland. Like Tampa in
the 1980s, the Orlando metro area is experiencing very rapid growth and development, much of it
occurring in unincorporated Orange and Osceola counties. 12 Unlike Tampa, however, Orlando has
a strong downtown plan that is the result of over a decade of concerted planning and development
efforts. The traditional central business district is still regarded by many as the dominant center
for the region, and this sense of centrality is bolstered by organized procedures for restoring and
rejuvenating the in-town neighborhoods immediately abutting the downtown core.
actually dropped to 271,523 by 1980. It increased to about 277,000 by 1987, partially
due to development that occurred in an area annexed in 1984.
The growth rate in the suburban areas outpaced that in Tampa and the suburbs
contained more population than the central city by 1970. Due to the 1953 annexation,
Tampa's population grew from about one-half of the entire county in 1950 to 69% of the
county's population in 1960. However, while the city's population increased minimally
during the 1960s, the entire county grew to 490,265. The county's population increased
rapidly to 646,960 during the next decade as the city actually lost people. Therefore,
58% of the county population lived in suburban areas by 1980. The suburban growth
continued during most of the 1980s. By 1987, 65% of the county population lived in the
suburbs.
11 In contrast to St. Petersburg's density figures, Tampa's 1995 population of 285,000 occupied over 110
square miles for an average residential density of approximately 2,600 people per square mile. And, as
the newer, generally low-density but well-to-do subdivisions sprout to the north and east of the current city
limits, the City fully intends to annex them, thereby further increasing its land area and decreasing is
average density.
12 In 1990, the population of the Orlando MSA was 1 million.
Figure 3: Map of Florida Showing Location of Tampa, St. Petersburg and Orlando
The Orlando area, however, is decidedly polynucleated; additional "centers" include the Walt
Disney complex in nearby Osceola County, Park Avenue at the heart of the upscale suburb of
Winter Park, adjacent to Orlando, and the sprawling "edge city" developing around the University
of Central Florida. Like Portland, however, Orlando and Orange county have been applying the
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concept of an "Urban Service Area" 13 for many years. Unlike Portland, Orange County does not
use the Urban Service Area as a way of dictating development density or recommended
development patterns. Rather the Urban Service Area is a fiscal device designed to maintain an
appropriate level of concurrency between development tax revenues and new infrastructure
development. Orange County has no thought to curtailing growth; they simply want to be able to
pay for it as it comes. As one official in Orange County expresses it, "Our goal is that ultimately
the boundaries of the Urban Service Area will match the boundaries of the county."
Portland has attempted to align the instincts and interests of both urban and suburban developers
within the framework of a commonly accepted and administered regional vision. (In fact,
Portland's regional plan is one of only a handful that is, in fact, overseen by a truly regional
governing agency.) 14  St. Petersburg and the surrounding jurisdictions that comprise Pinellas
county are all suffering from the same dearth of available undeveloped space. Slowly, albeit
tentatively, these various organizations and jurisdictions have begun to work together to begin to
maximize opportunities for internal re-development.
For example, the City of St. Petersburg has been working on an on-going series of redevelopment
plans, both for its central business district as well as for many of its oldest in-town neighborhoods.
In contrast to Tampa, however, and Orlando where growth is slightly demand driven, there has
been very little demand for development within St. Petersburg. One of the recognized drawbacks
to in-town redevelopment in and around the downtown is an overabundance of viable property.
These is too much supply and not enough demand. Tampa and unincorporated Hillsborough
County, however, tend to approach growth, particularly economic development, as a zero-sum
13 An Urban Service Area is "an area in which urban services will be provided and outside of which such
services will not be extended." An Urban Growth Boundary, on the other hand, is "the line on a map that
is used to mark the separation of urbanizable land from rural land and within which urban growth should
be contained for a period of time specified by a growth management program."
Easley, Gail. Staying Within the Lines. Chicago, IL: American Planning Association, 1992.
14 In 1979, metropolitan Portland, with urban development extending through some 26 incorporated
cities in three counties, formed an elected regional government called the Metropolitan Services District
(METRO). An urban growth boundary was delineated in 1980 by METRO, and it has been expanded
only slightly since. Today, METRO administers growth and development within this boundary, and in
conjunction with the other governments, is accountable for a regularly updated comprehensive growth and
development plan. By implementing this over-arching elected government body at the outset of the
growth management process, Portland thereby avoided one of the dominant problems in cross-
jurisdictional development planning; how to keep local governments from competing with each other for
growth and development.
game; what benefits one jurisdiction is regarded as a loss by the other, and vice versa. Given that
Hillsborough County, at slightly more than 1,000 square miles, is larger than the state of Rhode
Island, the overwhelming percentage of recent growth has been in the unincorporated county as
opposed to the city.
Figure 4: Plan of Central Tampa Showing CBD and In-Town Neighborhoods
Several arguments are presented as a means of rationalizing this pattern of development. Even
though the county has a great deal of extremely productive agricultural land, it also has a surfeit of
prime development property. In particular, the completion in 1987 of the Interstate 75 bypass
running about ten miles east of the Tampa city limits opened up enormous tracts of land for
potential development. (While most of the land along this corridor remains undeveloped, the
development rights for much of this land were secured as early as the late 1970s. Thus, enormous
amounts of potential development were grandfathered in before the State's far-reaching and
rigorous growth management legislation was officially ratified in 1986. A 1991 study conducted at
the School of Architecture and Community Design at the University of South Florida, concluded
that within only the northern half of Hillsborough County, over 1 billion square feet of potential
development had already been permitted. By way of contrast, consider that there is only about 350
million square feet of commercial office space in all of Manhattan. Clearly, the potential supply
grotesquely over-exceeds the potential demand, a factor that helps keep the costs of development
generally low, particularly in the eastern reaches of the county.)
The ease, rapidity and relatively low price at which new development can occur within the
unincorporated county effectively dampens demand for development within the City limits. Thus,
even as sectors within the City have seen modest growth over the past few years, these gains pale
in comparison with development within the County. Clearly, therefore, the degree to which it is
easier or more difficult for inner-city neighborhoods and properties to redevelop depends on
external factors such as the nature of the city core and the relative ease of development at the urban
fringes. With low levels of center city concentration and relatively unchallenged fringe
development, proponents of revitalizing in-town neighborhoods will be facing stiff competition.
Similarly, to the degree that a community presents its older neighborhoods as viable alternatives to
newer, suburban developments, the redevelopment of these neighborhoods will be facilitated.
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Figure 5: Advertisement for Suburban Master Planned Community North of Tampa
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Chapter U Patterns of Development and Re-Development in Post-War Cities
These sunbelt cities never experienced the nineteenth-century industrial
revolution. They are twentieth-century automobile cities, less densely settled and
more widely spread over the urban and suburban landscape. Aided by mid-
twentieth century highway building and almost universal automobile ownership,
sunbelt city populations pushed out the urban and suburban periphery to an extent
unimagined in the industrial era. 15
Cities that rose to predominance in the period after the Second World War differ from older, pre-
Twentieth Century cities in many ways. The patterns and forms of development in these,
predominantly Sunbelt communities, reflect the dominant suburban paradigms of the post-War
period. Sprawling, low-density, functionally segregated, auto-dependent, these cities are the fast-
growth urban environments in America today.
Observers of these new metropolitan areas, however, tend to be less than sanguine about future
prospects. The specter of Los Angeles is held out as the fate of communities such as Houston,
Dallas, Phoenix and Miami; choked on traffic and low-density growth, without room to expand
outward or the mechanisms for redeveloping inwards. Economically and functionally segregated,
these cities no longer carry the economic mandate of pre-War industrial and financial capitals.
People, today, flee Los Angeles and Houston, not for other cities of comparable size, but for small
towns in Colorado and Montana, from where they "commute" via modem and fax machine.
The very growth that powered the emergence of these cities as national, if not international,
players, has threatened the ways of life that initially made these cities desirable and, ironically, has
created the same conditions that initially induced people to leave the older, pre-War cities and head
to the Sunbelt. Today, growth is forcing both advocates and opponents of growth to reconsider
their options.
One option that is often proffered as a way around the current dilemmas is the focused re-
development of the generally under-developed older areas of these Sunbelt cities. Efforts at
attaining such ends, however, have met with relatively uneven levels of success, and while the
potentials these areas seem to present continues to grow as ever more people abandon the
15 Mohl, op cit, page 17.
traditional core, solutions at re-capturing this human and economic capital are few and far
between.
These failures are not surprising; the occur, in part, because the paradigms for urban re-
development (many of which have not been very successful) stem almost totally from 19th-century
pre-automobile environments: Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, San Francisco. The rules and
methods that may or may not have been appropriate to such "traditional" urban environments are,
for the most part, not workable in the newer, more suburban, post-War cities. They stem, in part,
from an unwillingness to throw away outdated planning and development paradigms that focused
on the primacy of central place, the dramatic separation of uses, and a belief in the automobile as
the optimal form of mobility. At the same time, planners can be justifiably accused to utopian
idealism and physical determinism in their general assumptions that the main thing hindering in-
town redevelopment was the lack of a good plan.
Finally, these failures point up a central fact about post-War development in the United States.
The conditions of development in this country are strongly influenced by macro- and micro-
economic factors that transcend the capacities of individuals, or sometimes even of municipalities,
to control, or even manipulate. As various economic analyses 16 of growth indicate, when every
player acts only in his or her best interests, the overall situation is never optimized. In a typical
development scenario, without collective control or oversight, ultimately densities end up higher
than optimal and prices end up lower. Under the aegis of a single developer or an enlightened
collective, these conditions can be reversed. Each individual prospers and the collective is better
off also.
Translated to the realm of urban planning and growth management, this suggests that one cannot
address the issue of in-town redevelopment without also looking at the all of the development
alternatives within the general catchment area. If a homeowner can buy a bigger house on a larger
lot in a new part of town for less money than he or she can buy in an old part of town, ideology
becomes the dominant factor suggesting that the redevelopment efforts will succeed.
16 For an excellent discussion of public goods, externalities and their relationship to development, see
Chapter 14 in DiPasquale and Wheaton, Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets. NY: Prentice Hall,
1996.
To a degree, economic theories involving public goods, externalities and their relationship to
development operate under assumptions that do not actually describe reality. All homeowners are
not identical; all housing units are not identical; we don't all address the same questions. The
underlying point, however, made by the economists' approach, however, remains. Without
collective oversight, Pareto optimization will never occur. The issue, therefore, becomes a
discussion of the conditions in which collective oversight can be optimized. Clearly, when a single
developer purchases a thousand acres of virgin pasture and sets about developing a master planned
community, the developer (and the lenders) controls nearly every factor of development. He or she
can lay out roads, put in communal landscaping and amenities, indicate which lands will be built
on and which will be left as permanent open space. Within the boundaries of the development, the
developer rules.
In situations in which there are myriad development interests, however, such simple questions as
What land is used for open space and what land is developed? become far more difficult to resolve.
While smaller issues such as the style, size and color of a house, the use of one's property, and the
location of one's vehicles, can be collectively mandated through zoning, building regulations and
deed restrictions, within a "free" market, each land-owner is going to seek to optimized his or her
individual gain, whether or not it helps one's neighbors.
Such is the typical economic and political arena within which many redevelopment efforts take
place. Not only are there various private sector factions each looking to optimize individual
holdings, there are generally public sector entities working to promote development, but often
without the same economic parameters as the private sector. In some situations, there are older,
established residents who represent an existing, albeit deteriorated, neighborhood, who stand in
direct contrast to newer, more affluent residents who are looking to "upgrade" the setting. All of
these disparate factions are at work in a situation in which the playing is not only not level, it is
note even completely playable.
In states such as Florida, the cost-effective redevelopment of once-developed areas takes on
additional importance in the face of rigorous growth management requirements. Fringe and
exurban development is increasingly burdened with the demands that growth pay for itself. A state
without a personal income tax, Florida uses extremely high impact fees to help pay for the
infrastructure necessitated by growth. These fees alone, however, seldom come close to covering
the costs of growth; combined with generally weak levels of previous infrastructure development
they perpetuate the "sprawl" environments that are increasingly coming under fire from various
parties. At the same time, there is often an oversupply of infrastructure capacity in the under-
developed core areas. 17
Arguments For and Against In-town Redevelopment
At this time, certain points seem unavoidable. As we near the end of the century, there is no
unified theory of how a city should develop, and a primary source of funding for revitalization
efforts -the Federal Government-is no longer a dominant factor. One theory avers that
governments should focus their efforts on the traditional downtown of a city, arguing that such
development is good for the city's overall image and that it creates much-needed jobs. This
economic development rationale, however, has tested in studies of numerous cities and has been
shown not to hold true. Downtown redevelopment does create some jobs and does bring additional
revenues to a region, but the jobs are often filled by newcomers who are in the upper income
brackets. Many of these newcomers choose to live in new, outlying suburban developments and
commute to their downtown destinations. Thus, they are not adding to the municipal coffers and
they are creating additional congestion and pollution.
A variant on this theory has achieved considerable coverage in recent times under the name of the
New Urbanism or Neo-Traditional Design. A melding of turn-of-the-century "City Beautiful"
planning principals, 1970s environmentalism, and nostalgia, this new "movement" has been
spearheaded by architects and landscape architects, particularly the Florida firm of Duany/Plater-
Zyberk, and the California firm of Calthorpe Associates. Arguing for a radical shift from
17 A 1993 article in the St. Petersburg Times (18 July 1993) highlighted the costs of services:
* Roads: It costs Hillsborough County $3.6 million per mile to build a new two-lane road, $7.6 million
for four lanes. It costs the county $5.5 million per mile to widen a two-lane road into four lanes.
* Water and Sewer: A 12-inch water main costs $56.87 per foot and a 6-inch sewer costs $28.44 per
foot. These are the kinds commonly used to hook up homes to the county's systems.
* Fire: County fire officials estimate it costs $887,000 to build a new two-bay fire house and $500,000
annually to keep it open.
* Parks: It costs $1.5 million to develop a new district park and $525,000 annually to operate it.
* Library: A neighborhood library costs about $2.5 million, add another $1 million to put books on
the shelves. That's not counting the $649,600 annually it takes to operate the facility.
conventional development practices, the New Urbanists advocate "urban villages," Transit
Oriented Designs (TODs), and Traditional Neighborhood Developments (TNDs). All of these
forms of development break with conventional practice in downplaying the role of the car,
emphasizing the role of pedestrians and bicyclists, and looking to reverse standard zoning practices
in creating integrated, mixed-use developments.
A competing theory of urban development is referred to as the laissez-faire or market economy
theory. Proponents argue that the rapid build-up of fringe development in Sunbelt metro areas and
the gradual deterioration of CBDs and in-town neighborhoods simply reflect the free-market at
work. Sprawl, 18 as this general approach to suburbanization is known, is efficient, given the
various factors involved at present. As described by Ewing:
On the other side of the issue is a small but influential group of skeptics. Most
hail from the field of economics and seem to delight in challenging the
conventional wisdom of planners. Arguing in Stuck in Traffic that land planning
isn't worth the effort, Anthony Downs is the dean of this group . . . But no one
matches the debunking zeal of the faculty at the School of Urban and Regional
Planning, University of Southern California. For years now, Harry Richardson
and Peter Gordon have argued against compact development and land use
regulation.19
As justification for their vociferous arguments against most forms of planning and development
regulation, Gordon, Richardson and others in their movement point to the naivet6 of the planning
profession and a certain lack of sociocultural understanding. Points of reference for the advocates
of sprawl include the following observations:
* Americans will not live at high densities (without massive government
interference in land markets).
" Americans will not use alternative modes (of transportation) (without a
dramatic increase in the cost of automobile use).
18 Many authors have attempted to definitively describe the conditions commonly referred to as "urban
sprawl." In general, these discussions focus on several common features that describe this pattern of
development: (1) large areas of continuous mono-functional development, such as sub-divisions that
include thousands of residential units but no commercial or retail uses; (2) large amounts of "ribbon"
commercial strip development, as typically defines the arterial roadways in most post-War cities; (3)
discontinuous development in which new projects "leapfrog" over undeveloped areas to create outlying
pockets of development; (4) large areas of essentially unplanned and uncoordinated land-uses.
19 Ewing, Reid. "Beyond Density, Mode Choice, and Single-Purpose Trips." Paper presented at the
Annual Growth Management Short Course, Orlando FL, April 1995, page 2.
* Americans will not live close to their places of work (given the many other
factors that are more important such as the cost of housing and the quality of
schools).20
In the face of such vaunting opposition, many opponents of sprawl avoid the economic rationale
entirely, and fall back on aesthetic or environmental arguments. Sprawl, they argue, is destroying
the visual character and ecological structure of our communities. Others acknowledge the
immediate, superficial logic of the economic argument, but counter with the claim that sprawl only
makes economic sense because so much of the cost of automobile transportation is subsidized by
the Federal government. Claiming that the "true" cost of a gallon of gas should be upwards of
$4.50,21 these theorists argue that a traditional focused, mixed-use, dense urban form still makes
more sense than sprawl from both an environmental and a economic rationale.
A third charge leveled against opponents of conventional sprawl development is they argue not
from facts but from normative stances. The common cant of proponents of neo-traditional forms
of development is that the average consumer doesn't really want to live in a gated suburban sub-
division, but would rather live in a mixed-use medium-density diverse "village." Quite clearly, if
this were the case, more than a nominal amount of the 1.5 million single-family homes built each
year would conform to this vision. In fact, repeat surveys of residents of Florida indicate that most
of the residents of new suburban master-planned communities do like their living environments. 22
20 Ewing, op cit, pages 2-3.
21 A study done in 1993 by Reid Ewing of the Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems at
Florida Atlantic University, using conditions and factors found within the State of Florida, concluded that
if all the external costs associated with automobile use were factored into the price of gasoline, prices at
the pumps would rise to between $4.50 and $4.80 per gallon. This is generally in keeping with the prices
that are charged in Europe, an environment in which sprawl is much less common, auto usage is lower,
mass transit much more prevalent, and city densities considerably higher than in the United States.
While articulate, heavily referenced, and convincing, the Florida Atlantic study offers no
suggestions as to how one could functionally raise the price of gasoline in this country. To a degree,
however, the cost of driving argument is a straw dog. Prototypes for personal automobiles already exist
that don't use gasoline at all, relying instead on solar energy for propulsion. While these prototypes are
typically more expensive than conventional cars, their prices would fall and their use rise rapidly should
the price of gasoline permanently escalate much above current levels. And, should these resource
efficient, essentially pollution-free personal vehicles capture the market, the entire argument over
economics and environment disappears.
22 Ivonne Audriac, Elizabeth Shermeyan and others at the University of Florida have done considerable
demographic survey work in examining the likes and preferences of Florida residents. The overwhelming
emphasis of this work seems to be that the majority of Floridians are not unhappy with their personal
living options, but are upset about issues of pollution, crime, taxes and other factors associated with
urbanization.
Reviews of the literature supporting and opposing the recently popularized theories of the New
Urbanists are inconclusive at best. For example, while it is a tenet of the theory that dense,
gridiron patterns of mixed-use development create an environment in which walking is increased
and auto usage is minimized, recent empirical research at the University of California at Berkeley
finds that the nuances of this argument belie reality. After studying a number of older communities
in and around the San Francisco Bay area, the researchers found that residents of "neo-traditional"
neighborhoods did, in fact, put less mileage on their cars. They did this, however, by taking a
higher number than normal of auto trips that were much shorter than normal. Given that the
maximum negative effect of car trips on air pollution occurs in the first few minutes after the car is
started, paradoxically, the impact of their auto use on air quality was worse than if they lived in a
sprawl environment and only took very few long-distance trips. In effect, the very argument of the
New Urbanists had been turned upside down.
In other instances, advocates of neo-traditional design will argue that their designs are safer than
conventional suburban alternatives. Again, empirical studies indicate that people are willing and
eager to pay considerable premiums for the convention trappings of security: gated entrances with
full-time personnel; roaming private security forces; absolute control over who enters and exist a
living environment.
Finally, empirical studies of mixed-use environments indicates that, as popular sentiment would
have it, living above, beside or near the store has deleterious impacts on property prices, with the
singular exception of very high-end developments. Even the magazine Architecture acknowledges
the dichotomy between what the theorists suggest and what surveys seem to indicate:
... issues of marketability may ultimately transcend them all. A survey
of 1,650 home-buyers and shoppers in California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan,
Texas and Washington state indicates that while buyers might enjoy an old-timey
atmosphere of small shops in retail areas, more than 80 percent want to be able to
park nearby.
The study, by American Lives, a San Francisco-based consumer research
firm, reveals that 80 percent of home-buyers also prefer cul-de-sacs and courts
over New Urbanist grids, because they believe children will be safer. More than
two-thirds prefer the privacy of big yards and houses set back from the street,
away from noise. 23
23 Landecker, Heidi. "New Urbanism Chartered," Architecture, July 1996, page 36-37.
Additional arguments in favor of redeveloping in-town neighborhoods focus on the environmental
benefits that would accrue. Here, the evidence is clearly equivocal. Proponents of dense, mixed-
use environments argue that every unit that is built on the site of a former development saves a new
unit being built on a virgin piece of land. Every additional bit of density that can be added to a
development, the more undeveloped land can be saved.
Opponents of this theory point out that the carrying capacity of different sites varies and that it is
just as bad to overshoot this capacity as to undershoot. Thus, if the mixed-use, medium-density
development overstrains the existing stormwater system, it could create more residual pollution for
the local aquifers and waterways than if many acres of virgin land were developed at fairly low
density levels. (The aforementioned argument about cars and air pollution is a similar case.)
In summary, therefore, an appeal to currently popular Neo-Traditional design theories as a way of
bolstering support for re-developing traditional in-town neighborhoods may not prove terribly
helpful. Nonetheless, many have argued for the redevelopment of under-utilized and vacant in-
town properties and sites, using all of the above rationales for support. In-town properties, by
definition, are older than suburban developments and far more likely to accord with the
"traditional" sense of urban neighborhood: rectilinear interconnected street pattern of similar but
not identical building types, often built at a density that exceeds contemporary developments and in
a mixed-use context. (One of the paradoxes surrounding the "New Urbanism" is its dominant
focus on creating new, suburban variations of traditional pre-War neighborhoods, with relatively
little interest in helping to revive existing legitimate examples of such neighborhoods that have
fallen on hard times. In part, this focus can be attributed to the exigencies of the design business;
the new urbanists have been hired by suburban developers and have spent time and effort coercing
these developers into using what is claimed to be a better development form. In part, however, this
neglect of in-town redevelopment opportunities can be traced to the numerous financial, economic
and social issues that surround the problem of re-development; in short, unlike the creation of a
new subdivision, redevelopment is not primarily a physical design problem.)
It is true that as in-town neighborhoods are redeveloped and residents once again begin to live
there, the population of the traditional city will increase. Often, this increase comes after some
period of stagnation or even decline in population. Proponents of redevelopment will claim that
this increase in population helps bolster the municipal tax rolls thereby increasing the traditional
city's wealth. Again, this argument can be debated. While it is true that additional residents add to
the city's tax base through property taxes (and general sales taxes, etc.), they also demand more of
the city's services. One rationale for redevelopment has been that claimed existence of "excess
capacity" of infrastructure, particularly with respect to transportation, water, sewer and other
utilities.
Again, this argument must be taken apart. While it is true that a currently vacant neighborhood
possesses more roadway, water main, sewer main, etc. than it currently uses, these facilities do not
work in isolation. If the cars that will begin to use the currently vacant streets of a redeveloping
neighborhood have to travel on an already-crowded level C or D arterial road that connects the
neighborhood to the downtown, they one could equally argue that the redevelopment is overloading
infrastructure capacity and that the redevelopment of the neighborhood will create a need to expand
the arterial at a cost that is guaranteed to vastly exceed the enhanced taxes coming in from the new
residents. One way around this type of problem has been for communities in Florida to appeal to
higher funding sources. Many arterials, for example, are state roads; when levels of service
deteriorate due to increased development and use, the State is required to upgrade conditions, not
the municipality. Thus, external funds are available to resolve conditions that lead to an increase
in internal revenues. To the degree that such funds continue to be available, they are a resource
that municipalities should avail themselves of. Of late, however, particularly in the State of
Florida, such funds have not been available, and it is currently the expressed policy of the Florida
DOT to deliberately allow the level of services on selected roads -typically in-town arterials-to
deteriorate to well below standard conditions, as a way of inciting drivers to find alternative routes
or alternative travel times. In other words, from a policy of external system expansion, the FDOT
is moving towards the creation of a "self-healing" movement system.
Proponents of in-town development who argue that currently unused lands can become a viable
source of affordable housing for people who are currently living in sub-standard residences
generally receive the greatest amount of attention and credibility. Groups such as Habitat for
Humanity have been successfully working for years in many Sunbelt cities, incrementally repairing
in-town residences and building new homes where the opportunities can be found. Such grassroots
efforts, however, are constrained at almost every quarter. Labor tends to be voluntary, with
occasional expertise provided by hired contractors. Properties are generally volunteered by owner
occupants or are taken from the city's roll of vacant properties. Given the precarious financial
standing of such volunteer organizations, even the slightest cost over-rides can cause considerable
delays. Within Tampa, for example, a Habitat-led project lacked the funds necessary to complete
the legally mandated electrical and plumbing work on one of its projects. For lack of $6,000 to
complete the construction, a home languished for over six months.
The sum result of such volunteer efforts, while laudable, has been minute when contrasted with
both the demand for affordable housing, and the potentially usable sites. The vast majority of these
sites, however, are held in private hands, at nominal annual costs, by owners who are waiting for
the "market to turn" so that they can cash out at a profit. Given the minimal holding costs, it is not
rare to find properties that have been passed down from generation to generation; many have been
vacant for thirty or more years. In other instances, the trail of ownership has disappeared, yet legal
and regulatory mechanisms prevent the municipality from simply appropriating the unused land
and applying it to a better purpose.
At present, very few Sunbelt cities are suffering from the broad-based poverty and crushing
municipal revenue shortfalls that defined older cities such as Cleveland and New York in the
1970s, or Philadelphia in the 1980s. On the other hand, with few exceptions, these cities are cash
constrained. Many Sunbelt cities are found in relatively low-tax states, with a preponderance of
retirees who are expecting to live on a fixed-income. Large scale redevelopment projects are
undertaken via bond offerings. These are the vehicles that enable cities such as Tampa to build its
Performing Arts Center, its Convention Center, the Florida Aquarium and the Ice Palace
professional sports arena. Similarly, St. Petersburg FL used a bond issue to build the
Thunderdome baseball stadium -eight years before the city received a major league team-- and the
ill-fated Bay Plaza mixed-use redevelopment project in the heart of the Central Business District.
Increasingly, however, the economic viability of such large-scale public works has been brought
into question, particularly as the useful life of the projects has begun to fall short of the duration of
the bonds that pay for them. In Orlando, for example, the Magic basketball team is already calling
for a new arena to replace the eight-year old O-rena, and in Miami, the Heat basketball team will
be vacating its eight-year old Liberty City arena for a larger (and safer) facility in Broward
County. In both instances, the bonds will be paid off long after the facilities are gone.
Thus, while increasing sums are being spent on large "civic" projects, cities are finding themselves
unable to attend to more mundane tasks such as maintaining infrastructure, enhancing police, fire
and other municipal services, and increasing the level of educational offerings. Tax Increment
Financing (TIF), a mechanism that was used with considerable success during the 1980s by cities
looking to revitalize downtown districts, is less useful for the small-scale development typically
found in adjacent neighborhoods. Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), Special Assessment
Districts (SADs) and similar mechanisms have also been used to generate additional funds for
operations and services within delimited commercial districts. Again, these concepts work best in
heavily commercial environments and are less appropriate for predominantly residential scale
redevelopment efforts. 24
Post-War Urban Re-development
This thesis builds upon several initial conditions. One of these posits that post-War urban
redevelopment efforts are now moving into a third phase. This new phase is unique from the 1950s
and '60s Urban Renewal programs, as well as the catalyst mixed-use projects of the 1970s and
'80s. This third phase is only gradually emerging; it has been characterized by the general
withdrawal of Federal and state funding for redevelopment efforts, an emphasis on redefining the
focus and function of the core city, and an increasing reliance on private-sector initiatives.
24 While the jury may still be out on the utility and viability of such special districts, they are
proliferating in cities across the country. Essentially, these special districts are a form of "private
government," comprising the business and property owners within a defined area who have banded
together and agreed to "tax" themselves in order to supplement regularly provided public services.
A BID or other district authorizes the local municipality to collect additional assessments from
all owners within the district who are, in turn, required to pay these assessments. These revenues are then
earmarked for selected projects to be carried out within the district. The ostensible goal in creating one of
these special assessment districts is to stem ongoing decline, increase safety and security, enhance public
perception of the area in question, and generally promote changes that will increase the profitability of
local businesses, enhance development potentials, and generally benefit property of owners.
In the short term, such districts increase both the level of taxes within a locale and also increase
the level of services. However, because of the relative newness of the district concept, no one is sure of the
long term benefits or implications of such programs. In general, however, BIDs and other programs seem
to work best when they are focused on predominantly commercial areas that are in need of improvement
but are not too downtrodden or dilapidated. These programs are of relatively little use in residential areas,
nor are they much help in jump-starting development in an abandoned neighborhood.
A great deal of work has been done in the area of urban redevelopment, but much of it has been
carried out within two paradigms that are now seen as outdated. During the 1960s and '70s, an
extensive body of literature was produced in keeping with the Urban Renewal model of city
redevelopment. This was a top-down, Federally-funded and Federally-mandated approach to urban
revitalization that was not only extremely expensive but was, in many instances, extremely
destructive.
With the advent of Richard Nixon's ill-fated second term, the Federal government began to seek
ways of divesting itself of direct participation in the redevelopment of the nation's cities. The
earlier Urban Renewal model was gradually replaced during the 1970s by a more economically
motivated model that relied on large-scale public-private mega-projects to attract people to the
inner cities through a combination of tourist attractions, shopping centers, recreational amenities
and gentrification. The Federal government's role in these projects was as a funding agency, often
in the form of earmarked block grants, or through programs such as the Urban Development
Assistance Grants (UDAG). Again, a body of literature developed around these projects, the best
known of which include Boston's Faneuil Hall/Quincy Market development, Horton Plaza in
downtown San Diego and the Inner Harbor in Baltimore.
Widely imitated, these projects were seldom replicated.25 Even now, cities continue to pursue one-
off large-scale entertainment oriented projects that, they hope, will attract tourists and residents to
25 The centers of many small and medium-sized cities in the United States are littered with the remnants
of 1970s public/private redevelopment projects: festival marketplaces, riverwalks, pedestrian malls and
the like. It appears that the twenty year period between 1970 and 1990, in which generous amounts of
Federal funding were available to cities with relatively few direct strings attached, promoted a form of
derivative urbanism that is only now being repaired. The success of Faneuil Hall and the Inner Harbor
sparked a spate of waterfront festival market projects in smaller cities across the country. With a few
exceptions -Bayside in Miami, for example-these projects generally under-performed.
In the 1980s, convention centers were seen as the standard vehicle for urban redevelopment; at
one time nearly twenty medium-sized cities had convention centers under construction. Given the
plethora of such facilities and given the very real advantages facilities in cities such as New York, Atlanta,
Orlando, San Francisco and a few others have, it is little wonder that many of these smaller-city projects
are not living up to expectations. Aquariums, performing art centers, stadiums and indoor sports arenas
all have had their day as the most attractive vehicle for in-town redevelopment. While these efforts have
produced some truly wonderful pieces of civic architecture -Camden Yards in Baltimore, for example, or
Jacobs Field in Cleveland-many cities failed to understand the full economic, civic and operational
issues at hand (St. Petersburg, for example, or Miami). Unless these projects were included as part of a
much larger, all-encompassing public/private masterplan for redevelopment, they had little chance of
producing the returns and impacts that their originators and backers envisioned. In short, especially given
visit the city centers. The economic logic and catalytic capacity of such projects is increasingly
suspect; funding has increasingly become a source of bitter debate that has divided communities,
particularly as federal and state funding dries up.
As noted, a third phase in urban redevelopment is emerging, one that is market driven,
economically savvy and oriented towards the private sector. Within this paradigm, however,
relatively little research has been undertaken and the body of literature is still emerging. Much of
what exists today stems from academic research: econometrics and land-use economics, fiscal and
social policy development, land-use and transportation modeling. This study hope to draw upon
this literature that has already emerged, in order to bring light to bear upon the specific issue of
economically redeveloping under-utilized in-town sites and neighborhoods.
the extremely flighty nature of today's sport franchise owners, cities seeking to enhance municipal
revenues and stature through the development of large-scale sports facilities are ultimately undertaking
extremely risky and unsubstantiated ventures.
Chapter III Under-Development: A Brief Typology
Deserted buildings and neighborhoods are evidence of tragic loss, but they also
represent opportunities. Their location and services could be valuable assets,
because land that has a current real estate value of almost nothing is equipped with
water, sewer, gas, and electricity services that would cost a lot of money to
duplicate in a greenfield location on the urban fringe. 26
Under-development, in the context of this essay, is defined as situations in which properties
that were once fully developed and contributing elements in a flourishing community have been
allowed to decay. If they have not been abandoned entirely, these properties are functioning at only
vestigial levels of their previous intensity. In many instances, the structures on the properties have
disappeared; deliberately razed to make way for some possible future venture, or allowed to
deteriorate to the point of disintegration. (Again, as noted earlier, this discussion avoids examples
of "downtown" redevelopment, choosing instead to focus on redevelopment efforts in the
immediately adjacent in-town locations and neighborhoods surrounding the downtown cores.)
Four specific types of in-town under-development are commonly found in Sunbelt cities. The four
types differ in size, original purpose, function and re-use potentials. However, they are not
mutually discrete; examples of one type can be part of another. Ranging in size from the smallest
to the largest, the type are as follows: 1) left-over spaces; 2) abandoned institutions; 3) outdated
commercial strips; 4) bypassed neighborhoods.
1. The Leftover Site
Every community of any perceptible size has examples of "left-over" sites; properties that simply
are not built out even as other surrounding locations are developed. Just as a certain rate of
housing vacancy or unemployment is considered normal and desirable, a certain nominal
percentage of vacant properties creates necessary slack in the development cycle, providing
developers with choices and creating valuable options. When this percentage, however, rises above
what appears to be the reasonable norm for a healthy community, or when particular parcels
languish for long periods of time, these "left-over" sites can be seen a an indication of pathology
rather than economic lubricants.
26 Barnett, Jonathan. The Fractured Metropolis. (NY: Harper Collins, 1995), page 145.
Such parcels may have been "odd-lots," slightly smaller or larger than standard. They could be
parcels that were left out when earlier developments were completed, and which never found a
valid use.2 7 Infrastructure projects often create such sites. New highways are pushed through an
older neighborhood, effectively destroying the cohesiveness of the original plan. Properties at some
remove from the new roadway might eventually recover some effective use, while those
immediately adjacent to the highway seldom do. Not necessary for the safe and effective
functioning of the roadway, these parcels cannot maintain an alternative use. Driving along
expressways, particularly where they have pushed through older areas, one sees dozens of
properties, often fenced in for liability reasons, overgrown with grass, effectively abandoned.
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Figure 6: Example of Left-Over Site in Tampa FL
The widening of older arterial roadways often creates left-over properties as well. By periodically
shaving frontage area from adjacent parcels of land, highway engineers can expand the capacity of
under-sized roads. In so doing, however, they can also diminish, if not invalidate, the effectiveness
and utility of the surrounding parcels. Current regulations and legal precedents have done away
with this practice, but there are many examples from previous decades.
Idiosyncratic abandonment or obsolescence creates left-over parcels; older buildings fall into
disrepair requiring improvements beyond the means of the owners. Sometimes, these owners
simply abandon the properties, letting them revert, after a period of time, to the municipality.
Other times, they allow the assessed values of the properties to be written down and continue to
pay the nominal tax burden, hoping for increased land values at a future time.
Finally, planning and/or development efforts can inadvertently create left-over properties. When a
parcel is over-zoned for an intended use, either through the best intentions of planning officials or
the desire of a developer, the intrinsic value of the property can rise to the point that it is
significantly higher than surrounding parcels. Given this inherent value derived from the adjusted
development potentials, the option to keep the parcel vacant increases in value. Should markets
decline or interest rates increase thereby diminishing the viability of immediate development, the
owner of the properties has a lot of incentive to keep the properties "asleep," effectively biding his
or her time until conditions for redevelopment are optimal. Given the tenuous and often attenuated
nature of the development process, this situation can create conditions in which otherwise prime
pieces of property are left idle even as redevelopment occurs around them.
2. The Abandoned Institution
By the 1920s, Tampa's population had exploded to more than 50,000, and more
than 200 cigar factories employed at least 10,000 workers. The striking, three-
story brick buildings stretched from Ybor City, across the Hillsborough River
through what was once Robert's City, to West Tampa.
In the late 1940s, however, mechanization caught up with the cigar
industry and brought the curtain down on a historic era.
Frank Perez, an accountant with Villazon & Company Cigar
Manufacturers in Tampa remembered those times well.
27 In the 1960s, planners in Great Britain actually created an acronym for such properties, SLOAP: Space
Left Over After Planning
"Three people working together could make 500 cigars in a day," he
recalled. "Then came a machine operated by three people which could make 5,500
cigars a day."
Most locally owned factories were bought by larger tobacco companies in
the Northeast, leaving behind the massive brick buildings. Some destroyed by fire
and demolition; between 20 and 30 have survived. Not long ago, it was common
to see the sleeping giants with broken windows and crumbling bricks, standing
alone on overgrown lots. 28
The transition of America from a manufacturing economy to a service-oriented society, from a
basis in blue-collar production to white-collar management, hastened the abandonment of
manufacturing plants and industrial facilities. Often, these facilities had been major institutions
within the neighborhoods or cities. Many acres in size, these facilities employed hundreds if not
thousands of local workers, many of whom lived in neighborhoods immediately adjacent to the
factories.
The economic obsolescence and ultimate closure of these facilities put these employees out of
work, and often hastened the deterioration of the surrounding neighborhoods. Forced to look
elsewhere for employment, workers and their families left their original neighborhoods; their homes
were either taken over by users at a lower economic strata, or simply boarded up and abandoned.
The institutional facilities, themselves, were often abandoned as well. The boarded up buildings
were an invitation to vandalism, and the large tracts of land surrounded by chain-link fencing only
added to the air of abandonment.
Generally, the structures housing these institutions were well-built and architecturally significant.
Given their history and their role in their communities, they were often on sites that initially offered
some degree of locational advantage. To varying degrees, therefore, as targets for re-development,
these institutions can play upon their structural integrity, their architectural character, and their
locations. In many instances, however, these aspects, alone, are simply not enough to convey
contemporary economic validity to these abandoned buildings and properties. Additional factors
can actually work against redevelopment. Historically or architecturally significant buildings are
often "protected" by local historic preservation ordinances. These rules, which are intended to
preserve the initial character of the buildings, often serve as unintended disincentives to developers
looking to redevelop the projects for new uses. While ordinances typically provide monetary
28 Scremin, Robert. "Getting a Fresh Puff of Life," in St. Petersburg Times, September 1994.
benefits in terms of low-interest loans, outright grants, or reduced tax burdens, these often come at
the price of strict interpretations of what the developer can and cannot do to both the inside and
outside of the building.
In addition, modern regulations intended to protect the life, safety and welfare of a building's
occupants can have a negative impact on the redevelopment of older structures. For example,
many older buildings were built from a combination of heavy-timber framing and masonry bearing
walls, with heavy plank floors. For a single use redevelopment, such buildings can be easily
retrofit to include modem life-safety features, and a successful project can ensue. However, should
the developer intend to section off the building vertically, putting different uses on different floors
of the building, new and more intense life-safety standards come into play, requiring considerably
more expense both in terms of materials and equipment, as well as space-absorbing fire-stairs.
Figure 7: Under-Utilized Cigar Factory in Tampa FL
(In a particularly relevant example taken from downtown Tampa, a developer bought a three-story
mid-block building, seeking to place a restaurant on the ground level and offices on the upper
floors. The building was a solid masonry-and-wood structure, with a narrow but deep footprint.
Given its location on the ground floor with easy egress to the main street and the back alley, the
restaurant was relatively easy to permit and occupy. However, when the owner came to get
permits to develop the office space on the upper levels, he discovered that in order to meet the
egress requirements dictated by size and use, he would have to give up nearly 25% of his usable
floor area to fire stairs and, because these stairs had to be built of the highest rated construction,
his development budget would go up by nearly a fifth. After a series of unsuccessful appeals for
leniency, the developer simply gave up. Today, the restaurant operates out of the ground floor and
the two upper levels sit vacant.)
Within the City of Tampa, several types of significant institutional properties present the potential
to play roles as redevelopment catalysts. Predominant among these are the cigar factories that
contributed so heavily to Tampa's initial economic prosperity and cultural character. Where the
city once held dozens of the large, imposing brick and wood structures involved in the curing of
tobacco and rolling of cigars, today, there are nearly two-dozen such structures remaining. With
few exceptions, these properties are vacant or under-utilized.
Complementing the cigar buildings that helped define the Latino community in pre-War Tampa are
the buildings that housed the many social clubs and cultural societies of the time. Buildings such
as the Centro Espanol, the Centro Asturiano, the Cuban Club were all the predominant cultural
facilities of their time. Today, many of these handsome brick and stone buildings are abandoned or
hanging in vestigial states.
Abandoned schools, churches, and hotels also offer opportunities for redevelopment. As Urban -
Renewal and blight overtook some of the older neighborhoods in and around Tampa's downtown,
schools and churches were often left standing even as housing and stores were razed. Today, even
driving along the highways leading through the CBD, one sees two high-schools, the 18 story
Floridan hotel, several churches, the Union Railroad Station, and other handsome brick and stone
structures.
Figure 8: Abandoned School in Tampa Heights FL
By the 1970s, the State of Florida was aware of that many of its older institutions and buildings
were in danger of deterioration if not destruction. Legislation passed in 1973 authorized the
creation of local community preservation boards, whose job it was to see to the preservation and
rehabilitation of the best examples of properties. Within the Tampa Bay area, the
Tampa/Hillsborough Historic Preservation Board and the St. Petersburg Preservation Board have
worked to survey, document and register significant structures. With the help of local, state and
federal grants, they have worked to curtail deterioration on badly damaged projects, rejuvenate
other structures and to preserve others. Among the success stories over the past twenty years are
the Tampa Bay Hotel, now the main building for the University of Tampa, the Tampa Theatre,
now a national landmark and the ongoing host of a variety of plays, talks, performances and films,
the Scottish Rite Temple in downtown Tampa, the Friday Morning Musicale performance building
in Hyde Park, and numerous smaller projects sprinkled throughout the City.
Significant projects that have resisted all attempts at revitalization abound, however. The
aforementioned Union Station and Floridan Hotel are both socially and physically significant
structures located in prime locations; neither has responded to any of a series of redevelopment and
preservation efforts. Of the twenty-odd cigar factories within the older parts of the community,
nearly a dozen have been structurally rehabilitated, but none are truly operating within the
paradigms of successful, for-profit redevelopment.
Currently, three cigar buildings in Ybor City are set up to serve as speculative office space; two of
the three have always had significant vacancies, while the third, smallest, and most recently
redeveloped is completely leased. A third of this building, it must be noted, is leased by its owner
and developer, and another third is leased by the City of Tampa's Redevelopment Agency.
Another cigar structure in Ybor City was purchased and redeveloped as a micro-brewery, with
some speculative office space on upper levels. An immediately adjacent building had all of its
windows bricked in and currently serves as low-cost warehouse space operated by U-Haul.
Ybor Square, an aggressive redevelopment effort, begun in 1972 by local publisher Harris Mullen,
incorporates a full block comprising two cigar factories. At the time, Mullen was quoted as saying
that "within 18 months, all of the property around [Ybor Square] will be coming around." Twenty
years later, vast tracts of property remain undeveloped and Ybor Square, itself, a mixed-use
complex of shops, restaurants and offices, has yet to reach a point of unqualified success.
Similar scenarios describe the cluster of institutional structures located in West Tampa about two
miles west of the downtown. With the demise of the cigar industry in the 1940s, and the
subsequent death knell dealt by the Cuban embargo, several of these buildings were converted to-
cloth-cutting and clothing manufacture. The internationalization of this industry in the 1980s,
however, reduced the viability of these uses and by 1990 nearly all of these buildings had been
shuttered. At least one building was rehabilitated as a speculative office venture, with mixed
results, attributed by the developer to the low quality of the surrounding neighborhoods and the
perception of crime. Other buildings have been studied for a variety of uses including up-scale
residential apartments or condominiums, executive office suites, housing for the elderly, and night
clubs and cafes. None of these projects has gone beyond the stage of schematic design and pro
forma analyses.
Several developers involved with potential rehabilitation projects place the blame for their failures
on the City, quoting legal and regulatory impediments, overly stringent requirements for parking,
handicapped accessibility, and stormwater runoff among other factors. Investment bankers and
real estate lenders, however, who have watched these early efforts with interest, feel that these
issues are only partially to blame. "There are so many problems with these old buildings," noted
one, "and there is no guarantee that there is any market for using them." Referenced problems
included the aforementioned concerns as well as issues such as asbestos abatement, life-safety
requirements, significant structural repairs, and the potentially negative impact of landmark
preservation status.
Figure 9: Ybor Square Redevelopment Project, Ybor City
In the early 1990s, the state of Florida passed a special historic structure building code that was
intended to facilitate the redevelopment of significant structures. With this came a bill that froze
the tax base of selected structures for a ten year period after revitalization. If renovations were
undertaken in keeping with state guidelines, property owners would only be taxed at the initial
00
nz
1k
purchase value of the structure for a ten year period. Recaptured tax moneys could be used to help
"make the numbers work."
For developers, this benefit can be viewed as a mixed blessing. To the degree that all of the desired
changes to the building can be made within the guidelines, the benefits of the reduced tax burden
come in quite handy. However, to the degree that the changes the developer wishes to make run
counter to the preservation code, the developer might wish to forego the tax advantages in order to
optimize the overall project potential.
While considerable mention has been made of using abandoned institutional structures for
residential purposes, to date, none of the significant structures in Tampa have been used this way.
Issues raised by observers include the lower return on a residential project versus a commercial
project, a lack of demand coupled with the higher expenses of rehabilitating an older, historic
building, and, with particular buildings, site-specific problems such as neighborhood crime, lack of
parking or other environmental factors.
3. The Outdated Commercial Strip
At the beginning of the 20th Century, most American cities of any size were operating, or in the
process of constructing, extensive rail-based mass transit systems. These systems typically came
in two major forms; each spawned idiosyncratic development patterns. The "beads on a string"
form of development accompanied the street-car lines that led from the central business districts
into the newly developed suburbs. Small nodes of commercial development surrounded each
transit stop, with various types of residences surrounding the commercial nodes.
Closer to the city-center, trolley lines, which typically ran on the streets with regular stops every
few blocks helped spawn the earliest commercial "strip" developments. Streets with trolley lines
typically developed a preponderance of commercial land-uses, which backed up to enclaves of
residential development. Those major streets without trolleys seldom saw as much commercial
activity.
The early trolley lines typically created "Main Streets" through urban neighborhoods, and as the
trolleys gave way to automobile as the dominant form of transportation, some of these strips
maintaiied their vitality while others deteriorated. The spatial demands of the car were
considerably higher than the trolleys. Streets needed to be wider to carry more vehicles and
parking needed to be provided adjacent to the stores. In some instances, early strips, close to the
city centers, were abandoned in favor of later developments, farther away from the city, where road
widths, building placement and orientation, and overall site design could be made to match the
spatial and functional characteristics of the car.
Later generations of the auto-based commercial strip eventually replaced these initial versions. In
strips from the 1950s and '60s, stores were often clustered into facsimiles of the traditional Main
Street, with arcades fronting a collection of stores, set back from the street by parking lots. By the
1980s, these initial strips had become obsolete, replaced by full fledged shopping centers, mini-
malls, power-centers and other permutations of the commercial strip.
Figure 10: Plan of Tampa Showing Older Commercial Strips
significant
under-development
As the 'commercial strips aged, so did the adjacent neighborhoods. Suburban expansion moved
into its second generation; residents of the initial post-War sub-divisions that had been built within
city limits departed for newer developments with bigger houses on larger lots, farther from the City
centers. A burgeoning band of deterioration began to surround the traditional city centers,
particularly in neighborhoods that had formerly been the enclaves of blue-collar or lower-income
workers.
Figure 11: Abandoned Buildings Along Kennedy Boulevard, Tampa FL
Today, many of the arterial routes leading from the city centers to the suburbs lead past abandoned
or vacant commercial strips. Often, buildings have been torn down and replaced with low-
overhead uses such as used-car lots, automotive repair facilities or parking. In other instances,
buildings remain, boarded up and deteriorating. In instances where the surrounding neighborhoods
have managed to maintain some vitality and viability, these blighted commercial strips depress
neighborhood real-estate values and add to a general ambiance of abandonment and disrepair.
The growth of these early commercial strips resulted from the codification of existing practice. As
the City grew, it expanded northward along Florida, Nebraska, Howard and Armenia Avenues, and
westward along Kennedy Boulevard (then known simply as Grand Central), Buffalo, Columbus
and Hillsborough Avenues. As the major access routes in the cardinal directions, these roads took
a lot of vehicular traffic. Given these levels of accessibility, these roads became the ideal locations
for entrepreneurs and merchants. The tight, pedestrian scale downtown shopping street was
stretched out to become an auto-oriented street in which the stores were still generally continuous,
but their configurations were long and shallow as opposed to being narrow and deep. As the lots
on either side of these arterial streets were platted no differently than the conventional residential
areas, there was generally only enough space at the front of the stores for angled curbside parking
or, possibly, two rows of parking in a small surface lot.
Over time, in order to guarantee proper levels of maintenance and safety features, these roads were
taken over by the State, and designated as State Highways. This designation removed full
responsibility for the care and maintenance of these roads from the local jurisdiction. It also added
a layer of bureaucracy.
When the City of Tampa adopted its first zoning code in the 1940s, early regulations had to deal
with the existing circumstances created by the state designation and common practice. Rather than
use the power of the regulations to rectify the weaknesses in the situation through sensible zoning,
planners and officials rubber-stamped the existing situation. As one native remarked, "there
simply wasn't the political will to fight the land-owners and the state." So, these strips were all
zoned totally commercial.
This situation worked for a while; there was generally a balance between the number of stores and
the ambient resident population and the volume of auto traffic traversing the streets, while high was
manageable, even given the historically narrow rights-of-way of Tampa's streets. By the 1950s,
however, suburbanization began to take hold, and the residents of the older neighborhoods began to
leave for newer homes further out. As the initial residents left, they were replaced by residents at a
slightly lower economic station; they could not afford to keep all of the pre-existing stores in
business, and the store-owners recognized that their primarily constituents now lived in the
suburbs. The stores and shops, too, began to depart the traditional commercial strips.
Again, the transition was slow and as long as the roads were still the major arteries north and
south, east and west, many stores could continue to operate based on the drive-by traffic. Then, in
the 1960s, Interstate 4 was completed running east and west through the City, and Interstate 275
was constructed, carrying traffic north and south. Very rapidly, those cars looking to make
through trips, began to use the new limited access routes.
By the 1970s, the suburbs had taken the stores and the highways had taken the cars; the older
strips were left with no real raison d'etre, and entrenched zoning regulations that had become an
enormous hindrance to effective redevelopment. With mile after mile of uniformly dense
commercial zoning, merchants or businesses looking for the cheapest place to locate had many
locations to choose from. Slowly, lower quality commercial uses flocked to the older strips. By
the 1980s, some strips, such as Kennedy Boulevard and Howard Avenue were simply abandoned.
Others, such as Nebraska Avenue and Florida Avenue looked like graveyards, littered with small
shops that catered to the generally poor local residents, and extremely low-quality uses such as
used-tire stores, auto repair establishments, and used furniture outlets.
Even as the quality and character of these strips plummeted, little effort was made to stem the tide.
Any suggestion of concentrating and focusing commercial uses where they might work best
together, and of downzoning the remaining lengths in order to spark residential development, was
squashed. While logical from a regulatory point of view, the prevailing political mindset tended
against it. In Florida, property rights movements are very strong and there would be no funds to
pay for a "taking."
In some locations, the inhibitions to rehabilitation are structural. As noted, many of the oldest
commercial strips were simply residential routes that provided a direct connection between two
common points and which, over time, came to receive the brunt of traffic and commercial activity.
The original platting on these streets often remains in place. Small residential-sized lots that
worked well for single-family houses or even for early commercial options no longer provide
enough room for even a small commercial function.
State-mandated Transportation Concurrency Requirements exacerbate the problem, mandating
road expansion whenever Levels of Service (LOS) fall below specified minimums. Thus, the
depths of these arterial lots will have to be reduced as the roads are expanded in order to carry
more traffic. A lot that may have started with the dimensions of 50 x 100 or 60 x 120 may now be
only 80 or 90 feet deep. Conventional lending practices for small commercial projects mandate
that some percentage of on-site parking be visible from the fronting roadway. With standard
depths for parking lots requiring at least 40 feet of space plus the necessary separations between lot
and road and between lot and building, owners find themselves with only thirty or forty feet of
depth within which to build their projects. For many building types, this dimension simply cannot
meet functional requirements.
Local codes and regulations create additional problems. Often, original front-, rear- and side-yard
setback requirements will be still be in effect. The limitations created by parking requirements will
be compounded by mandated open area at the back and sides of the proposed structure. In
Tampa, general code standards for commercial uses require the provision of 3.3 parking spaces for
every 1,000 square feet of retail space. There is a movement afoot, however, among planning and
development officials, to create opportunities to reduce this standard on a case-by-case basis.
Official realize that the current situation is untenable both from the standpoint of the owner of
commercial property and from the position of the adjacent neighbors, many of who want some
limited level of commercial use, but are extremely opposed to large-scale development. Currently,
the City is investigating a move away from strip zoning towards the selective use of overlay
districts in specific locations where small-scale retail would be beneficial and potentially profitable.
Among the first issues being studied is the reduction of the minimum parking requirement. The
idea behind this action is that the reduced requirements will make it profitable for neighborhood-
oriented commercial uses to locate within the special overlay zone. The improvement of the area
within the zone will have a beneficial impact on those adjacent locations outside the zone, even if
there are no special incentives provided. 29
29 Interview with Ron Rotella, Special Assistant to the Mayor of Tampa, 26 April 1996.
Under Rotella's direction, the City is currently looking at implementing the first such overlay district
along a several block length of South Howard Avenue, at the southwestern boundary of the Hyde Park
Environmental regulations, particularly with respect to stormwater runoff, create additional
disincentive to development. Because Florida faces severe summertime storm conditions, it is not
uncommon for two- to three-inches of rain to fall on a site within a twenty minute period.
Environmental regulations dictate that some percentage of this rainfall (usually the first 1.5") be
contained on-site and not allowed to runoff into the streets or onto adjacent properties. An easy,
and acceptable, way to meet this requirement is to leave large portions of the parcel untouched,
with a permeable ground covering of grass or dirt or wood chips, and to create slight swales that
direct water from the far reaches of the site to these unpaved areas. In general, however, codes
dictate some minimum area of the site be left at 100% permeability or else additional measures will
be required. Depending on location and building use, this requirement can run as high as 50% of
the site coverage. Thus, the owner of an already constrained site measuring 60 x 120 will be
required to leave 3,600 square feet of the site untouched in order to receive a building permit.
Clearly, this condition dramatically diminishes the utility of these small properties.
Alternative measures exist, but only at considerable costs. Vaults can be constructed below
ground enabling the developer to effectively pave over the entire site. Such features, however, add
tens of thousands of dollars to the development costs and indicate a higher quality of development
than either the site or the general area can support.
Similarly, a developer can seek to purchase additional properties, looking to gain enough land to
create a stormwater retention pond whose capacity meets the overall requires for the property to be
developed, but whose overall size demands less land area than simply meeting the required
percolation area. Again, such acquisitions add to the cost of development, and, given the nature of
neighborhood. Sandwiched between two older and more affluent neighborhoods, the SoHo distirct
comprises half-a-dozen restaurants, several shops and a number of second-story offices. The district is
vital and active, but parking has always been a problem, increasingly so as new shops and restaurants look
to occupy space. Under the guidance of several restaurant owners, an ad hoc, yet workable, parking
program has been arranged in which night-time uses such as restaurants and clubs share parking spaces
with day-time uses such as offices and stores. Under the City's plans, these practices would be reified,
and each commercial use within the district would pay an assessment based on annual revenues to
contribute towards district-wide improvements.
property ownership along the older roadways, such land assembly may entail considerable expense
of time, effort and money. 30
Conformance to codes and regulations is a major disincentive to redevelopment efforts, particularly
for properties or projects in which profit margins are small. To the degree that such codes and
regulations are within the jurisdiction of a local governing agency, waivers or reductions can be
sought. Within the City of Tampa, for example, setback requirements, can be petitioned before the
Architectural Review Board, and in legitimate instances where the existence of a requirement
creates a hardship that denies legitimate use to a property, Board members are required to entertain
motions for waiver or reduction of requirements. Similar appeals can be made when seeking to
change a land-use or to increase the density of permitted uses.
Some requirements, however, cannot be as easily mitigated. Stormwater regulations, for example,
are dictated at the level of either the Federal government or through regional water management
districts, neither of which can be easily approached for small scale site-by-site petitions. With
respect to traffic requirements and regulations, sites that sit on local roads have considerably more
flexibility than those that front official State highways.
As discussed by an architect who has worked on numerous redevelopment projects, without clear
jurisdictional control, even the more sensible projects might founder.
30 One way around the requirement that each property-owner mitigate his or her runoff is the creation of
district-wide stormwater systems. Downtown Tampa falls into such a district; this enables developers to
cover their entire site with impervious surfaces, and simply contribute a fee towards district-wide
mitigation. (Although they still must attend to specific requirements for minimum amounts of public
open space, this need not be permeable.) Such systems, however, are extremely expensive to create, and
while regulations create situations in which such systems make the most sense from a functional
viewpoint, they generally imply cost levels that simply are not tenable at the low- to medium-density
development prevalent throughout much of the city.
The Florida Center for Community Design + Research studied the potential of using mandatory
stormwater regulations as a vehicle for creating district systems that would use centralized stormwate
retention ponds as natural amenities and thereby allow for higher densities of surrounding development.
Such an approach is quite common in large planned communities developed by a single entity. Given the
logistics of an urban redevelopment project involving hundreds of separate property owners, however,
such an approach is not feasible without enormous external subsidies. While the advantages of
developing in-town properties at densities that are considerably higher than standards could compensate
for the costs of creating the district system and the natural amenities, there is little, if any, demand for
districts built at such densities. The lack of demand derives from several sources: general preference for
lower density development; the need to provide considerable amounts of parking, even in high-density
This is a major problem facing many forms of redevelopment. The
current mayor used to be a developer, so he understands how some of these issues
ean get in the way, but he really doesn't control the game. He can't tell the EPA
what to do or the EPC. He can't tell DOT or FDOT what to do. Mundane
impediments become enormous because of the segregation of power into various
regulatory structures ...
Unraveling this Gordian knot becomes a game of astronomical
proportions. 31
4. The Bypassed Neighborhood
Old factory districts represent another large category of bypassed urban land.
Success in reusing these sites has depended so far on where they are located.
Thousands of acres of old steel mills still languish in the Monongahela Valley
southeast of Pittsburgh, while the old Jones and Laughlin mill that is closer to the
city center, and right down the hill from Carnegie Mellon and the University of
Pittsburgh, is being redeveloped as the Pittsburgh Technology Center.32
To a degree, this fourth category of redevelopment opportunity encompasses aspects and examples
of the previous three types. The by-passed neighborhood is typically a byproduct of one or more
of the aforementioned causes of under-development, coupled with severe changes in local economic
conditions. When major employers closed down and abandoned their facilities they often left entire
neighborhoods of workers behind them. Some workers were able to move, others remained, but in
a neighborhood robbed of its economic reason for being, the general character began to deteriorate.
Single-family uses were converted to multi-family, one economic level was replaced by another,
fringe properties were allowed to deteriorate beyond repair; over the course of time, the entire
character and vitality of a neighborhood deteriorated.
The post-War period saw the creation of numerous such neighborhoods throughout the United
States, in cities of all sizes, shapes and locations. The Great Depression combined with the Second
World War to create a period of approximately 15 years in which money, jobs and development
opportunities were all in short supply. Buildings and development did without revitalization and
renovation. When the War ended, the outburst of development opportunities spurred by the
rebounding economy and deliberate government actions such as VA loans and the construction of
situations; the existence of numerous lower-density alternatives. The very nature of the suburbanized city,
therefore, mitigates against this potential solution.
31 David Rigney, Director of Construction, Historic Tampa/Hillsborough Preservation Board. Interview
with author, June 1996.
the Federal Highway system were not directed at the deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods.
Rather, growth took place at the suburban fringes. The single-family house with a car parked in
the driveway became the icons of success and achievement, and developers and car dealers catered
to these desires.
The radical departure in home construction developed by builders such as William Levitt on the
east coast and Ned Eichler in the west changed both the delivery and concept of the home. These
men and other master builders streamlined the construction process, turning what had been
traditionally a handicraft industry into a partially mechanized system of production. The
designing, platting and developing of communities likewise took on aspects of mechanization and
mass production. Builders went from constructing ten or twenty units a year to a thousand or
more.
Even as those residents with the opportunity to do so were leaving the older neighborhoods for new
opportunities in the suburbs, the in-town neighborhoods were becoming the locus of full-scale
experiments in planning theory. The first government sponsored public housing projects in
America had been built in 1939 as part of the omnibus 1939 Housing Act. Tampa was among the
first communities in the country to feel the impact of this Act, as projects were built in the fringes
of the Tampa Heights community just north of the downtown.
Initially, such projects were seen as stepping stones for people and families who could not afford
homes of their own and who had no valid alternative for shelter. Projects were not supposed to be
too comfortable and luxurious, as they were envisioned as temporary measures while people sought
new jobs and better opportunities. As early as the 1950s, however, it was becoming obvious that
these initial theories were not playing out in reality. Families were becoming permanent residents
of these projects, and very quickly these projects were seen as negative influences on surrounding
neighborhoods and communities.
Nonetheless, such federally funded complexes were viewed as the only viable form of affordable
housing. Urban Renewal, which became federal policy at the end of the 1950s, only hastened the
32 Barnett, op cit, page 149.
decline of many older neighborhoods. Hardest hit in the Tampa area was the old Latino
community of Ybor City.
The traditional home of Tampa's vibrant Cuban, Spanish and Italian communities, Ybor City at its
height in the 1930s had over 40,000 residents in a tight, densely-knit area just to the northeast of
downtown Tampa. The deprivation and lack of upkeep that marked the period between 1930 and
1945 were particularly hard on Ybor and, with the coming the 1950s, large portions of the
population moved northward and westward to newer suburban developments.
Figure 12: Vacant Blocks of Land in Ybor City
In 1963, Interstate 4 sliced through the northern portion of the neighborhoods. Combined with an
aggressive policy of slum clearance, over 900 buildings in the community were torn down. Very
few were replaced, and by the mid-1970s, most of this once-vibrant area were totally vacant.
Some of the more monumental institutional buildings were left standing: cigar factories, the
brewery, some churches and schools. Entire blocks, however, that formerly held townhouses,
apartments and shops, were entirely vacant. Within a radial mile of Tampa's City Hall, over
eighteen blocks of the formerly vibrant property were left covered with grass. Others were
partially empty, and Seventh Avenue, the social and psychological heart of the neighborhood was
almost entirely abandoned, the stores boarded up and sidewalks deserted.
While Ybor City suffered the worst fate of the neighborhoods in and around the downtown, few
were spared. Similar Renewal-based clearance schemes combined with Highway construction to
tear through the fabric another Latino enclave in West Tampa. The 1967 extension of the
Interstate northward bifurcated the original suburb of Tampa Heights with similar results to those
in Ybor City. More buildings were left standing, but the quality and character of the neighborhood
steadily declined. Crime increased and property values decreased. Single family homes were
subdivided, so paradoxically, the population of the area grew in size, but it also grew steadily
poorer.
In a period during the 1960s when Tampa was still the dominant focus of a fast-growing metro
area, the new highways dramatically improved auto accessibility in the region. In the 1950s, the
primary suburban developments were to the northwest in an area now know as Town and Country.
In the early 1960s, Carrollwood Village was started, due north of the City, and by the 1970s,
similar master-planned communities were springing up at all fringes. The decision in the 1950s to
add a state university on a 1,000 acre parcel at the far northeastern fringe of the city gave impetus
to both the northern highway extension and additional growth in this area.
Additional factors added to the centrifugal expansion of the city. Tampa International Airport,
built on the site of a former military field on the edge of Old Tampa Bay, about seven miles from
downtown, fomented a wave of commercial development that resulted in the creation of the
Westshore Business District; today, this is the largest contiguous business district in the state of
Florida with over 70,000 workers and 20 million square feet of commercial development. A
prototypical "edge city," Westshore competed directly, and successfully, with downtown Tampa
for businesses and workers.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Urban Renewal projects affected the downtown as well.
Highway construction through the northern sector of the downtown had already cut the center off
from the surrounding neighborhoods. Subsequent renewal schemes sought to eradicate "blighted"
housing from the area. Dozens of low-rise buildings were torn down and lots left vacant.
Typically these buildings had served as boarding houses for lower-paid workers in and around the
city center. With these buildings gone, these workers drifted away to other alternatives, including
the public housing projects that were rapidly beginning to ring the downtown, often built in the
wake of highway construction.
In the most extreme examples, Urban Renewal efforts, in Tampa and in other cities throughout the
country, actually caused the demise of older neighborhoods. Such stories were brought to the
public attention in Jane Jacobs' heralded 1960 text The Death and Life of Great American Cities 33
written to document her anger at the wholesale destruction of the West End neighborhood of
Boston. While the bulk of her discussion and the lessons she draws from it focuses primarily on
the pre-War, pre-automobile, Northeastern and Midwestern cities such as New York, Chicago and
Toronto, her searing indictment of misguided Urban Renewal planning theory has relevance in
cities throughout the country.
Even in its benign applications, such top-heavy centralized Federal programs tended to do as much,
if not more, harm as good. Public housing projects, heralded in the 1950s as the means of enabling
struggling, lower-income families to get back on their feet and into the market for home-ownership,
had become, by the 1970s and 1980s, havens for crime, poverty and despair. Many of the sectors
within the City of Tampa with the highest level of criminal activity include such housing projects,
and even where the projects themselves have remained relatively viable, the influence of the
complexes on the character, nature and economic stability of the surrounding neighborhoods was
seldom beneficial.
33 While the book was written in the late 1950s and immediately gained critical acclaim, its impact on
official Urban Renewal programs appears to have been negligible. The devastation of Ybor City, for
example, did not fully begin until nearly ten years after Jacobs' book was published. By the time Sunbelt
cities such as Tampa were beginning to feel the brunt of Renewal practices, the program was beginning to
collapse under its own weight. Ironically, one of the few cities in the Southeast that was only minimally
affected by Urban Renewal was Birmingham AL; here the 1967 race riots so unnerved civic officials that
no attempt at "renewal" or "black removal" as it was called in many locales, was attempted. Today, while
downtown Birmingham suffers from the same problems of suburban flight and disinvestment as are found
in most other Sunbelt cities, the bulk of the city's building stock remains intact, representing not only a
direct link to the city's past social, commercial and developmental patterns, but also providing an ongoing
incentive for renovation and revitalization. An old building, in many ways, represents an easier
redevelopment challenge than a block of vacant land.
Chapter V Under-Development: Factors Hampering Re-development
A. Landbanking and Speculation
Often, the buildings in older neighborhoods or along abandoned commercial strips, were fully
depreciated and completely paid for before they were shuttered. Burdened with only nominal
annual property taxes, such properties are often held by their original or new owners who are
waiting for re-development opportunities. Given the typically low costs of holding the properties,
however, and the very real risks inherent in being the first to invest new moneys, the incentives to
actively re-develop any of these properties remains extremely low.
This practice, land-banking, is one of the biggest factors in keeping under-developed in-town
properties from re-developing. Current rules and regulations often make is relatively inexpensive
to hold outdated buildings or parcels off the market in the hopes that other players will foment a
development boom and the owners of these buildings and parcels will be able to cash out at a
significant profit. Such practices are clearly evident among the case properties studied in the
Tampa examples. Many parcels of land in both Ybor City and Tampa Heights are currently held
in the estates of the original owners; some properties have been in the same family for nearly a
century. Others were purchased for nominal amounts in the 1970s and early 1980s. Currently,
many of these unused parcels still have minimal assessed values; taxes and nominal upkeep can
cost less than $1,000 per year. Given the prevailing sentiment that both of these neighborhoods
represent the focus of imminent rejuvenation and rehabilitation, it is clearly in the best interest of
the owners to continue to pay the relatively low carrying costs and wait for potential windfalls in
the future. Unfortunately, when such attitudes dominate, conditions within a dilapidated
neighborhood enter a state of gridlock; each owner is relying on someone else to make the first
move towards redevelopment.
To some degree, public and non-profit agencies have been able to make some steps towards
spurring redevelopment. In both Tampa Heights and Ybor City, a good percentage of vacant land
is held by public-sector and non-profits. For the former, however, aggressive development can be
a political liability, while the latter shares in some of the sentiments of the private sector; the longer
we can wait, the more we can get for our property. Thus, many prime parcels of land in both of
these neighborhoods sit vacant, waiting for even higher returns. In Tampa Heights, for example,
efforts to revitalize a twenty-block sector are stymied by the lassitude of landowners whose
property sits adjacent to the Interstate highway. For years, it has been rumored that this section of
the highway has been slated for imminent expansion. Engineers have, in fact, drawn up plans, but
no funds for construction have been allocated. Nonetheless, homeowners of properties fronting the
highway are certain that officials from the Florida Department of Transportation are going to show
up shortly with large checks as part of the land acquisition process. In the interim, these
homeowners have no incentive at all to participate in some of the fix-up and revitalization efforts
that are occurring a little as half-a-block away. Adding insult to injury, since these frontage houses
can be seen from the highway, drivers on the highway have little idea of the significant renovation
efforts that are taking place just out of sight.
The option of land-owners to wait before developing their properties has been a particular source
of frustration to the earliest investors in Ybor City. "Don't just sit there," many of these smaller
investors fumed at their larger colleagues. "Do something." However, for many years, the wait-
and-see attitude was extremely strong. For some investors, even though Ybor appears to have
turned a significant corner, and assessed property values have more than doubled in many
locations, the incentive to hold on outweighs the incentive to cash out. With large portions of
Ybor, particularly along the Seventh Avenue commercial strip, held by less than ten large land-
owners, the decision not to get involved represents a considerable drag on development momentum.
Even today, entire sections along Seventh remain shuttered and dark, despite the considerable
progress that has been made in recent years.
Once the larger land-holders do begin to divest themselves of their properties, they are looking at
the uses that are sure to provide the highest immediate return, either through a direct sale to an
entity that can pay top dollar, or through a equity partnership with an enterprise that can return
immediate profits. In the case of Ybor City, the district's relatively generous zoning and land-use
regulations played directly into the wishes of the incumbent landowners. Bars, restaurants and
night-clubs were the "home run" uses during the period of the early 1990s, and as property owners
began to sell out, Ybor City began to fill up with more and more eating, drinking and partying
establishments. The original plans for a mixed-use bohemian "urban village" went out the
window, less as the result of any single counter proposal than the victim of extremely loose
regulations, coupled with strong market conditions and little regulatory oversight.
B. Highway Construction
A legacy of the days of post-War idealism and economic growth, the creation and subsequent
expansion of limited access, high-speed roadways has had an enormous negative impact on
struggling in-town neighborhoods, particularly those that were predominantly residential in
character. Intended, innocently enough, to enable people to easily commute between country and
city, the highways, instead, fomented an enormous shift in population, commerce, and jobs, from
the cities to the outlying regions. In no place was this de-population so intense as in the older in-
town neighborhoods.
In Tampa, the path of Interstate 275 and Interstate 4 coincide exactly with a wave of depopulation,
property value declines and overall neighborhood deterioration. As noted above, the development
of Interstate 4 in the early 1960s, tore through the heart of Ybor City, creating an immediate and
dramatic decline in the northern section and hastening the imposition of Urban Renewal tactics to
the south. Similarly, in the later '60s, the development of Interstate 275 running northward from
downtown Tampa to the cities of Gainesville, Ocala and Atlanta cut Tampa Heights in half. While
both halves suffered, the eastern half suffered the most as property values plummeted and all those
residents who could afford to leave did so.
As an attempt to mitigate this devastation and as a way of providing affordable housing to make up
for the units lost, federal programs constructed a number of public housing projects in and around
these highway corridors. These low-rise, bunker-like projects quickly became haven of poverty,
crime and drug-use. While the projects have been the site of continual updating and renovation
over the past decades, their visible blight on their immediate surrounding has been palpable and
permanent. Notwithstanding political and regulatory pressures, some efforts have been made
within the City of Tampa to have the projects condemned and destroyed, and to out-source the
existing residents to smaller scatter-site projects throughout the city.
C. Zoning Mismatches
Often, in an effort to "spur" redevelopment, planning officials have re-zoned under-utilized sites
and abandoned neighborhoods under the notion that the potential to build more on an parcel would
serve as enough inducement to build something. Often, these efforts succeeded only in creating
parcels that had no viable use but were burdened by the potential of extremely optimistic zoning.
This potential, rather than the reality, help artificially inflate the asking price of the properties,
thereby making large-scale re-development even more difficult.
Officials, recognizing this issue, can try to have the properties down-zoned, but have to be
extremely careful in this respect to avoid potential litigation over the issue of "takings." Owners
can argue, often persuasively, that the down-zoning effectively deprives them of the full
development potential of their property and thereby demand compensation for the "lost" revenues
at the fair-market price.
The Tampa Quality District, a formalized program for using zoning bonuses as an inducement for
redevelopment, has been singularly unsuccessful. An invention of the 1980s, the program offers
developers who agree to develop particular types of projects -generally mixed-use-in particular
locations -generally at the fringes of the CBD-extensive development bonuses. As explained by
Fernando Noriega, Director of Community Development, however, bonuses that, on paper, looked
like incredible deals, were really not worth very much to the developers. Noriega attributes this
failure to one problem in general: automobiles.
We were offering developers an incentive to create really urbanistic projects;
mixed-use with lots of density. But, in Tampa, everybody drives his or her own
car. So, in order to take advantage of all that extra development potential, you
either have to buy a lot of additional land, or you have to build parking structures.
Either way, it's very expensive. And, if you are looking to create an upper-scale
clientele, the parking has to be immediately adjacent to the buildings. The only
way to use your development bonus is to build enormous parking decks, and the
market here simply cannot afford that type of development.34
34 Fernando Noriega, Director of Community Development, Tampa FL. Interview with the author, July
1996.
Ironically, therefore, in its attempt to induce development, the City created conditions in which the
potential for a site so overwhelms the reality as to effectively stifle any redevelopment at all.
D. Proximities and Perceptions
Given the extreme mobility of residents within a suburbanized metro area, the least implications of
blighting factors within a neighborhood can lead to residential flight as owners attempt to optimize
their property values. The exact moment when a neighborhood begins to change or lose value is
extremely hard to pinpoint, but there are both telltale signs and causal factors. If a lot of houses
go on the market at the same time, it can indicate that factors within the neighborhood have
changed. 35  If houses go on the market and cannot sell at a desired asking price, it indicates a
dichotomy between the perception of the current owners and the market at large. If longtime
commercial establishments shut down and nothing comes in to replace them, or if a higher level
land use such as commercial or residential is replaced by a lower level use, such as parking, these
are indications that general perceptions of the value of a location may be changing.
Causes include myriad factors, only some of which are controllable at a local level. The heady
days of the 1980 real estate boom led to the creation of a lot of projects that did well as long as the
boom continued. When the bottom fell out at the beginning of the 1990s and tenants or buyers
could not be found for the inflated prices, numerous properties went into receivership. The
blighting effect of freshly built projects shuttered up and covered with "For Sale" signs is nearly as
strong as that of abandoned buildings or graffiti-covered walls.
35 The mere presence of a large number of "For Sale" signs, however, should not automatically be seen
as a sign of impending deterioration. In Hyde Park, for example, it is hard to drive down a single street
and not see at least a few "For Sale" signs. When questioned, however, real estate agents generally agreed
that many of these homeowners were simply "fishing," listing their houses at extremely high prices with
the intent of selling only if they find a buyer to meet this demand. "Some of these houses," one agent
noted, "have been for sale since I started working here."
There are some factors at work in Hyde Park, however, that do promote a relatively high degree
of turnover. Taxes are chief among the factors prompting sale. Particularly along Bayshore Boulevard,
the taxes on a large single-family home in Hyde Park can easly exceed $1,000 per month. Added to the
cost of insurance and utilities, non-financial fees can often exceed the monthly mortgage payment,
particularly for houses that were purchaesd before prices peaked in the late 1980s.
This last factor also affects the sale of homes in Hyde Park. Many buyers who purchased their
homes in the 1970s and early 1980s sold out at the height of the market. Buyers at that time were often
pushing their financial limits and with the relative diminuition in prices and the increase in incidentals
such as taxes and utilities, these buyers would like to reduce their housing costs.
Paramount among the potentially blighting factors, however, are crime and concerns for safety and
security. This works at both the extreme macro scale and at the scale of the neighborhood. When
ten tourists were killed within a one year time span, the entire state of Florida suffered through a
major downturn in tourism. This downturn was debilitating enough that the State government took
it upon itself to mount a series of damage-control ad campaigns in the attempt to woo tourists.
At the level of the neighborhood, a single incident within a transitional environment can create
enough negative publicity to seriously harm nascent redevelopment efforts. As one long-time
resident and small developer from Ybor City fumed, "Every time things start going, something
happens (a crime) and the publicity means that we have to go back to ground zero." Even in the
absence of any serious incidents, every developer interviewed for this study, no matter how
disparate their products, indicated that safety and security are paramount concerns for their target
audiences. As little as two blocks can separate a desirable site from an undesirable one, according
to one developer. "When we were just starting out," he noted, "we got a half-block parcel between
Platt and Swann in Hyde Park. (Two east-west through streets that run parallel to each other three
blocks apart.) We built some town houses and we lost our shirts; because of the perception that
it's not safe, no one wanted to buy north of Swann. South, there's no problem at all, but north, I
wouldn't touch it."
E. Environmental Factors
Superfund's cleanup standards have had the unintentional result of impeding the
cleanup of contaminated sites. Without cleanup, many old, urban industrial sites
fall into disuse. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that there are
approximately 450,000 such sites, often called brownfields, in the U.S.
Unpredictable cleanup costs often cause businesses to overlook brownfield sites in
favor of untouched suburban or rural greenfield sites. This pattern of land use
results in environmentally destructive urban sprawl and leads to fewer urban
jobs.36
Environmental concerns are particularly prevalent in abandoned industrial or manufacturing sites.
Increasingly stringent environmental regulations, often handed down from the Federal level,
coupled with a general lack of any environmental standards in the decades prior to the 1960s, have
created situations in which the re-use of many industrial properties would entail enormous amounts
of time, effort and expense, both from the legal and regulatory procedures and for actual physical
clean-up and mitigation.
Figure 13: Abandoned Service Station, Tampa FL
In many cities, these environmental issues have helped create left-over parcels. Often, the cost of
complying with stringent new regulations exceeds the potential profits from selling a parcel. Many
of the earliest gas stations built in this country, for example, adhered to no particular codes for
safety or environmental standards. The soil beneath former station sites is often highly saturated
with oil and gasoline, conditions that not only render it unusable under current EPA regulations,
but which also render it virtually unsellable. The owners of the property at the time that the latest
regulations went into effect bear the responsibility for cleaning the soil prior to any sale. Often,
these properties are held by large corporations for whom the nominal cost of carrying property is
negligible, while the costs of de-contaminating the properties can be quite high.37
36 CNA Public Policy Forum, Forbes, 19 July 1996.
37 Howard Avenue, one of the oldest mixed-use commercial strips in Tampa was originally dotted with
small "mom and pop" gasoline service stations. Typically, these stations stood on one or more of the
The latest news concerning such "brownfield" sites indicate potential relaxation of current
standards. In many cities, particularly those with significant industry or manufacturing in their
history, brownfield sites occupy considerable portions of the downtowns and in-town
neighborhoods. The considerable costs of reclaiming these polluted lands for productive use
effectively blights large portions of the traditional city center, further accentuating the economic
disparity between older centers and the newer fringe areas. In an attempt to resolve this issue,
coalitions comprising mayors, developers, elected officials and representatives of environmental
agencies have been meeting in various states, looking for ways of effectively, yet safely, bringing
this properties back on line.
This problem can create something of a catch-22. Often, the abandoned facility is the dominant
development parcel in a neighborhood. Additional lesser parcels are also available, but the
economic incentive to develop them depends on the residual land value that would accrue to them
should the larger industrial facility be rehabbed. The up-front costs of such a rehab, however,
coupled with the risks inherent in urban pioneering, leave the industrial facility and the surrounding
parcels in a state of limbo.
Currently, efforts are on-going across the country, spearheaded by Mayors, Governors and other
officials, who are looking at ways of reducing the cost of mitigation and more readily getting older
properties and facilities back on line in some sort of capacity. For private-sector developers,
however, particularly those considering the purchase and redevelopment of existing facilities, the
current uncertainty surrounding such redevelopment projects generally outweighs the potential
profits that can accrue from a successful venture.
corners at intersections along the street. These sites were small and over time, these stations were
abandoned or torn-down, but seldom replaced. Today, along one, one-mile stretch of road that slices
between relatively up-scale south Tampa neighborhoods, there are no less than eight sites of former gas
stations; only two continue to operate as stations. Two others are the sites of small food stores that have
occupied the properties since before EPA requirements were increased. Two are abandoned concrete
pads, one is a parking lot for an adjacent office, and the last one is a seasonal fruit stand. Discussions
with an architect who had been involved in a speculative project to renovate one of the older stations
revealed that the costs of de-contaminating the soil below a badly polluted 100 x 100 foot site could run as
high as $750,000. At $75 per square foot, this cost not only greatly exceeds the potential sales price of the
property, but could easily exceed the cost of the proposed improvement. Effectively, these prime sites are
rendered useless for anything but an auto-related, or conditional use.
F. Development Factors
Many redevelopment projects involve a transformation in land-use and/or intensity. One of the
most difficult aspects of such a re-development project is the assembly of the land parcels
necessary to make the project viable. For example, market analysis might indicate that an old
mom-and-pop pre-War shopping strip could, in fact, serve as a larger mixed-use neighborhood
center. However, the larger use and updated codes imply additional property requirements for
parking, runoff and so forth. In this small example, the developer may have to purchase six or
eight adjacent residential parcels in order to make his scheme viable. In larger examples, the
number of parcels needed can easily run into the dozens (or even hundreds), each comprising its
own legal, regulatory and procedural problems.
An additional problem for the would-be developer is that the asking prices of parcels will increase
as the developer's intentions become known. Assembling a number of contiguous parcels without
tipping one's hat as to one's intentions is clearly possible, but takes time, expertise and money, all
of which are factors that can cut into the ultimate viability of the project. Many times, what looks,
in the architect's plans, like a viable and profitable proposal, becomes, in the reality of the
development process, an attenuated and expensive venture. Often, these requirements are so
onerous that otherwise viable projects are foregone.
Clearly, redevelopment projects involve considerable degrees of risk, particularly for the first
projects in a slowly re-developing neighborhood. In the presence of other, less-risky development
proposals, lenders are apt to demand more from the redevelopment proposal than from the others.
Even as a developer is getting letters of agreement and option agreements, lending criteria could
change or interest rates could go up. The additional equity requirements, debt returns and so forth
can add up to a considerable spread between a re-development project and a new development.
The entire building industry is institutionalized to support sprawl forms of
development and to make most infill unattractive as an investment. Suburban
developers are generally large corporations backed by Wall Street securities and
national sources of financing. Suburban developers make money by building
quantities of housing on large tracts of open land with fewer risks than infill
developers . . . An infill developer, by contrast, has to build all the units at once,
finish on schedule, and hope to sell the units as soon as possible after they are
built to avoid carrying the cost of the whole development. The building process is
slowed for the infill developer by neighborhood concerns, demolition and site
preparation, and additional requirements that stem from the urban setting
(structured parking, code requirements and other requirements). In addressing
neighborhood concerns in particular, the war stories from developers who have
built infill projects are legendary. Even developers with the best intentions for
creating better neighborhoods can become outcasts just for proposing change.
Typically, infill developers are working on small projects that require the
same or more architectural and engineering services as large scale suburban
projects. Moreover, since infill developers are most often building attached, or
multifamily dwellings, they incur additional costs and risks associated with this
building form. Design requirements to meet the American Disability Act (sic)
energy efficient standards and other codes, while necessary and appropriate, are
usually more stringent, and therefore more expensive, for multifamily dwellings.
Insurance companies refuse to insure, or place high premiums on, some forms of
developer's liability coverage for condominiums and other forms of high-density
residential development. 38
Additional factors faced in attempting to develop non-standard projects, particularly those
involving fringe or "developing" neighborhoods, include the difficulties in obtaining the necessary
permits, variances, or zoning approvals involved in changing land-use designations or zoned uses.
In many jurisdictions, labyrinthine procedures are involved in obtaining re-zonings or land-use
variances. Multiplied by numerous sites and a developer could be looking at two or more years of
effort to simply get permission to build his or her project.
Finally, ironic as it may seem, even while officials promote and support in-town redevelopment
projects as an efficient and economical alternative to rural or suburban greenfield developments,
particularly because of the re-use of extant infrastructure capacity, in many instances, officials are
still obligate to assess impact and development fees on these infill projects that are as onerous as if
the project were being built on a fringe site that did demand new infrastructure.
G. Financial Factors
The aforementioned regulatory and procedural factors have direct financial ramifications. Even if
a developer can get a letter of intent from a bank or other institution to provide funding for a
project, the longer the assembly and permitting process takes, the more likely the financial
structure of the deal will have to be changed. Generally, given the speculative and unconventional
38 Sargent, Tom. "Infill in the Marketplace: Alternatives to Sprawl," in On the Ground, Vol. 1, No. 1,
Summer 1994, pages 3-4.
nature of the proposed project, institutions will demand higher equity contributions and higher
returns for one-off, untested redevelopment projects than for "plain vanilla" simple suburban-style
projects. As interest rates change or additional costs accrue, the structure of the deal can become
more and more unwieldy, and lenders are certain to increase their demands. In an example from
Ybor City in Tampa, a developer's proposal for putting twenty town-house units on a vacant
parcel two blocks from the neighborhood's main commercial center was met with a lender's
demand that 50% of the unit's be pre-sold. Given the neighborhood's current status as an arts and
entertainment district, such a project would be breaking new ground and the developer was unable
to find buyers willing to commit to such a venture a priori; the lending offer was rescinded and the
project was shelved.
Option values also stand in the way of well-intentioned redevelopment schemes. As noted above,
in situations where a number of owners are holding properties that are widely regarded as prime
candidates for potential re-development, each owner has the tendency to view his or her property as
the culminating project in the re-development effort, and to price his or her vacant land
accordingly. This "option" to wait for re-development serves to increase the potential asking price
of the parcel, sometimes to the point that none of the available parcels can be had for a price that is
low enough to get the redevelopment effort off the ground.
As David Geltner and his co-authors have pointed out,39 this "wait and see" position becomes
particularly strong in situations in which the property in question can be used as surface parking
39 Geltner, David. M., Norman G. Miller, and J. Robert Brown. "The Parking Lot as a Unique
Investment Class: An Option that Pays Dividends," Real Estate Finance, 1991, pages 69-77.
The ... surface parking lot is, in essence, an option - an asset that has the
potential to be developed into something much greater. But parking lots differ in an
important way from the stock options familiar to security investors. While all options
offer the prospect of very large capital gains when you sell, parking lots provide the
additional benefit of a positive cash flow while you hold them ...
Although the option component is an important aspect of the investment
characteristics of downtown parking lots, important differences exist between parking
lots and traditional options on financial securities . . . First, the option to develop a
parking lot into a building never expires . .. Second, the option component of the
parking lot is often already "in the money" (in the sense that it would already be possible
to build a building on the land that would be worth more than the building's
construction cost), while many traded stock options are deeply "out of the money" . . .
These differences make the option component of parking lots less risky than typical
publicly traded stock options. The third and perhaps most important difference between
parking lots and typical stock options is that parking lots are actually bundles; they
consist not only of an option component that provides the major upside potential for
while the owners wait for the right offer. In a situation in which a parcel sits vacant while
surrounding properties are renovated, rising tax assessments on the vacant parcel serve as an
inducement for redevelopment, whether by the land-owner of through sale to a developer.
However, when the parcel is used for surface parking, the increased costs of ownership due to
increased assessment generally are accompanied by increased demand for parking. Therefore, the
owner is easily able to pass along any cost increases, and possibly even increase his or her
revenues, all the while waiting for the "best" offer on the property.
Even in situations in which no revenues accrue from a vacant parcel, absentee landlords or lands
held in trust can prove to be stumbling blocks due to wildly inflated or unwarranted price demands.
Within Ybor City, even as redevelopment continues apace, several key properties remain vacant.
Their inactivity derives not from lack of developer interest but from unreasonably high demands on
the part of the owners, who view the property purely as a financial play and have no desire or
intention to redevelop the site themselves. Given their current financial status, they can afford to
wait until all of the comparable structures have been purchased and then, with control of the
limited supply of the commodity, they can demand, and possibly receive, their desired price. In the
mean time, their properties remain a "black hole" in the progression of redevelopment throughout
the neighborhood.
Within some municipalities, officials have attempted to wrest control of such parcels from land-
banking owners, not via the power of eminent domain but by passing regulations that stipulate that
properties must show "considerable improvement" within a mandated period of time or face forced
sale and initial assessed value. To date, officials within Tampa have refrained from resorting to
this mechanism for fear of the law-suits that would immediately ensue. Given a climate in the
State that is heavily in favor of individual owner's property rights, it is unlikely that such a move
would go unchallenged.
Additional financial factors come into play in analyzing the difference between redeveloping an
existing structure and developing an entirely new project. If the structure in question is operational
and the owner/developer is seeking simply to up-grade or adapt the property, costs are generally
capital gain in the investment, but they also have an income-producing parking-
operation component that provides a "floor-value" to the investment asset. (69-70)
lower than if the property has been vacant and is slated for rehabilitation. As noted, various fees
and code requirements can be modified if not waived, in such instances, and various additional
funding sources can be found for various parts of the renovation. (For example, the City of Tampa
makes moneys available within historic districts for facade improvements designed to allow owners
to bring the front of buildings up to some facsimile of their original condition.) Similarly, for listed
or contributing structures (of which there are many in both the Hyde Park and Ybor City
neighborhoods), low-interest loans, redevelopment grants and other financial options from various
sources are available. However, when it comes to new construction, developers quite often feel
that they are facing the opposite situation. In many older neighborhoods, new structures not only
have to pay the requisite fees and exactions, but they may also be subject to design review and
oversight, with building permits withheld until specific architectural features are adopted, modified
or otherwise incorporated. Both these features, themselves, and the time involved in the review
process can be viewed as unnecessary expenses by developers.
Taxes also play a role in determining the financial viability of a proposal. Redevelopment projects
are notoriously rickety as start-up operations. To the degree that ad valorem taxes are based on
perceived or appraised values rather than actual operational cash flows, these taxes can become a
serious disincentive to the operational viability of the re-development projects. In the period
between 1993 and 1995, many of the developers and owners of the earliest redevelopment projects
in Ybor City had the assessed value of their properties, and hence, their taxes, more than double.
For operations with constrained cash flows, the additional $1,500 per month in property tax can
mean the difference between a positive or negative NOT.
Finally, the very fluidity and accessibility of the Sunbelt metro environment can hurt potential
redevelopment projects. As noted, cities such as Tampa contain many well-built, architecturally
significant, but abandoned commercial and institutional structures. While regulations and
locational issues often preclude the use of these properties as residential developments, many
developers have entertained the idea of turning old cigar factories or civic clubs into boutique
office complexes. However, given the complexity of adaptive re-use coupled with ancillary issues
such as finding the land necessary to meet parking requirements and possibly the provision of
additional security measures, without some substantial form of government intervention -subsidy,
grant, write-off, or tax break, for example-the project cannot be brought on line to be competitive
with other office space in the area.
For example, the owner of one 50,000 square cigar building had intended, when purchasing the
structure, to turn it into boutique offices. City regulations requiring extensive site work for parking
and stormwater retention, coupled with the costs of gutting and refinishing the four-story brick
building, simply pushed the price of redevelopment beyond what the market would bear. To make
any type of minimum return on his investment, the developer would have had to rent the space at
over $12 per square foot, at a time when brand-new class-A space in a downtown high-rise could
have been let on long-term leases for $13 to $15 per square foot. Given the constrained foot prints
of the renovated building, the presence of space-cramping heavy timber columns dividing the floor
plates, and the transitional nature of the immediate environs of the building, the developer knew
that he simply could not achieve the rents necessary to make the pro forma work out. He passed on
the project, and the building is currently being used to store bulk materials while the owner looks
for a buyer."
H. Economic Factors
In many instances, developers in fast-growing environments wok from with the "Field of Dreams"
belief that if they build it, someone will come. Given the capacity to receive the funds to do the
project, developers' market analyses and due diligence are not always as thorough as they might
be. Where such a cavalier approach might not be terribly damaging for standard types of suburban
development, when dealing with redevelopment projects, this attitude can be fatal. In this instance,
the assumption is that if a way can be found to simply re-develop parcels and properties within the
older city neighborhoods, residents and businesses will flock to use these redeveloped areas. Such,
as example after example shows, is not the case.
4 This example points at one of the issues in a low-density, auto-dominated fast-growth environment.
Within the $12/sf rental range of this project, literally dozens of alternative office options could be found.
And, given the relatively low cost of land at the fringes, it is possible to develop an entire project from
scratch based on a pro forma projected rent of $12/sf. In short, there is simply too much competition in
too fluid a market for a redevelopment project to claim any real advantage based on location or price.
Those few renovation projects that have worked as offices tend to have been done by owners looking to
occupy much of the space themselves, by developers catering to a niche market, (a law firm looking to
establish some cachet; doctors in proximity to a hospital), or by developers who have pre-development
agreements with non-profits or government agencies.
Redevelopment efforts can be supply driven or demand driven. Too often, however, there is a
surfeit of supply and a dearth of demand. The ability to convince a loan officer or a limited
partnership of the potential of a redevelopment project is not the same as the ability to convince
residents, owners, and users to frequent and use the same project.
Even on an upturn, supply alone does not presume demand. In Ybor City, now that significant
redevelopment has been occurring for almost five years, speculators are beginning to enter the
market, buying and renovating properties and setting up "concept" bars and clubs. The earliest
investors in these types of operations often did the minimum necessary to get an occupancy permit.
If things went well, typically the initial investors either put more money into their project,
improving quality and/or expanding in area, or they sold to a better-capitalized outside entity who,
in turn, made these secondary improvements.
Now, well-capitalized ventures are buying properties directly, often paying premiums for the
remaining undeveloped structures. The benefits of agglomeration, however, seem to extend only to
a certain point. Well-capitalized ventures are not seeing the profits they initially envisioned, but
their presence has also hurt smaller less well-funded operations. While many of the bars,
restaurants and clubs appear to being doing well, significant turnover is also evident. Thus, it
appears, in contrast to previous years, that additional development of this type no longer adds to
the audience in Ybor City. Rather, bars, clubs and restaurants are now in direct competition with
each other. Demand appears to be stagnating while supply continues to expand.41 While such a
situation is undoubtedly good for the consumer, it also implies that some investors in
redevelopment projects will be forced to sell, close or change their concepts.
41 In part, the stagnation in demand stems from the somewhat uncoordinated public/private nature of
development in Ybor City. Unlike a private development, no entity is aggressively marketing Ybor City
to a target audience. And, unlike the Coconut Grove area of Miami which has many similar
characteristics to Ybor City, there is no single dominant "anchor" entity to provide an overall focus for the
district in the vein of Coco Walk in Miami. Without a target audience, investors and merchants complain
that they can never be sure who will be frequenting their establishments.
City officials are aware of this weakness and are currently attempting to set up a study to assist in
rectifying the situation.
I. Regulatory Factors
Discontinuities between codified zoning regulations and concerns for redevelopment can often
hinder efforts to re-develop vacant properties. In the example cited above of the abandoned
commercial strips, contemporary zoning regulations, designed for the characteristics of current
arterial development, render older properties almost impossible to develop. For example, setback
requirements today are considerably higher than previously. Older parcels, sized to meet the
earlier requirements cannot accommodate today's demands. In addition, functional demands for
parking today are much higher than when the initial strips were developed; new demands such as
those for stormwater retention, mandatory open space and additional demands, cut further into the
buildable area for many of these small parcels, thereby rendering them functionally unusable.
Two additional sets of regulations also hinder redevelopment efforts. In Florida, impact fees are
assessed on all new construction as a way of ensuring a equitable relationship between service
provision and service demand. Mandated by the State, the legitimacy of such fees has been hotly
contested by numerous parties, one side arguing that the fees do, in fact, help match demand and
supply of services, the other arguing that the fees merely serve as a large disincentive to
development, and that the taxes derived from developed property would be more than enough to
cover the increased cost of providing services. In general, development groups such as the
Homebuilders Association come down heavily in opposition to such fees, while environmental and
civic groups generally come down in favor of them.
The nature of the regulations, however, is so sweeping as to actually hinder types of development
that everyone seems to agree is desirable. As applied in the City of Tampa, wherever a parcel of
land has been vacant for over five years, upon construction of a new structure, impact fees must be
assessed and collected. This means that when Tampa Preservation, Inc. buys a vacant site in
Tampa Heights for $5,000 and works with volunteers and donations to construct a 1,400 square
foot house that they intend to sell for less than $50,000, they may be required to pay over $5,000 in
impact fees, depending on the duration of the site's previous vacancy.
The fees are based on building size and expected occupancy; construction cost is not an issue.
Thus, a rehab effort in Tampa Heights and a tract house in the Tampa Palms master-planned
community can end up paying the same amount of impact fees. In Tampa Heights, however, these
fees can easily exceed 10% of the ultimate house cost; in an environment where non-profit groups
are pulling as many strings as possible to give non-qualifying applicants and opportunity to own a
home, this difference is often insurmountable. And, as one member of TPI noted, "In Tampa
Heights, all of the infrastructure is already in place. The rule runs counter to our goal which is to
redevelop the neighborhood, but there doesn't seem to be anything the City can do about it."
Conversations with Ron Rotella of the City indicate that Clarke's perception is essentially correct.
"It is illegal for the City to simply waive impact fees," he notes. "There are a few measures we can
take for specific types of development, but by and large the rule stands; new construction is
required to pay development fees." 42
One area, however, in which the City does have some discretion is the so-called "50% Rule." This
statute in the City's building code is viewed by many homeowners, architects and contractors as
the redeveloper's bane. Briefly stated, the rule says that whenever a property is improved by an
amount that equals or exceeds fifty-percent of the value of the original structure (not including the
land), the entire structure must be brought up to meet the latest codes and regulations. Thus, when
a homeowner buys a 1,200 square foot 1950s ranch house and looks to do a 1,000 square foot
expansion, according to the rule, the entire structure (all 2,200 square feet) must be built to meet
the latest codes and regulations.
42 There are ways around this requirement should the object be important enough. For example, the City
was negotiating with a Target super store to locate along Gandy Boulevard in South Tampa. This is a
heavily traveled route that links Tampa to St. Petersburg, but because of its proximity to MacDill AFB and
the essentially transient nature of many of the residents south of the street, there was a dearth of retail.
Target, looking build a structure of over 100,000 square feet balked at the cost of the impact fees, which
amounted to over $200,000. As a legally acceptable way around this problem, the City arranged with
Target that the store would pay the impact fees and in return, the City would mitigate the store's annual
tax burden until a net present value of $200,000 had been reached. The tax shortfall, in turn, would be
made up from one of the City's discretionary funds. In this way, Target meets its development goal, the
City gets a major retail presence in an area that had been under-served, and because of the extended
duration of the re-payments, the City also insures the cooperation of the store going forward.
While this is an elegant and equitable solution to a regulatory problem, it clearly cannot be done
for very many projects. In this instance, the City wanted the store to move to a particular location. The
store was agreeable, within certain financial limitations, and the City felt that the benefits of the store
presence in this location outweighed the time, energy and expenses that would be incurred to win the
store's agreement.
South Tampa has many properties in which the structure is worth relatively little but the land is
quite valuable; this applies particularly to sites on the water. It is not unusual to find a house
appraised at $300,000 where the land is worth $225,000 and the building $75,000. Such
situations present a dilemma to the buyers. If they tear the existing structure down, they
immediately add to their land costs and also incur all of the development costs and impact fees of
new construction. If, however, the renovate or expand the original structure, they are effectively
limited to a $37,500 budget (in this instance).
One way around this situation is incremental renovation. In the instance above, the homeowner
would ask the architect or contractor to design a series of improvements. The first improvement
would be done for the allocated $37,500 budget and the house would be submitted to the City for
re-assessment. Once the re-assessment has been done, and the house has an increased value (say
$110,000), a second renovation would be undertaken, this time for the new, higher 50% figure.
The impact of Hurricane Andrew on South Florida in 1992 added to the gravity of the 50% rule.
Many of the buildings in Tampa are simple concrete-block, slab-on-grade construction whose
finished floors sit anywhere from six to ten feet above sea level. Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regulations, however, stipulate that new construction must sit above the minimum
flood level for the particular location within which the home is built, or else federal flood insurance
will be withheld. In most parts of Florida, this level is either 11 or 13 feet above sea level. Thus, a
renovator who does not adhere to the 50% rule runs the danger of losing Federal flood protection
for his or her property. In specific instances, this rule has forced homeowners to literally elevate
their structures several feet while doing renovation work.
Needless to say, these rules and requirements add to the cost of construction for both new and
renovated properties. While the FEMA regulations are outside the City's jurisdiction, the 50%
Rule is not. Recently, the City initiated action to reduce the rigor of the rule with an eye to the
rehabilitation of older houses. Under the proposed wording, as long as the renovations in a project
meet the current code requirements, and the existing portions of the project meet previous codes,
the homeowner can spend as much money as necessary to rehabilitate a building. As noted by a
member of TPI, "Working in Tampa Heights, this is clearly going to help us and others looking to
rehab older houses."
Chapter V Options for Transformation: Case Studies from Tampa FL
Revitalization In and Around Downtown Tampa
Creating a successful downtown in the last decade of the 20 century is probably
one of the most challenging things facing cities. It's a really difficult proposition
because of all the fundamental forces working against you: decentralization of
employment, decentralization of population, concentration of urban problems in
the inner city, the resulting lack of investment. 43
Like many cities, large and small, Frostbelt or Sunbelt, Tampa saw its downtown decline
precipitously in the decades following the end of the Second World War. Historically, downtown
Tampa marked the site of the initial settlement, adjacent to Fort Brooke that had been set up by the
US Army in the 1830s. Bounded on the west by the Hillsborough River, on the south by
Hillsborough Bay and some 20 century spoil islands, and on the east by the 40 foot deep Ybor
Channel which had been built to service large vessels, Tampa's downtown was a compact, densely
developed. mix of uses. (The construction in 1963 of Interstate 4 created a fourth "edge" for the
downtown, leaving it with an official CBD of less than one-mile square.) Before the 1960s, no
buildings were taller than 15 stories, and the majority of the brick and stone buildings were
between three and five stories tall. The downtown has a simple orthogonal grid of streets, running
in the cardinal directions; at 210 x 210, Tampa's CBD blocks are the smallest of any city center
outside of Portland OR.
During the 1950s and 60s, businesses and residential uses began a steady migration away from the
downtown towards the suburbs. By the end of the 1960s, the remaining residential uses tended to
be second- and third-story boarding houses and precursors of today's SROs. Older buildings were
torn down and generally replaced with surface parking. The advent of skyscraper development in
the 1970s promoted this transition, and by the middle of the 1980s, Tampa's CBD was, for all
intents and purposes, a cluster of 40 story high-rises surrounding by an eclectic collection of older
low-rise buildings and many blocks of surface parking.
Throughout the 1960s and '70s, the city's official position was to encourage the development and
redevelopment of residential uses within the defined downtown area. The significant downtown
43 Patrick L. Phillips, Economic Research Associates, McLean VA, quoted in the St. Petersburg Times, 12
June 1995.
developments of the 1970s were both public-private ventures. Tampa City Center, comprising a
38 story office tower, a 300-room Hilton Hotel and a 1,500 car parking structure, was built
immediately across the street from Tampa City Hall, and straddling the City's traditional "Main
Street," Franklin Street. In addition, Franklin Street from the City Center to the Interstate was
closed off as a pedestrian mall. Millions were spent on streetscaping and design improvement.
The sum effect was the rapid decline of most of the retail uses located along the Mall.
In the 1980s, possibly helped by the publicity generated by the city's inclusion in John Naisbitt's
bestseller, Megatrends, commercial and civic development in downtown Tampa boomed. Within
the decade, 7 additional high-rise office towers were built, as well as a state-of-the art Performing
Arts Center, a Convention Center and an award-winning public park/parking structure. In addition
to the projects that got built, dozens of speculative projects were presented. While many were
never built, the energy and optimism generated by these projects helped to create a sense of
downtown Tampa as a locus for future development.
Lost in this optimism was any sense of the downtown as a place for residential development.
Outside of a number of buildings that were protected by historic designation but which had no
productive use, there was little interest in exploring residential options within the CBD proper.
Instead, official focus for residential redevelopment shifted to the immediate in-town, adjacent
neighborhoods, most of which were still in stages of ruin and blight. The city's downtown
development plan which was officially adopted in 1987, and was included as part of the City's
official, State-mandated, Comprehensive Plan of 1988, "alludes to a presumed synergistic
relationship between the CBD (one of the county's three major employment centers), and the areas
on its fringe. Enhancing the attractiveness of those areas for residential use by downtown workers
is widely believed to be essential to the achievement of a revitalized downtown." "
Thus, like many cities throughout the country, and, in particular, like many Sunbelt cities,
Tampa's official development plan, promulgated in the 1980s and maintained to this date, suggests
a coordinated center-city redevelopment plan that put large amounts of commercial and civic
development in the CBD and envisioned significant levels of medium- to high-density residential
development in the immediately adjacent neighborhoods. The terminology used to describe these
neighborhoods was "urban villages," a concept that was receiving favorable press throughout the
country and active implementation in cities such as Seattle WA and Portland OR. Within the State
of Florida, visions similar to Tampa's could be seen in the center-city plans for Orlando,
Jacksonville, Miami, St. Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale.
Clearly, the emphasis of the Downtown Plan was on commercial development and re-development.
With few exceptions, the fate of most of the adjacent in-town neighborhoods hinged on the
continuing growth of the Central Business District. A follow-up study, however, done in 1990 by
the Planning Commission at the City's behest, suggests that the official plan was flawed in at least
two significant ways. First, while the potentials for commercial redevelopment within the city
center were, and are, significant, little, if any of this potential was being achieved. In fact, during a
short period between 1992 and 1994, shortly after two new high-rise office buildings came on line,
Tampa ranked up with Dallas, Miami and Houston as a national leader in vacant office space. The
buildings were built but no one came.
The Planning Commission's study also suggested that the adjacent in-town neighborhoods were, in
fact, extremely weak candidates for residential redevelopment. The heady days of the 1980s real
estate boom had left many long-time land-holders with an inflated sense of the value of their
properties. This, coupled with negligible holding costs, created severe property speculation. In
addition, as noted in the study, "(a)nother major deterrent is an excessive crime rate. The rate
exceeds city-wide averages by 200 to 400 percent in most crime categories."
The Planning Commission's report, published in October of 1990, was equivocal in its outlook for
in-town residential redevelopment. While acknowledging the ostensible potentials the areas
possessed, the report clearly outlined the limitations, and concluded on a decidedly down note. In
the six years since the Planning Commission's analysis was completed, a great deal has happened
in both the CBD and the adjacent neighborhoods. Little of it, however, conforms with the city's
official vision, and while that vision remains on the books, public officials and private-sector
developers admit that things are moving very differently than might have been foreseen. 45
44 Hillsborough County City-County Planning Commission. Central Business District Periphery
Housing Study: Technical Report. (Tampa FL: Planning Commission, 1990), page 1.
45 Most of the plans done in the 1980s for the CBD and immediate environs were predicated on assumed
increases in downtown worker population. With a worker population of approximately 26,000 in the
The following case studies examine four neighborhoods immediately adjacent to downtown Tampa.
Each neighborhood has been the focus of considerable public and private sector design and
development efforts over the past twenty years. The four neighborhoods represent four different
approaches to the issue of urban re-development, differences that are accentuated by their location
in a fast-growing suburbanized metropolis.
The four neighborhoods represent varying degrees of redevelopment success and failure. They also
represent different challenges going forward. Most significantly, however, when taken as a
collective, united with the downtown proper, these neighborhoods serve as a unique example of the
potentials and the problems of redevelopment, as well as of the possibilities for the future.
Case Studies of Urban Redevelopment
The current market for a new suburb in derelict parts of an old city is likely to
consist of people from nearby areas who have started to make a little money, plus
people whose other housing choice is a small house or a mobile-home way out on
the urban fringe. To eliminate long hours of commuting every day, they might be
willing to consider a house in a close-in neighborhood, but the neighborhood has to
be affordable and part of an area large enough, and complete enough, to be clearly
distinguishable from deteriorated inner-city districts.46
In the 1970s, Philip Clay of MIT described two major means of neighborhood
revitalization: "gentrification" and what he called "incumbent redevelopment." Clay's models and
discussions were similar to those presented by Anthony Downs in his book Neighborhoods and
Urban Development.4 7 In both cases, gentrification was seen as the infusion into an existing
neighborhood, of outside capital and energy, generally in the form of younger, more affluent people
who invested time, energy and money in the neighborhood. While it was hard to dismiss the
middle of the decade, the CBD was seen as a home to as many as 70,000 workers by the end of the
century. Instead, for several years, worker population actually fell. Today, the most optimistic surveys
put the downtown worker population at just under 30,000 people. By contrast, the Westshore Business
District, five miles west of the CBD, has over 70,000 daytime employees.
As one public official put it, "These plans were all based on increases in the downtown worker
population. Instead, it went down. And, studies show that the number of downtown workers who live
outside Hillsborough County has increased over the years. It seems pretty safe to assume that the
downtown worker population is not looking for in-town housing."
4 Barnett, op cit, page 146.
47 Downs, Anthony. Neighborhoods and Urban Development. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1981.
significant improvements that could be made to neighborhood through such factors, most observers
felt less than sanguine about the disruptive impact gentrification has on the original residents of a
neighborhood, most of whom are bought out and displaced.
Incumbent re-development, on the other hand, was the situation in which the residents and
businesses of a neighborhood contributed towards the overall renovation and rejuvenation of the
area. Whereas gentrification was seen as disruptive to the original nature and occupancy of a
neighborhood, incumbent redevelopment was regarded as the best of both worlds. Those who
hailed from a district and wished to remain there, could do so. Those who wished to sell out and
move could find buyers. These buyers would contribute to the general upgrading of the
environment, but without dramatically raising prices or fomenting gentrification.
Critical to both definitions, however, is an influx of external capital. In gentrification, the
"yuppies". bring extra money and sweat-equity with them. Properties are renovated and re-sold, or
simply occupied. The new residents tend to have specific consumption patterns, so local retail
adjusts to support these new demands. Retail development and residential development work
symbiotically to create a new, typically mixed-use, enclave, with a cachet and character all its own.
Such external influxes of capital, however, are not so easily attracted in cases of incumbent re-
development. In the 1960s and 1970s, a range of government grants could be hand to help such
activity. While the success record of such grant programs as the Community Development Block
Grant program was checkered, the availability of external moneys that could be had with relatively
few strings attached did lend a sense that opportunities were available, particularly for those
neighborhoods and districts that were down but decidedly not out.
By the 1980s, however, Federal policies coupled with decreasing availability of funds led to sharp
cuts in external grant moneys. Faced with such impediments, examples of such internally-
generated rejuvenation became fewer and farther between.
Within Tampa, an example of the impact of gentrification can be seen in the Hyde Park
neighborhood just south of the downtown. Similarly, an ongoing example of the efforts involved in
incumbent regeneration can be found in the case of Tampa Heights, just north of downtown
Tampa.
There are, however, at least two other potential models for neighborhood revitalization, both of
which are applicable to in-town redevelopment. The first of these involves the collapse of a
previous institution, be it a large manufacturing plant, a shipping yard, a military establishment,
etc., and the subsequent take-over by a large, private sector developer. Mud Island, in Memphis is
one example of such in-town redevelopment; Harbour Island, in Tampa, is another example.
Finally, there is a fourth path to redevelopment, one that is less straightforward than any of the
other three. It involves an over-arching public/private partnership and is generally applied in
situations in which neither a single private-sector entity nor a single government entity has the time,
energy, money or desire to attempt to re-vitalize an area. Incumbent regeneration will not work
because there are simply too few people and institutions left in the neighborhood. A single private
entity might find the project too big, or too complicated to undertake. The same criteria hold true
for government agencies, particularly in light of the dismal record of similar efforts undertaken by
the Federal government in the 1960s. An example of this type of public/private re-development
effort is Ybor City in Tampa.
* Hyde Park: Classic Gentrification
Four factors account for gentrification. One was the substantial inflation
of housing prices during the 1970s, which for a time made real estate in central-
city neighborhoods a more attractive investment. At the outset, this was a major
impetus for gentrification. A second factor was the coming of age of a huge
population cohort, the postwar "baby boom" generation, from which many
gentrifiers have been drawn. Third, the restructuring of urban economies has
generated many new white-collar jobs in corporate management, firms providing
business services, and traditional professions such as law. Many of the new
recruits to these occupations work in the central city, and for them residing in a
near-downtown neighborhood can be highly attractive. Fourth . . . substantial
portions of the middle class, have once more embraced the urban neighborhood as
a place of residence.
The direct consequences of gentrification have yet to play out . .. in no
major US city does the number of gentrifying neighborhoods represent more than a
small fraction of the local housing stock. Thus, gentrification, of itself, does not
promise to reconstitute the property base of local municipalities or rebuild whole
cities. Gentrification in some cities has dislocated poorer incumbent residents who
can no longer afford the rents asked in "upscale" neighborhoods in a few cities loft
conversion in industrial areas has pitted real estate developers against incumbent
commercial and industrial enterprises, the latter being threatened by the rent and
tax increases that can strike properties that are proximate to such conversions. 48
In the late 19 century, the city of Tampa sat adjacent to Fort Brooke on the eastern side of the
Hillsborough River at the mouth of Hillsborough Bay. In the 1890s, Henry Plant, a railroad baron
from the Northeast pushed his railroad line south into the heart of the city. A fierce rivalry existed
between Plant, who was developing rail lines down the West coast of Florida, and Henry Flagler,
who was developing similar lines down the East coast of the state. Flagler had started the practice
of establishing large, luxury hotels at specific stations along his train routes. These were
advertised to well-to-do Northeasterners as vacation destinations and winter-time homes.
Flagler's success with hotels in St. Augustine and Palm Beach pushed Plant to propose a similar
project for Tampa. Given the density of downtown development and the cost of land there, Plant
purchased-a large tract of land on the west side of the River and in 1891, he opened the Tampa Bay
Hotel there. A compilation of at least half-a-dozen architectural styles, the 300+ room hotel was a
immediate sensation and a tourist attraction. To ease the passenger's journey, Plant built a
railroad trestle across the River, and then convinced the City of Tampa to build a similar bridge,
just to the south of the trestle, for vehicles and pedestrians. Not only did this facilitate easy
movement between the hotel and the City, but it spurred the suburbanization of the land around the
hotel, along the shore of the Bay.
The first major development to take place after the bridge was built was Hyde Park, named after
the Illinois hometown of developer 0. H. Platt, who purchased twenty acres of orange groves and
subdivided them for large homes for Tampa's elite. From this point on, Hyde Park became "the
focal point for Tampa's social life."
Two of Tampa's oldest schools, Gorrie Elementary, constructed in 1899,
and Wilson Junior High School, built in 1916, are located in Hyde Park verifying
that it was one of the City's first housing developments of significant scale.
Newspapers from the turn of the century show that Hyde Park became a
fashionable address for prominent Tampans. This growth continued from 1891,
until the culmination of the Florida Land Boom and the beginning of the
Depression in 1929.
48 Bennett, Larry. Fragments of Cities: The New American Downtowns and Neighborhoods. (Akron,
OH: Ohio University Press, 1995), page 17.
Trolleys provided public transportation from Ballast Point to the Tampa
Bay Hotel. In 1914, the County road alongside the trolley line was paved with
two 11-foot strips of brick, and Bayshore Boulevard emerged as a major
thoroughfare.
After World War I, the Land Boom began as millions of people poured
into Florida. The early 1920s were a rapid growth period for Tampa and Hyde
Park. Smaller homes, Florida "bungalows" with low slung roofs, appeared beside
the earlier grand residences.
Most jobs were centralized downtown, and Hyde Park's convenient
location resulted in the construction of many new homes. At this time, Tampa had
no zoning, so apartments and grocery stores were built alongside single family
homes, resulting in scattered land uses throughout the area.49
The Land Bust and the Depression effectively halted the growth of Tampa and Hyde Park, as well
as most communities in Florida. The only major project undertaken during the 1930s, however,
had considerable significance. As part of the WPA undertakings, Bayshore Boulevard was
widened, a central median and a seawall were added, and a promenade was built along the water's
edge. Along with the Tampa Bay Hotel which, by this time, had fallen into bankruptcy, this
project quickly became one of the civic and aesthetic features of the region.
Hyde Park stayed in limbo from 1929 through the end of the Second World War. After the war,
however, FHA loans, new highways and rapid suburbanization overtook Tampa and most other
cities in Florida. Hyde Park, with its tight gridiron of streets, was not convenient for auto traffic,
and with many of the thirty- , forty- and fifty-year old homes in need of maintenance and repair,
those who could left the neighborhood for newer subdivisions being built to the north of the City.
In the 1950s and '60s, Hyde Park was left to those who could not afford to move to the suburbs.
Once elegant waterfront residences were converted into apartments or boarding houses. Other
buildings were simply abandoned and boarded up.
During the early '70s, commuting to the city for employment and specialized goods and services
became difficult and expensive. Environmental and energy considerations also combined to make
commuting less desirable; thus, scattered, sprawling developments lost some of their appeal.50
49 Hillsborough County Planning Commission. Hyde Park Plan. Tampa, FL: Hillsborough County,
1976), page 6.
50 Ibid, page 6.
Hyde Park was an obvious first choice for people looking to live in an in-town neighborhood.
While the neighborhood was rundown, it was essentially untouched by Urban Renewal, and
property prices were quite affordable. Five and six-bedroom Victorian houses from the 1920s
could be had for as little as $50,000, and smaller cottages and bungalows were priced as low as
$15,000. In general, these houses were less than three blocks from Bayshore Boulevard, and while
somewhat rundown, most properties still had their original architectural features intact.
The neighborhood quickly became the focus of an early example of gentrification. Some of the
earliest people to recognize the value of both the buildings and the location were architects, artists
and others from creative fields who were drawn to the area because of the unique character of the
buildings and because the houses, while in need of repair, were generally affordable. 51
Initially, speculators and more timorous homeowners stayed away from Hyde Park because of the
reports of high levels of crime, generally stemming from the numerous boarding houses along the
northern edge of the neighborhood. In the early 1970s, however, the City of Tampa initiated
condemnation proceedings and began construction the Crosstown Expressway. While much of this
limited-access toll road was built within existing railroad rights-of-way, a short piece was run
through the northern part of Hyde Park, immediately west of the CBD and south of the Tampa Bay
Hotel, now run as part of the University of Tampa.
In other instances, such a construction project could have had devastating impacts on the adjacent
neighborhoods, but paradoxically, the Expressway bolstered the burgeoning redevelopment efforts.
The right-of-way was routed through the least expensive properties in the neighborhood. These
were generally the oldest buildings, most in the need of repair. Dozens of boarding homes and
si As an example, one elegant two-story house located two blocks from the Bayshore in the heart of the
neighborhood was purchased in 1975 for $45,000. Its current assessed value, which is down from the
highs at the end of the 1980s, is close to $300,000 and Realtors speculate that the property would sell for a
price well above $350,000, even in a generally deflated market.
While individual property prices vary considerably based on location, size, amenities, upkeep and
historical character, average prices in Hyde Park are among the highest in Hillsborough County. In 1995,
the average per square foot cost of existing houses in Hyde Park stood at slightly greater than $100. New
house prices were generally higher than this. By comparison, average house prices in Seminole Heights, a
neighborhood that also derives from the turn of the century and which also has many examples of period
residential architecture, were about half those in Hyde Park. The comparisons between the two
neighborhoods, however, boded well for both. House prices have remained high in Hyde Park, despite
general economic downturns, and prices in Seminole Heights have risen an average of $5,000 to $10,000
since 1994.
vacant buildings were destroyed and replaced with a well-landscaped, generally elevated four-lane
divided highway. As a result of the construction, crime levels fell dramatically, and the southern
half of the neighborhood comprising mostly single-family homes and small apartments was
separated from the northern segment that contained mostly multi-family housing and commercial
uses.
The Expressway thus eradicated one of the few areas in the district that was truly blighted, pumped
money into the neighborhood, lead to some streetscaping and general beautification, facilitated easy
access between Hyde Park and other parts of the City, and helped reduce criminal activity.
After the Expressway was completed in 1974, gentrification efforts in the neighborhood took off.
Now, in addition to homeowners willing to put sweat equity into restoring a house, contractors and
speculators began purchasing buildings for renovation and re-sale. Given the desire to promote
redevelopment and the generally mixed zoning in the area, some of the largest single-family homes
in the neighborhood were redeveloped as boutique offices.
When the Expressway bifurcated the district, it left the southern part with only a single major
commercial center. In the mid 1970s, this Old Hyde Park cluster of stores was given an extensive
facelift and new stores and restaurants were added.
In the early 1980s, in one of the first examples of large-scale private sector intervention in the
district, Amelea, Inc., a Canadian development company proposed an upscale mixed-use project
for the Old Hyde Park location. Designed by Toronto architect Joseph Bogdan, this extremely
ambitious project included 250,000 square feet of upscale stores and shops, nearly 100,000 square
feet of commercial offices, and well-over 100 town-homes and condominiums.
The redevelopment proposal met with some initial resistance from neighbors who felt that it would
adversely impact traffic conditions in the immediate surroundings. A series of design changes by
the developers helped mitigate this opposition. Such design features include a unique "double
frontage" for much of the project. Commercial uses facing into the "square" at the center of the
project back up directly against long, shallow townhouses that face onto adjacent through streets.
Thus, from all major venues, Old Hyde Park Village, as it was named, has no back. From the
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outside it appears as a series of contextually designed townhouses; from the interior, it looks like a
small village shopping district, albeit one with extremely upscale shops and boutiques.
To enhance the pedestrian character of the district, to buffer the adjacent, older residential areas
from the bustle of the commercial center, and the enhance the pedestrian quality of the entire
center, the developers placed three, four-story parking structures at the far reaches of the project
boundaries. Done in concrete with brick veneer and planted with vines, the garages are wider than
their immediate neighbors, but no higher. As the developers were required to maintain some of the
older, historic buildings as well as most of the original through streets and a central fountain, the
project has the appearance of having been in place for much longer than ten years.
The short-run results of this redevelopment project were not positive. A sudden increase in interest
rates coupled with lackluster sales forced the developers to re-organize and slowed progress to a
standstill. Some of the original stores and restaurants were not able to meet the increased lease
payments and with the severe real estate recession at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s, there was considerable turnover in shops.
The unconventional design of the project may have contributed to these early troubles. Located in
the middle of a high-density residential neighborhood, the Village was nowhere near any major
vehicular thoroughfares. It had only a single anchor tenant -Jacobsons, from a chain of smaller,
upscale departments stores; the majority of stores were small, high-priced boutiques selling
clothing, perfume and jewelry, and restaurants.
The subsequent, Phase II addition of a seven-theater movie complex added considerably to the -
drawing power of the Village, as did its steadily escalating popularity as a place to go to hang out,
to see and be seen. By 1992, it was well known as the in spot among younger professionals in the
south Tampa area.
Housing sales were sluggish at the outset. The notion of living "above the store" was novel in the
Tampa area, and the recession at the end of the '80s coincided with the completion of many of the
units. A planned third phase of the project was put permanently on hold in 1990, but ground was
finally broken for an additional 124 townhouse units at the end of 1995.
Figure 15: Mixed-Use Development in Old Hyde Park Village, Tampa FL
As a case study in the gentrification and revitalization of a historic neighborhood, Hyde Park
stands out as a paradigm. The neighborhood had bottomed out in the 1960s, the victim of benign
neglect, suburbanization and changing cultural values. The aforementioned factors -perceived
value for those willing to invest sweat equity, increasing commute times for suburban dwellers, the
oil embargo and subsequent increase in commuting costs, the construction of the Crosstown
Expressway-all created conditions that made Hyde Park ripe for gentrification in the 1970s:
Subsequent development in the 1980s helped reinforce the historic character of the district. Hyde
Park, today, is both a nationally and a locally designated historic district. Under the aegis of the
Historic Tampa/Hillsborough County Preservation Board, a host of volunteer agencies had
documented all of the original buildings in the district in the 1970s. This documentation was used
in apply for historic district status, and became the basis for a set of officially sanctioned "Hyde
Park Design Guidelines." These guidelines, in turn, provided the parameters for both
redevelopment efforts as well as new construction.
New construction began to appear in the district at the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Where
older buildings we so far deteriorated as to be beyond salvaging, builders were able to petition to
raze the structures and erect new ones. Most of the original single-family houses in the district
were built on relatively small lots with 50- or 60-foot frontages. Generally, such buildings were
replaced with new single-family houses, although the newer homes were both larger and more
efficiently laid out on their sites.
Sometimes, however, the sites were larger, and either zoning permitted more than one unit to be
built, or variances were sought. Given the escalating property values in the district, in many
instances, a single structure was torn down, and two or three units were built in its place.
Townhouses and courtyard duplexes have been extremely popular in that they provide many of the
amenities sought by home-buyers -attached, two-car garages, back-yards, generous interior light
and air-but allowed the builder to keep prices in the moderate to high-moderate range.52
By the mid-90s, several design/build development companies had emerged that focused almost
entirely on medium-density infill development projects. Each company followed essentially the
same pattern, with variations due to the intended market, the standard product and the selected
architecture. One company, Bayfair, Inc., specializes in replacing well-located but under-sized or
run-down single family houses with much larger, more elaborate models. A rule of thumb in this
approach is to try and locate properties where the cost of the land (sometimes including the pre-
existing structure) will not amount to more than one-third of the sale price of the completed
construction. While it is technically possible to arrange such conditions by simply building more
expensive houses, developers attempt to stay reasonably close to the high average price of home
immediately around the proposed construction site.
In particular instances, the price of these infill homes will considerably exceed that of the
surrounding buildings; homes located on the water or along Bayshore Boulevard, or in an area
where the potential for doing a number of such projects is relatively high. For a typical project,
however, a property purchased for $165,000 will become a large (3,000+ square foot), two-story
house with an asking price of approximately $500,000.
Because many of the houses in Hyde Park are listed as contributing structures, they cannot be torn
down except in cases of severe structural damage. Because of this, direct house-for-house
redevelopment is somewhat limited within the confines of the Landmark District. Outside the
District, however, along Bayshore Boulevard and on Davis Islands, such redevelopment practices
abound.
Within Hyde Park, there are still many smaller, non-contributing single-family homes, particularly
at the fringes of the district. In such instances, the numbers may not work on a direct one-for-one
redevelopment. Here, however, developers look at more creative solutions. Where possible, there
might be two similar structures on adjacent lots. Here, with re-zoning, the developer might be able
to build four townhouses and thereby justify the initial costs. Craig Ross and Scott Shimberg of
Hyde Park Builders have produced over one-hundred units working in this vein.
"Our approach is very simple," notes Ross. "We look for properties which are under-valued or
under-sized for the immediate environment. If the zoning can be worked, we figure out how many
multi-family units we can put on the site; we figure out our hard and soft costs and our sales
prices. We subtract the costs from the prices and whatever is left over is what we can pay for the
property. If we can get it for that amount -or less-we go ahead."53
Ross and Shimberg have done a great deal of market research, both in studying potential projects
in evaluating completed work. "Our typical buyer is a professional women between the ages of 25
and 40. Generally, they are single and they work downtown or in Westshore. They are looking for
something that is comfortable, and well-designed, but most of all, they are looking for security."
Hyde Park Builders standard product is a town-house cluster project, with two- or three-story
townhouses grouped around a central drive court. Each unit has a two-car garage beneath it, with
small outdoor spaces on the sides of the buildings facing away from the courtyard. "The garages,
perimeter fencing, and gates all add to our cost of doing the project," says Ross, "but it is what we
have to do in order to reach this market. And, it is quite an extensive market. These are people
who have good jobs, have discretionary income, but who want to feel safe and secure at home.
They want to live in Hyde Park (or on Davis Islands) because they are safe, they are close to the
water and the shops, and people feel comfortable walking or jogging or roller blading."
53 Craig Ross, Hyde Park Builders, Tampa FL. Interview with the author, June 1996.
A third redeveloper working in Hyde Park does some new construction, but focuses primarily on
renovating older buildings, typically looking to convert uses where possible and feasible. Again,
the company's efforts are motivated by a positive bottom line. Property will sit vacant until the
asking price comes down or the market improves to the point that they owners of the company feel
that they can make a profit on the renovation.
Figure 16: Infill Courtyard Townhouse Project
In addition to these companies, a host of smaller design/build firms also dabble in redevelopment in
the Hyde Park neighborhood. Typically, builders look for situations where they can increase the
density of their sites, generally looking to replace one single-family house with a duplex, two
adjacent houses with a triplex or quad-block. As related by one architect/developer, he looks for
properties on blocks that still have their original alleyways intact. Many of the blocks in the Hyde
Park area were built with 12 foot center-lot alleys for garage access and utilities, but not all are
still extant. With two fifty-foot frontages and alley access, one can petition to develop three two-
story townhouse units with attached garages entered from the rear and courtyard access in the
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front. With a single sixty-foot lot, one can create a courtyard duplex with similar garage and front
yard conditions.
Figure 17: Duplex Infill Development
Construction costs for all these infill projects tend to be somewhat higher than for conventional
residences built in other locations both because of the additional amenities that go into the
buildings -hardwood floors, higher ceilings, trim materials, etc.-and because of the additional
review procedures required by the City of Tampa. Asking prices for well-designed townhouse and
duplex units in nicer locations easily reached $100 per square foot by the early 1990s; despite a dip
in both prices and sales in 1993 and 1994, by 1995, infill development was booming once again,
with most condos in the neighborhood selling for between $125,000 and $185,000.
While Hyde Park builders caters to a particular clientele, the typical buyers for infill units tend to
be younger professionals, most of whom work in and around downtown Tampa or in the Westshore
Business District, about seven miles west of Hyde Park. A smaller percentage of residents work in
St. Petersburg, which is a relatively easy commute down Bayshore Boulevard, across the south
Tampa peninsula and then across the Gandy Bridge. Most buyers are single or young couples in
their twenties or thirties. There is a small but stable gay population, and some of the more upscale
condominium units are seeing increasing numbers of empty-nester buyers.
In addition to the single-family homes and newer multi-family condominiums, Hyde Park still
contains a wide variety of neighborhood-scale apartment options, many of which are original
construction from the 1920s. An early prototype apartment design consists of a U-shaped or H-
shaped two-story building with extremely narrow wings and anywhere from eight to sixteen units.
The narrow width, extensive surface area and high-ceilinged interior were adequate to provide
comfort in the days before window-unit air conditioning became popular in the 1950s. Sturdily-
built out of masonry covered with stucco, examples of these buildings abound throughout the
district, and are generally interspersed among the single-family homes. Some have been renovated
and charge rents that are well above-market, but many are usable, but not in great condition. As
such, the provide moderate priced options. Many of the residents in such apartment buildings
occupy lower-level white collar jobs at downtown offices; some work in the numerous bars and
restaurants in and around Hyde Park.
By 1993, however, the market in Hyde Park had come back to the point that several developers
were looking to create upscale rental apartment complexes. There was considerable difficulty in
finding large enough parcels of land for such suburban-style garden apartments, and several
developers came up with ingenious proposals involving swapping a collection of smaller scattered
parcels for a 14-acre City-owned parcel being used as a playground. To date, only one such
project has been completed, a 200+ unit project done by Post Apartments from Houston. Built just
outside the Hyde Park district line on former light-industrial land, the complex has been extremely
successful, with one- and two-bedroom options aimed primarily at young professional singles. At
prices between $600 and $900 per month, this project is at the upper end of South Tampa rental
property, with the exception of units located directly on Bayshore Boulevard or on Harbour Island.
In summation, the past twenty years have seen an extremely successful gentrification of the Hyde
Park neighborhood, combined with market-driven examples of selective densification. Currently,
Hyde Park stands as one of the most desirable living environments in the City, because of the
obvious traditional character and interesting architectural features, its easy access to recreation,
shopping and work, and its diverse, yet generally up-scale constituency.
Several factors, however, clearly helped make Hyde Park such as success. Even at its nadir, Hyde
Park never reached the levels of abandonment and decay of many other in-town neighborhoods, in
Tampa and elsewhere. Although buildings had been converted from single-family to multi-family
and from single-tenant to multi-tenant, most buildings were still occupied and usable. The
construction of the Crosstown Expressway helped eradicate some of the worst housing conditions,
and by bifurcating the district, created a sense of the southern half as safe environment. In
addition, the neighborhoods location immediately southwest of the downtown astride a truly
beautiful waterfront boulevard created enormous locational advantage. Finally, given the tenor of
the times in the 1970s, Hyde Park found an active and energetic group of supporters, in both the
public and private sectors; people who were willing to commit time, money and energy to turning
the neighborhood around.
e Tampa Heights: Struggling Incumbent Regeneration
One mile north of the CBD, sits Tampa's earliest suburban neighborhood, Tampa Heights.
Similar to Hyde Park in lineage, architecture and street organization, Tampa Heights, too, fell upon
hard times during the period after the Second World War. Unlike Hyde Park, however, to which it
is often compared, Tampa Heights never caught the gentrification rebound. Twenty years after it
was first identified as a potential redevelopment gem, the neighborhood is still struggling; even
though it has brought itself back from the brink of total decay, even the most positive advocate
admits that there is still a long way to go.
The first "suburb" of the newly-created city, Tampa Heights was located due north today's Central
Business District. Situated at an elevation that was between fifteen and twenty-five higher than the
city proper, Tampa Heights suffered none of the problems of malaria and other mosquito-borne
diseases, and was viewed as a cool and leafy retreat from the city center. In the 1880s and 1890s,
those residents who could afford to do so, moved northward to the Heights, where they built airy
Victorian wood-frame houses with wraparound porches and large windows.
The boom that produced Tampa Heights, however, was challenged almost as soon as it occurred.
As noted, in 1888 Henry Plant convinced the Tampa city leaders to construct a bridge across the
Hillsborough River into what became Hyde Park, and with the creation of the Tampa Bay Hotel
and the subsequent re-construction of the Lafayette Street bridge in 1896, the boom to develop
Hyde Park was on, generally powered by the same audience for houses in Tampa Heights. With its
proximity to the Hotel and the Bayshore and its sense of being the "trendy" place to live, Hyde
Park quickly surpassed Tampa Heights as the well-to-do neighborhood.
As the twentieth century progressed, therefore, and development continued in Tampa Heights, it
was more economically, socially and culturally varied than in Hyde Park. Spanish, Cuban, Italian,
German, Jewish and black residents all moved into Tampa Heights, surrounding some of the larger
and more lavish older homes with small, neat bungalows and frame houses. Nebraska Avenue and
Florida Avenue, parallel streets moving northward from the downtown became the predominant
routes out. of the city; these streets were lined with stores and shops.
Without the dominant industry and culture of Ybor City, or the wealth of Hyde Park, Tampa
Heights felt the impact of the Depression and the War more severely than these other
neighborhoods. As early as the 1940s, the neighborhood was viewed as the ideal location for the
earliest Federally-funded public housing projects. After the War was over, suburban flight had a
strong, negative impact on Tampa Heights. The final blow to the neighborhood came in the late
1960s with the northern extension of Interstate 275, which functionally and physically separated
Tampa Heights from Ybor City, the abutting neighborhood to the east.
By the middle of the 1980s, Tampa Heights had one of the highest crime rates of any location
within the City of Tampa. Long known for its drug dealers and prostitutes, many of the old,
houses in the neighborhood, which had originated as single-family dwellings and had later been
turned into boarding houses, had been turned into crack-houses, havens for those who sold as well
as used the drug. Grid 95, covering the northeastern section of the neighborhood, and home to the
Robles Park public housing project, had the fourth-highest crime rate in the City in 1989. At that
time, crime in and around public housing projects had become endemic, and then-mayor Sandra
Freedman instituted a special program to combat the problem. Working with the Chief of Police,
the City authorized a number of QUAD Squads (Quick Unit Action Deployment), who were
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deployed in the worst sectors of the City. In addition, City bulldozers were brought out to raze
known crack houses and the word was spread that the sale of drugs, particularly in the worst
neighborhoods for drug trafficking, would no longer be tolerated.54
By the end of 1993, the City's anti-crime efforts had begun to have a sizable impact, particularly in
the most crime-ridden inner-city neighborhoods. Tampa Heights had been considered such a
neighborhood, but by 1993, crime in one of the seven Grids comprising the community was down
over 40%, crime in two others was down between 20 and 40%, and in another two Grids, was
down between 0 and 20%. Only in one small sector of the neighborhood had criminal activity
increased, and this was by less than 20%.55
Residents of the neighborhood base the turnaround on a series of factors. Paramount among them
is the City's action in cracking down on drug trafficking and prostitution. Complementing these
efforts, however, were the efforts of private citizens, as individuals, or as members of community
and civic associations such as the Tampa Heights Civic Association. This was a group that came
together in the late 1980s, "out of frustration," noted one long-time member.
In addition to cracking down on criminal activity, in 1987, the City created the Challenge Fund, a
revitalization program designed to provide funds for citizens looking to renovate and restore older
properties.
In the face of shrinking Federal funding and with the realization that the City alone would not be
able to improve the quality of housing in the inner city, in 1987 the Mayor's Office initiated the
Challenge Fund. According the Fernando Noriega, Director of Community Development for the
City, the idea stemmed from examples found in Northeastern and Northwestern cities. The goal
was to induce private sector funding sources to provide mortgages to applicants who might
otherwise be viewed as high-risk borrowers. In return for banks and credit unions overlooking
exceptions in their credit criteria, the City would guarantee all loans for the first five years.
54 In July 1994, the QUAD squad oversaw the razing of the 200th crack house in the city of Tampa. By
eveyone's estimate, this program has had an enormous positive impact on the problem of drugs and drug
dealing within the city limits. St. Petersburg Times, 20 July 1994, B 1.
55 Lammers, Dirk. "Crime by the Numbers," in Tampa Tribune, 17 July 1994. The original source for
the crime statistics was the City of Tampa Police Department.
While the program stipulates ways in which the lenders can effect these exceptions -reduced
underwriting criteria; lowered interest rates; enhanced amortization standards- "in reality, the
lenders seldom have to lend at below-market rates. Instead, we encourage them to lend to home
buyers who would otherwise not be able to qualify for a mortgage." Typically, these are people
who have a poor credit history, would be spending more than 28% of their gross income on house
payments, or who do not have the necessary job history.
Within the City at large, over a ten year period, the Challenge Fund has helped approximately
14,000 families acquire some form of housing. Today, the program has 26 banks and 8 credit
unions involved, providing approximately $25 million in loans each year. Within Tampa Heights,
the Fund has help several hundred families purchase property. As of 1994, only a bit more than
one percent had defaulted on their loan obligations. 56
"There is no doubt that the City has been incredibly helpful in our efforts to revitalize the housing
stock in Tampa Heights." 57 The speaker is Becky Clarke, a member of Tampa Preservation, Inc.,
a private, non-profit group whose goal since 1988 has been to preserve and revitalize the original
housing stock in the neighborhood. Founded in Hyde Park in 1974, TPI took on Tampa Heights as
a cause in the late 1980s after visiting other cities across the country and hearing presentations
done by the National Historic Trust.
"We were inspired by what we saw in Savannah and Kansas City and elsewhere, and we asked
why we couldn't make something like this work in Tampa." Using money that they had earned by
rehabilitating and selling an historic house in Hyde Park, TPI pledged $40,000 to a revolving fund
to be used in Ybor City. Because many of the members of TPI also belonged to the local chapter
of the Junior League, the League, in turn, contributed $50,000 to the fund. An additional $10,000
donated by Leadership Tampa, a non-profit civic group, gave TPI the $100,000 start up funds it
needed to begin work.
56 Rosen, Marty. "Urban Pioneers," in St. Petersburg Times, Sunday 18 July 1993, page 3H.
57 Becky Clarke, Tampa Preservation, Inc. Interview with the author, July 1996.
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TPI's first project was to assist the local chapter of Habitat for Humanity. "They were struggling
a bit," notes Clarke, "so we purchased two lots for them, and contributed funds to pay for the
design of two prototype buildings, and then paid for the construction." The small, 1,400 square
foot, wood-frame houses included some of the Victorian features that were common to the
neighborhood -porches, gingerbread railings and trim, metal roofs. Including volunteer labor and
contributions, the buildings were designed to sell for $35,000, "the most the neighborhood could
absorb at the time." Completed in 1990, the houses were "the first new construction in Tampa
Heights in eons."
Figure 19: New Residential Construction in Tampa Heights
Realizing the magnitude of their self-appointed task, TPI chose to focus their efforts on a single,
20-block sector of the neighborhood. "We spent some time scouting around," says Clarke, "and
we decided that there was an enclave where there were still a number of restorable houses and a lot
of empty lots." In 1990, the group won a State Preservation Grant to be used in restoring four
additional houses within that target area. Including these initial projects, TPI has played a role in
the development of between 45 and 50 sites to date, and currently owns another 10 sites that they
are looking to develop.
Our role is a lot like that of a standard real estate broker. We buy vacant land and
re-sell it to buyers who are looking to build their own homes. We buy vacant land
and build our own houses on it for re-sale. Or, we buy older homes and restore
them. We are not looking to make any money on the deal and we are not looking
to gentrify the neighborhood.
We have a few standard rules. We will never displace any law-abiding
citizen from the neighborhood. We deal only with housing, as opposed to social
services, and we are not looking to be landlords, so we don't do rental projects.
For the projects we do build and sell, we have deed restrictions. We get the right
to approve any subsequent improvements or additions, and we prohibit subsequent
subdividing of parcels or properties. Other than that, we are really looking to help
the people here make things happen on their own.58
In the last few years, Clarke notes, they have begun to see spontaneous redevelopment
efforts from private owners and developers in the neighborhood. Paramount among these were
young professionals, generally in their late 20s or early 30s, many of whom worked in the
downtown, who were looking to purchase their first home. Many of these investors were single,
and a considerable percentage were gay. A 1993 feature in the St. Petersburg Times, focused on
the role of gay professionals as urban pioneers, and tracked their progress in Tampa, as part of the
initial wave in Hyde Park in the 1970s, then in Seminole Heights (located just north of Tampa
Heights) in the 1980s, and finally, in Tampa Heights at the advent of the 1990s.
In Tampa Heights, a rundown, crime-ridden neighborhood just north of downtown,
a gay community thrives.
"We don't have families and aren't threatened by riff-raff," said one gay
professional, in his 30s, who recently bought a crumbling home in Tampa Heights.
He couldn't afford Hyde Park, yet wanted to live close to his downtown
job. A gay friend suggested Tampa Heights, where three acquaintances were
renovating old homes.
"They actually took me there and showed me their projects," he said.
Within weeks, he bid on a Victorian home in need of major repairs. "It's sweat
equity, and you fulfill a dream that you can't do in Hyde Park." 59
Similar stories can be told by many others who have purchased buildings or property in Tampa
Heights in the past few years. Some of these deals have been brokered by TPI; more and more
now are not. At the beginning of the decade, vacant lots, generally 68' x 120', could be purchased
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58 Clarke, op cit.
for $5,000-$7,000. Today, the cheapest lots begin at $10,000 and it is not uncommon to find some
single-lots with asking prices as high as $25,000. "Those prices are a bit unrealistic,"
acknowledged one seller, "but not that far off. And, you might as well start high and then negotiate
down."
Five years ago, it was not impossible to find original home, albeit in extremely dilapidated
condition, for a little as $12,000. Today, the best of such homes have been purchased and
renovated, and some are back on the market at prices almost ten times their original purchase price.
Other houses, purchased at somewhat higher prices, have shown similar increases in value. In
1992, Tony Ulloa, a downtown executive and past-President of the Tampa Heights Civic
Association, purchased his small Victorian home for $28,000. In 1994, after two years of sweat
equity and renovation, the house was appraised at over $120,000.
Ulloa's initial concerns, like those of other buyers in the area, was to find something that he could
afford, and to get "the best bang per buck." Today, such small-scale renovation and redevelopment
continues, but not without some obstacles. Dan Stevenson, a contractor, has been living and
working in Tampa Heights since the early 1980s. "Things are happening now," he says, "but I
don't understand why there isn't more of it."
Stevenson points to pockets of activity within the neighborhood, blocks where three of four new
structures sit side-by-side with other buildings that have been renovated. Many of the newer
buildings are the work of a single construction firm who is now in the process of speculative
development. In general, the new houses imitate the traditional Victorian gingerbread quality of the
older structures, and sell for between $75,000 and $85,000.
Stevenson credits the City for helping clear up the original drug and crime problems, and points to
the new YMCA facility along Palm Avenue as one of the better investments in the neighborhood.
"It's a new building; it's big and clean, and it attracts people from downtown who might otherwise
not come up this way." On the other hand, he points out, other social service agencies in the
Tampa Heights area are clearly working against the on-going revitalization efforts. "The main
culprit is the Salvation Army. They have a major soup kitchen operating from their Tampa
59 Rosen, op cit, page 1H.
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Heights facility and every day at 5:00 PM, there are hundreds of indigents just hanging around
waiting for a handout. And, with the location (astride an Interstate exit ramp, and Florida Avenue,
one of the major northward exits from downtown), this is what the downtown workers see when the
go home at night. It's the worst possible advertising in the world."
Even though the facility is less than two block from the current headquarters of the Tampa Police
Department, the Salvation Army has been the target of complaints because the soup lines attract
drug dealers looking to sell to the indigents. Residents also point to the bus-transfer station located
beneath the Interstate Highway that runs along the southern edge of the neighborhood. "It's scary
driving under the highway when it's full of people waiting for the busses," says one resident.
"There may not be anything to it, but it's a problem as far as the image of the neighborhood goes."
On the other hand, Clarke of TPI, is quick to point out that the Salvation Army and the
Metropolitan Ministries pre-date most of the recent residents in the neighborhood. "People forget
that we are the new kids on the block here. These social service programs provide a very real
benefit to members of our society; it is our responsibility to learn how to live with them and not the
other way around.
"The fact is," notes Clarke, "that rehabilitating Tampa Heights is a very hard project if you are
going to look at it strictly from the point of view of making a profit. It's simply not here. But, if
you are like us, and you are looking to really effect some change, there's a lot of opportunity."
Pressed to name an individual or entity that has taken the leadership role in Tampa Heights recent
revival, Clarke demurs. "There's no one person or group. There are literally dozens of groups
involved in the Tampa Heights area.60 We've been lucky to have the support of the City, but
we've also had to support of private-sector groups like Home Depot and landscaping companies.61
This is truly a communal effort. We've got a long way to go, but we've seen some real success."
60 One of the most recent addition to the ranks of groups involved with Tampa Heights is the Tampa
Heights Neighborhood Revitalization Alliance, an umbrella organization comprising all the various
groups and agencies working in the neighborhood. "This has been a very useful group," says Clarke. "It
allows us to figure out what we each are interested in and what we do well; then we go and focus on our
own areas of expertise. This way we avoid duplication and efficiency increases.
61 Home Depot has a long-term reputation as a supporter of local revitalization efforts, supplying
materials and expertise to groups such as TPI and Habitat for Humanity. In Tampa, local Home Depot
stores have helped groups sponsor events such as building projects. In other areas, the Mayor's office has
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Clearly, despite the parallels in their histories, Tampa Heights and Hyde Park represent different
problems and different solutions in terms of neighborhood redevelopment. Sitting along the edge of
Hillsborough Bay and Bayshore Boulevard, Hyde Park has an enormous locational advantage. On
the other hand, the City of Tampa is planning on relocating its current Police Headquarters from
Tampa Heights to the CBD, freeing up a 16 acre parcel of land along the Hillsborough River. It is
anticipated that the City will seek developer bids for this land, with a focus on some sort of upscale
residential project. "It would be great if someone like Post Apartments (a large Houston-based
developer of up-scale apartment complexes) would come in and do one of their projects," says one
current resident. "As long as they leave the River's edge accessible." Responding to this, Noriega
of the City's Community Development office notes that the City intends to offer the parcel with an
eye for what the developer intends to do with it, not for the price to be paid.
Hyde Park clearly had some additional advantages. "Even at its worst," notes David Rigney,
Director of Construction for the Tampa/Hillsborough Preservation Board, "Hyde Park was never
really at the bottom. Houses that were formerly single-family were used as multi-family, and some
of the construction had deteriorated, but the buildings were all there, all intact. Tampa Heights is
like a war zone compared to Hyde Park."
Ironically, while highway construction hastened the decline of Tampa Heights, it helped the
revitalization of Hyde Park, and Urban Renewal, which effectively left Hyde Park untouched, left
Tampa Heights with well over 1,000 units of public housing, which, over time, became one of the
major sources of criminal activity within the area.
Finally, despite the attention that Tampa Heights has received from both the public and private
sectors, the overriding intention for the area is clearly different than it was for Hyde Park. "Hyde
Park was a classic case of gentrification," says preservationist Rigney. "That is not the goal for
Tampa Heights." "Our goal is not to gentrify," says Frances Kruse, of TPI, echoing Clarke. "We
want a mixed neighborhood." 62
been able to get local professionals to donate their time and services, free of charge, for efforts such as
house painting, tree trimming, landscaping and street-lighting.
62 Rosen, op cit, page 3H.
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External factors may influence Tampa Heights' redevelopment for the better. At the end of 1995,
Seminole Heights, the neighborhood immediately to the north of Tampa Heights, was designated as
a Local Landmark District; in 1993, the core of the community had been added to the National
Register of Historic Places. Like Hyde Park, Seminole Heights will now be subject to development
review by the Architectural Review Commission. Owners of properties will be given guidelines for
renovations and new additions. Tax breaks and other incentives will also be available. Noted one
developer, 'This could bode very well for Tampa Heights. Properties in Seminole Heights will
become more expensive as the general conditions improve, and there should be a spin-off effect to
the south. In addition, as conditions in Seminole Heights improve and there is a clearer sense of it
as an up-and-coming neighborhood, there should be some residual impact on Tampa Heights."
Figure 20: Obsolete Commercial Strip Along Florida Avenue, Tampa Heights
Nonetheless, Tampa Heights still has a long way to go. Population in the neighborhood has
stabilized, and there are clearly signs of renovation and new investment. Still, despite the welcome
addition of the YMCA, there is concern about other service agencies such as the Metropolitan
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Ministries and Salvation Army.63 Two major commercial streets cut through the neighborhood
moving north and south: Tampa Avenue and Florida Avenue. Each bears vestigial signs of its
importance in the immediate pre- and post-War period, but neither can be viewed today as anything
but an example of an outmoded commercial strip.
Where once the two streets both carried two-way traffic, with Florida Avenue as the main
commercial street in the neighborhood, and Tampa Avenue as a more mixed collection of
commercial and residential uses, now the streets function primarily as traffic arteries. Converted
by the Florida Department of Transportation into a one-way pair (Tampa flowing south into the
CBD; Florida flowing north, out of the downtown), the uses along the streets clearly reflect their
diminished status. Small stores, without the requisite parking, sit adjacent to the lots of auto-
wreckers and used-car dealers. As one resident points out, "Florida Avenue is like a graveyard.
Where there used to be dealers selling cars, now there are only people selling hub-caps and
mufflers.".
Along the southern edge of the neighborhood, closest to the downtown, there is evidence of
landbanking. Several properties are listed for sale, at asking prices that run from two to four times
their assessed value. Inquiries as to the sale price of clearly abandoned properties were answered
curtly; "The property is not for sale." Several large parcels are held by city or county agencies,
including an abandoned high school and a former library. Both buildings have a certain civic
monumentality and sense of architectural presence. Both, however, may be too far gone to save.
"The County ran the school building into the ground," says one architect who was around when the
building was shuttered. "I am not sure you could use it today without extensive structural
renovations." Another architect, hired to do a feasibility study on the library building, reported that -
the layout and design of the structure make it extremely expensive to re-use. "As an old library, it
63 Metropolitan Ministries recently received a $15 million endowment to create a two-block, enclosed
"compound" between Tampa Street and Florida Avenue. Within the walled precinct, the agency hopes to
offer care and training for people and families of all ages, including quarters for housing families and
individuals. Announcement of the project was met with considerable protest from residents, and approval
was only granted by the City after striking a deal with Metropolitan Ministries. As explained by Noriega,
"we agreed to allow them to expand the quality of their offerings, but not the volume. They will be
dealing with people who are case managed. As long as their clients obey the rules, they will be allowed to
stay." In the City's eyes, given such controls, the positive attributes of the new construction, the increased
activity and the many well-paying jobs that the project would create, outweighed the possible negative
impact of an expanded social service presence.
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worked fine. As an office building or other contemporary use, it's very very inefficient." In both
instances, there are no immediate plans to re-use these abandoned institutions.
Similar fates have befallen some of the many churches that dotted the original neighborhood. A
few have been the victims of arson and abandonment. Many are still operational, but without the
necessary funds for upkeep and repairs. Like many other situations, however, despite the size of
the problem, there are glimmers of hope. A local architect recently signed a contract with TPI to
take possession of a large, architecturally elegant brick church that had been badly damaged by
arsonists in the early 1990s. "It's not the type of project that would make sense to do as a
developer," says TPI's Clarke, "but this man really loves the building and he wants to use it as his
own office. We'll do everything we can to help him make it work."
In additions to the dozens of vacant infill parcels, several large tracts of vacant land can be found
in the neighborhood. Typically, these belong to private owners or institutions, many of whom are
not yet looking to develop or to sell. One whole-block parcel, the former site of St. Joseph's
Hospital, is held by the Dioceses of St. Petersburg. "Initially," notes Stevenson, who owns six
parcels across the street from the site, "I got them to go in with me on a package, looking for
someone to take on eight acres. We got no response to our notice and after a year, the Diocese said
that there weren't interested in developing it at the time." As another observer noted, "The Diocese
has no need for the money, so they'll do something with the site whenever they decide it's time."
Stevenson's six parcels are still on the market, at $25,000 apiece, which is lower than the $50,000
price he was initially asking. He hasn't had many inquiries. "I did have one fellow call me. When
I told him the price, he laughed and said that he could buy half-a-dozen similar sites for between
$10,000 and $15,000. "Then go buy one of them," I told him. "Just stay in the neighborhood."
* Harbour Island: Private-Sector Neighborhood Redevelopment
Some indication of how hard it may be for those in positions of power to
make downtown a magnet can be gleaned from the experience of one ambitious
investor that has already stumbled. Beneficial Corp.'s Harbour Island, a vast
commercial and residential development just across the shipping channel from a
wharf area under revitalization, opened in 1985. Its 66,300 square-foot retail
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center was supposed to be Tampa's marquee marketplace - a showplace of
upscale shops and trendy restaurants. Instead, the island's shops have a 50%
vacancy rate.
Finn Caspersen, chairman and chief executive officer of Beneficial, based
in Wilmington, Del., says he started developing Harbour Island at about the time
John Naisbitt's book "Megatrends" called Tampa one of the "Ten Great Cities of
Opportunity" in the U. S. Mr. Caspersen now says, "I think both of us were a
little early."64
Located less than 100 yards directly south of Tampa's Central Business District, Harbour Island
represents a redevelopment opportunity that few cities can match. The 217 acre parcel of land is
entirely surrounded by water, linked to the Downtown by two bridges for cars and pedestrians. "In
effect," notes Tom Harvey, former development manager for the Island, "we've got the largest
downtown gated community in the country."
Harbour Island began life as Seddon Island, a spoil island created in the early 1900s when the
channels leading to Tampa's main port area were deepened to between 35 and 45 feet in depth.
The Seaboard Railroad used the property as a marshaling yards for their trains, and as a transfer
point in shipping phosphate and lumber.
During World War II, Tampa emerged as a center of ship-building; much of this was carried out at
facilities located on another spoil island, Hookers point. After the war, particularly with the Cuban
embargo, activities on Seddon Island and at Port Tampa were gradually consolidated on Hookers
Point. By the 1970s, the property was, for all intents and purposes, abandoned. CSX Railways,
its owner, listed it for sale in 1972, with an asking price ofjust under $3 million.
The island evinced a great deal of interest. Developers came forth with a wide variety of re-use
proposals, including housing, conference centers, and even an amusement park. No one was
willing to pay the asking price, however, until 1979, when Beneficial Finance Corporation, from
New Jersey, agreed to purchase the property for $2.9 million.
At the time of the purchase, Beneficial was primarily a consumer finance company. It had been
doing very well in this business and Finn Casperson, the CEO of the company, was looking for
64 Tippett, Karen L. and Robert Johnson. "To Halt Slide, Tampa Looks Back to an Old Mayor - and
Strategy." Wall Street Journal, Florida Journal. Wednesday, February 22, 1995, page E4
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ways to diversify the company. Casperson was familiar with Tampa from having visited the West
Coast of Florida as a child with his father, the founder of Beneficial. At the time of the sale,
Casperson did not have a specific idea of what to do with the property, but he felt that it had
excellent redevelopment potential and that it represented a smart business move for his company.
Figure 21: View of Downtown Tampa from Harbour Island
On top of the purchase price, Beneficial had to pay to have many contaminated sites on the island
cleaned and mitigated. Because of these expenses and because of the unique location, from the -
outset, the island was seen as a dense, urban activity center. Zoning was approved for a
redevelopment land-use plan that included 4,560 residents, over one million square feet of office
space, a conference center, a 500-room hotel, and a considerable amount and variety of retail.
The masterplan and phase one design work for the project, which was rechristened Harbour Island,
was complete by the Hillier Group, an architecture and planning company from New Jersey, that
had done earlier work for Beneficial. Work began on the project in 1983, and by 1986 the first
200 condominium units had been completed, the hotel and offices were in operation and the 66,300
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square foot retail center, "The Shops at Harbour Island" was open for business. Done in light
brown brick, with concrete trim, the buildings bore a noticeable resemblance to other Beneficial
facilities in the Northeast, and the propriety of the architecture for Tampa's hot, humid, sub-
tropical climate was a topic of considerable debate. Additional design features also stimulated
discussion. The Shops were laid out essentially in the manner of a mall, with an internally
functioning, double-loaded corridor, even though the entire project sit right on the water's edge at a
juncture facing Davis Islands, Hyde Park and the CBD.
Nonetheless, the opening of the Island was a cause for considerable celebration. Former President
Ford came to Tampa for the Grand Opening ceremonies, along with thousands of visitors, and the
project was featured in a number of design and development publications. Almost immediately,
however, the project ran into trouble. As Harvey notes, "The opening of the Island coincided
almost exactly with the bottom falling out of the real estate market in this part of Florida."
Residential development in 1987 was 25% below its 1986 levels and continued to decline for
several years to follow. Commercial development, particularly Class-A office space, continued
until 1990, but the writing was already on the walls, and the market for additional office or retail
space on Harbour Island disappeared.
By this time, Harbour Island was considerably in the red, and Beneficial's other diversification
attempts were also coming back to haunt the company. Revenues and profits were falling, and the
Company was actively seeking to divest itself of its loss-leaders. Given the enormous amounts of
money that had already been invested in the Island, Beneficial chose to sell off its other outside
interests, but to retain ownership of Harbour Island. At the same time, however, they were
continuing to lose money on Harbour Island; estimates are that the company lost at least $100-
million on the project. 65
In looking to restructure, Beneficial decided to take a hands-off position with respect to the
development and management of the Island. In 1987, they contracted with Trammell Crow
Residential and Trammell Crow Commercial to carry out the development of the project. After
five years and five project managers, Tom Harvey was hired to oversee this process.
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Figure 22: Plan of Harbour Island
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"Right from the outset," he notes, "I could see things that had not be done as efficiently as they
might have." The Shops, for example, were in a state of limbo, in part because of the economy in
general, but in part because they were badly mis-sized. The Shops were too big to serve the limited
audience on Harbour Island itself, but too small to function as the kind of Festival Marketplace
draw they were originally intended to be.
"The idea for a festival marketplace had come from the Rouse Corporation., and it simply was out
of place here in Tampa. People were hoping that what had happened in Boston or Baltimore might
happen here, but there's simply no way it would work. Those cities are entirely different than
Tampa is."
On the other hand, the office building was fully leased and the hotel was doing well, in part
because of excellent management by the Wyndham Corporation, and in part because of a relatively
lack of high-end hotel spaces in and around the CBD.
The first two condominium projects had been completed and were selling, but very very slowly.
Seddon Cove was a cluster of four-story flats with a saw-tooth plan running along the edge of
Seddon Channel. The units were large, with at-grade parking below, and generally broad vistas of
the water and Davis Islands to the west. Harbour Place included two eight-story courtyard
buildings containing condo flats and duplexes. Again, parking was included within the buildings,
at grade, with the first units beginning on the second floor.
Initial prices for these units were at the high end of the housing market for the City, but each
complex included its own security force and gated entryways. And, by this time, the Harbour -
Island Athletic Club had been built and was quickly becoming one of the most popular such clubs
in the City. Nonetheless, condo sales were sluggish, and one of Trammell Crow's first
responsibilities was to see how they could increase revenues.
Trammell Crow commissioned some market studies in order to better understand the demographics
of the Tampa Bay area. "By far and away, the people told us that they wanted to see houses on
Harbour Island," Harvey recalls. "This ran completely counter to what the original vision had
been, but the analysis seemed to bear it out."
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Stand-alone housing, however, was not a popular option with Beneficial, because of the very high
density that they current zoning permitted. With a top residential density of 60 dwelling units per
acre, Beneficial could not see the logic in building stand-alone houses at 12 units to the acre.
"Still, we studied the market, and the results seemed to indicate that we could sell very tight, very
well-designed houses at the high-end of the market." Trammell Crow's instincts were, again,
correct, and both the luxury house projects and the luxury-townhouse complexes were very well
received. Currently, new luxury waterfront houses on Harbour Island are selling at around $1.0
million; smaller, courtyard houses away from the water are selling for between $350,00 and
$500,000, while attached town-homes are selling from between $200,000 and $300,000.
"Our next thought," notes Harvey, "was to add apartments. This was not really part of the original
plan, but we figured that there was an audience of people who wouldn't be interested in buying a
condominium, but who wouldn't mind paying a premium for a nice apartment in a new, tightly-
patrolled environment."
Figure 23: Island Walk Apartment Complex, Harbour Island
Again, Trammell Crow's instincts were correct. Island Walk Apartments were completed in 1992,
and were an immediate hit. "These were the first apartments in the Tampa area that included a
garage with each unit. We were able to get a 50% premium over similar products in the area."
Buoyed by this success, the developers built the Island Place Apartment complex the following
year. Here, unit plans were more ambitious, including two- and three-story designs; again, every
unit had a garage, with some of the larger units including room for two cars. Once again, the
apartments were a hit and Harbour Island was able to command a huge premium over other
complexes targeting the same audience.
The development decisions made by Tranmell Crow helped increase the population of the Island
tenfold. From 200 residents in 1989, Harbour Island currently has over 2,000 full-time residents,
living in a wide variety of unit types. The demographics of the Island is varied. There are a
number of families, typically found in the single-family houses. Seniors, retirees, empty-nesters,
some singles, and couples without children tend to occupy the town-houses and condominiums.
The apartments house the greatest diversity, including singles and couples of all ages, with a few
families, typically living on the Island temporarily due to relocation, house-hunting or divorce.
According to the leasing offices, occupancy rates are very high, and while there is considerable
turnover, vacancy rates remain very low.
Predominant reasons people give for living on Harbour Island include the newness of the buildings
and the design options, but the predominant motive is a sense of safety and security. All of the
residential options on the Island have their own 24-hour security services. All units have alarms,
and all complexes are gated. "Without a doubt," notes Harvey, "security is a critical issue for
people who choose to live here. And, we are the only major complex of this type anywhere on the
south side of the City that can offer this kind of security." These sentiments are echoed by leasing
agents at the various complexes.
On the other hand, according to Harvey, only a few people choose to live on Harbour Island
because of its immediate proximity to downtown. "Only about a quarter of the people on the
Island work in the downtown area.," he says, "They work everywhere; even over in St.
Petersburg." Pressed on this point, he suggests a reason. "Downtown Tampa is pretty centrally
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located. It's within five minutes of half-a-dozen very nice neighborhoods. What difference does it
make if you live two minutes from the office (on Harbour Island) or five minutes away (on Davis
Islands or in Palma Ceia)? Everything is within pretty easy reach.
At present, considerable portions of Harbour Island remain to be developed, although the exact
direction of this development is not certain. Trammell Crow is no longer involved in the project,
having been bought out by Beneficial, and Tom Harvey has stepped down to pursue other projects.
Even though recent projects have been extremely successful, accounting practices prevent
Beneficial from writing down all of the initial losses they suffered, and now that the Florida
economy is on the ascendant once again, the company is eager to increase revenues sharply.
Rather than adhering to a pre-determined masterplan, the company hopes to auction off parcels of
land on the Island to different developers, each of whom can build the project that he or she feels is
most likely to sell. Such a laissez-faire approach may increase revenues, but it reduces the
likelihood.that the various parts of the Island will integrate, economically or communally. At
build-out, the Island may be less of a community than simply a collection of very well-off high end
compounds in very close proximity to each other.
The issue here is one that cannot be fully described in Return on Investment calculations or
spreadsheets. Rather, the question is whether the developer's efforts to "force feed" a project will
mitigate against the creation of an "organic" sense of community; returns will go up, but the
quality of the environment will go down.
While Harvey does not feel that the success of the Island depends on its proximity to downtown
Tampa, he does feel, however, that the continued expansion and development of the downtown will
only increase the success of Harbour Island. In the Spring of 1996, in an effort to increase cash on
hand, Beneficial sold the two apartment complexes to Raymond James Associates, an investment
banker fronting for a Midwestern pension fund. "I understand why they sold the projects," says
Harvey, "but I felt that the timing was wrong. Once the Ice Palace hockey arena project gets
finished (in September of 1996) and some of the additional development around the Aquarium gets
underway, there will be increased interest in living on Harbour Island. Those two apartment
projects will become even more valuable." The Ice Palace and the Aquarium are both located
immediate across the Channel from Harbour Island. The Aquarium, which has been open since
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April 1995, has already dramatically increased traffic past the Island; the arena is sure to increase
it even further. Both projects involved millions of dollars of beautification, landscaping and
streetscaping. The public perception of Harbour Island has been dramatically enhanced, if only
because the approaches to it and roadways immediately adjacent to it have been so thoroughly
upgraded.
After many attempts at keeping the retail Shops on the Island in business, Beneficial elected to
close the shops permanently at the end of 1995. Casperson intends to move one of the company's
back-office clerical operations to Tampa and given the dismal record of the Island's retail, the
company intends to convert the original 200,000 square feet of retail to open-plan office space.
Such a move, however, creates an odd demographic blending in the original hotel/office complex,
given the disparity in wages and income between the Beneficial workers and the lawyers and
accountants who occupy most of the ten-story office tower on the Island. Conversely, it leaves
these workers, hotel guests, and Island residents with very few retail and restaurant options on site.
Currently, Harbour Island is going through both a growth spurt and a transition in its development.
Economically, the project has moved from "beleaguered" to "upscale." Organizationally, however,
it is no longer clear who is directing development, nor is it clear who the target audience is, or what
the envisioned outcome should be. Unlike Davis Islands, its larger neighbor immediately to the
southwest, of Hyde Park, Harbour Island does not project a sense of community or neighborhood.
Rather, it has the austerity and distance of a heavily guarded campus; very upscale, very chic, very
well tended, but remote and uninviting. To the degree that its target audience is high-end
professionals who are looking for security and ease of maintenance, there is a good chance that the
entire Island can begin to approach its 4,000+ projected buildout population by the turn of the
Century. However, to the degree that Beneficial sees Harbour Island as an upscale, in-town
"community," they are currently wide of their mark.
Within the larger framework of in-town redevelopment, however, Harbour Island clearly plays an
important role in Tampa's attempts at revitalizing and re-using older portions of the community.
With over 2,000 residents to date, and the potential to double in population in the near future, the
Island adds to the tax base and the city's vitality. The project may, in fact, fit most closely into
the role envisioned by planners and officials for all of the nearby neighborhoods; that is, as a
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denser than normal, predominantly residential enclave. In nature and form, however, it bears little
resemblance to any of the other case environments, or to any other in-town neighborhoods. Rather,
Harbour Island is more like a compressed version of one of the gated communities that are arising
at the fringes of the City, with a similar target audience, a similar building product (albeit one with
more emphasis on attached- than on detached-housing, and much less land area), and similar social
concerns.
Ybor City: An Old Neighborhood Looking for New Uses
At a Regional Plan Association conference on the future of the inner city, a real
estate developer was asked what the first move should be in making a bypassed
urban area an attractive alternative to suburbia. His answer: "Build a golf
course." The prescription makes sense, despite its shock value. If old
neighborhoods are to be alternatives to suburbia, they need to offer comparable
amenities, although a golf course is not the only possibility."
As the 1950s arrived, Ybor City had lived through good times and survived bad.
It had its problems but was changing, particularly as Tampa mushroomed away
from its downtown core and suburban shopping centers took root.
Then along came a superhighway called Interstate 4, knifing through the
heart of the neighborhoods north of Ybor's Seventh Avenue business center. As
the 1960s dawned, the downward spiral was unrelenting. Businesses moved and
well-groomed areas became low-rent.
Ybor's colors paled and its voices hushed to a whisper.67
Ybor City is located two miles northeast of Tampa's Central Business District, with its southern
border adjacent to the Port of Tampa, one of the nation's largest natural harbors. Comprising 70
acres of land, Ybor was founded in 1885 by Vincente Martinez Ybor and two associates. The
three had operated a successful cigar-making business in Key West, but were looking to escape the
devastation of the regular hurricanes that swept the island. They came to Tampa at the invitation
of local business leaders, and quickly set about creating an environment akin to a company town.
Within ten years of its founding, Ybor City had its own street cars, fire department, waterworks,
and police force. Although Ybor City was annexed by Tampa in 1895, it retained its distinct
ethnic flavor. It was a "city within a city, a city as truly Latin-American in appearance and in the
customs of its inhabitants as though it had been in the heart of Cuba."68
" Barnett, op cit, page 149.67 Hathaway, Ivan. "Coming Home to Ybor." Tampa Tribune, 1995.
68 Grismer, page 204.
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At the turn of the century, Tampa had a population of 15,839, of which approximately 10,000
lived in Ybor City. In 1920, Ybor comprised 1,280 acres of land and over 15,000 residents.
Recognized at the turn of the century as the "Cigar Capital of the World," Ybor
City developed with all the uses needed in a community, and had 30 cigar
factories; by the mid-1920s, there were 159 factories employing 13,000 workers.
Factory owners provided employment and housing, while other entrepreneurs
started businesses. The various ethnic groups organized "social clubs" which
provided a center for entertainment, recreation, education, and health care. A
WPA report in 1941 cites the presence of "stores, theatres, movie houses, schools,
churches, and newspapers, as well as clubs, hospitals, and clinics."69
By 1941, Ybor consisted of "approximately 10,000 Cubans, 8,000 Spaniards, and 6,000 Italians"
as well as lesser amounts of other ethnic groups. From this War-time peak, Ybor's population fell
steadily. As early as the 1930s, labor problems and the growing mechanization of the cigar
industry combined to sap the vitality of the cigar industry. The period after the way saw Ybor's
fortunes decline further as those residents who could afford to do so move to newer suburban
developments to the north and west of the City. Many buildings were abandoned and left vacant,
and in 1959, Ybor City was targeted for Urban Renewal.
For all intents and purposes, Urban Renewal and the creation of Interstate 4 all but destroyed Ybor
City. The combine effect of the two Federal programs was the destruction of over 600 buildings,
including several significant social or cultural facilities, and the dramatic depopulation of the area.
Even as the buildings were being razed, local efforts were underway to find options for
redevelopment. As early as the mid-1960s, the Barrio Latino Commission had been created in
order to review such initiatives, and in 1974, the central part of the community was designated a
National Register Historic District. The following year, Hillsborough Community College chose
Ybor as the location of one of its branch campuses. In 1983, the City of Tampa paid over
$150,000 for a full-scale urban development masterplan for Ybor, a plan that for all its good
intentions, never really got off the shelf.
69 Florida Center for Community Design + Research. Integrating Community Design and Transportation.
(Tampa FL: Center for Urban Transportation Research, 1993), page 25.
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In 1987, the City created the Ybor City Community Development Corporation, and in 1988,
designated much of Ybor as a Community Redevelopment Area, using this designation to create a
Tax Increment Financing District, and targeting the community as an Enterprise Zone. Funds from
the TIF District were used to support the Development Corporation.
Figure 25: Seventh Avenue, Ybor City
Despite these activities, however, Ybor's population continued to fall throughout the 1980s. By
the 1990 census, Ybor and its immediate environs included only 1,842 residents, but "officials-
estimate that only about 500 people live in the heart of Ybor."70 By 1988, 72 percent of the
buildings in Ybor City had code violations. Thirty-one major buildings were entirely vacant, and
another 27 were at least one-fifth vacant.
The revitalization study completed in 1983 was embodied into a special district zoning law that
was passed by the City of Tampa in 1986. Paramount among the assumptions of the plan was the
70 Szymanski, David. Business & Finance, Tampa Tribune, 20 December 1992, page 10.
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notion that if the businesses of Ybor, primarily those along Seventh Avenue, could be brought back
to life, inevitably and inexorably, residential development would follow suit.
~. i.-
Figure 26: Vacant Parcels, Ybor City
Commercial development, however, was slow to follow the 1986 ordinance, and there was virtually
no change in business development until 1990. In 1991, 14 new businesses moved into Ybor City.
Almost that many arrived the following year. Then, in 1993, a hurdle was passed, as over thirty
new businesses were started in the District. 1994 continued the boom with 50 new businesses, and
a similar number opened in 1995.
Within this five year period, the ten-block strip of Seventh Avenue, the traditional heart of the
neighborhood, came alive once more, albeit in a very different incarnation that previously. From
being the social, cultural and economic heart of a tight-knit ethnic enclave, Seventh Avenue became
"Party Central" for people all over the Tampa Bay region. Police estimate that on good weekend
nights, when the weather is pleasant and there are events scheduled throughout the district, over
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50,000 people will pass through Ybor City. Traffic backs up on the Interstate with visitors from
as far north as Ocala and as far east as Orlando.
The Ybor City Community Development Corporation (CDC) estimates that during this period,
approximately $40,000,000 has been invested in development within the District. All of this,
however, produced only 29 residential units. Most of these were renovated loft-type spaces located
above ground-floor commercial uses along Seventh Avenue. With the exception of one, three-story
infill project along Seventh Avenue, which contains two, third-story apartments, and a number of
small stand-alone houses south of the main commercial street, none of the residential renovations
involved new construction.
A source of puzzlement to planners and Ybor advocates, the dearth of residential development is
easily explained by area developers. "Quite simply," remarks Craig Ross of Hyde Park Builders,
"there is no way that we could build anything in Ybor and make any money." Ross and his partner,
Scott Shimberg, have been very successful with in-fill residential development throughout South
Tampa, but they have no intention of getting involve in Ybor City. "The price range of the typical
person who would buy in Ybor is about $75,000 per unit. There's no way we could meet that
figure and still provide some of the amenities and features that we feel are integral to our product."
Key among these features are attached garages and sophisticated security systems. "You could
give us the land," notes Ross, "and there would still be no way that we could provide this type of
product for the existing market." When asked why there is a strong market for up-scale infill
development in Hyde Park but not in Ybor, Ross noted the significant perceived differences
between the two neighborhoods. "Hyde Park is seen as a safe, pleasant, middle- and upper-middle-
class environment. Ybor City is seen as a place to go party, but it's perceived as being dangerous
and unsafe. People go to Ybor to have fun and come back to find that their car has been broken
into. You simply cannot get buyers to spend significant amounts of money to live in an
environment like that."
Like others, Ross indicated that the prices in Ybor have risen to a point that all but precludes new
residential construction. Tampa Heights, on the other hand, presents many of the same risks as
Ybor in terms of safety and security, but at a much lower entry cost. "You can buy a nice house in
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Tampa Heights for $40,000. If you are willing to fix it up and be careful, you can get a real
bargain." Bargains of this nature can no longer be found in Ybor City.
The City of Tampa's stated policy for Ybor City has been to look for large-scale developers who
would be willing to put up a project of significant size and draw. Idea include a hotel, a design
center, or a large entertainment-oriented mixed-use complex on the lines of the very successful
Coco Walk in Miami. Companies as large as Steiner Corporation, developer of Coco Walk in
Coconut Grove, Disney Development, and the DeBartolo Corporation have been contacted about
opportunities in Ybor City. To date, no one has expressed much more than passing interest. 71
"These programs are at cross purposes with the expressed goal of getting more residential into the
neighborhood," noted another developer. "When the word gets out that you are looking at large,
national players, land prices stay high. On the other hand, you want to encourage small developers
to get involved with projects such as residential that may actually be loss leaders without some
degree of owner involvement."
Over and over, in discussions of non-commercial development in Ybor City, conversations come
around to the need for "non-economical" options. That is, officials and developers recognize that
the first large-scale residential development in Ybor City will probably lose money. Should the
developers be able to hold out long enough to sell of a good number of the units, and should the
sales and occupancy go well, subsequent developers might be able to produce similar residential
offerings at a profit. Even aggressive advocates of Ybor City recognize the catch-22 nature of the
current situation. "We are looking for larger developers to come in a take up a whole block of
land," remarks CDC director, Rebecca Gagalis, "but we understand that for a large developer, the
numbers just don't seem to work out."
Taken in the context of other well-publicized, broad-based efforts at revitalizing urban
neighborhoods of significant historical importance, Ybor City represents a variation on the typical
case. Unlike Boston or Baltimore, Ybor City stands isolated from the immediate downtown
71 In July of 1996, Mayor Dick Greco, a former developer, set up a number of visits to Ybor City by
representatives of several large development companies. While, at the time of this writing nothing had
come of these meetings, the "word on the streets" was that at least one had expressed significant interest
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context, separated from Tampa's Central Business District by about a mile, a distance that
includes rail lines, abandoned properties, surface parking lots and two housing projects. While the
major vehicular connection between the CBD and Ybor recently received a multi-million dollar
face lift, these changes have spurred little redevelopment and the transition between the two areas
remains an amalgam of empty industrial buildings, active marine-related businesses, and vacant
lots. Unlike Baltimore and Boston, downtown Tampa does not have the daytime worker
population to keep Ybor City active, even at lunch time. And, unlike the Church Street station area
in Orlando, to give cite one very well known example, Tampa does not, as of yet, have the
necessary tourist base to support Ybor. Functionally, therefore, Ybor City comes alive on Friday
and Saturday evenings, and during the daytime on Saturdays and Sundays, serving as a regional
draw for visitors to and residents of the greater Tampa Bay area.
Again, unlike Boston or Baltimore, Tampa does not have the requisite transportation infrastructure
to make Ybor City accessible except to those who come in automobiles. Concomitant with this
limitation are the requirements for car parking; the more people who come to the district, the more
space must be given over to parking. And, since the regularity and volume of visitors is still very
much up in the air, to date, there are no structured parking alternatives. During particularly busy
weekend nights or for periodic special events, most of the vacant lots in Ybor are turned into profit-
centers as owners or operators rent out parking spaces at $3 to $5 per car.
The realization that Ybor City needs some alternative to car transport, combined with a desire to
imitate New Orleans with its extremely successful Charles Street Trolley, led to the creation of the
Tampa Historic Trolley Association whose expressed goal is to get a 1.5 mile in-ground trolley rail
laid between downtown Tampa and Ybor City.72 However, unlike New Orleans, whose French
Quarter is often held up as a model of what Ybor City could become, Ybor lacks the extant
buildings and institutions to make such a transition possible. Unlike the French Quarter, or South
Beach in Miami, or Coconut Grove, Ybor City is coming close to running out of old buildings to
renovate, but there are still enormous gaps in the development pattern. As the most viable
in developing some sort of mixed-use complex in Ybor City, with an announcement expected within six to
eight weeks.
72 As of July of 1996, the Trolley Association has been successful beyond anyone's dreams in attracting
money to their cause. With the help of Mayor Greco, the businessmen and women in the Tampa
Downtown Partnership and considerable lobbying at both the State and Federal levels, the Trolley had
125
candidates for redevelopment are, in fact, converted into viable uses, the call is going out for
projects involving new construction. With a few small exceptions, however, no one is responding.
The predominant factors stifling development appear to be price and risk. Even though many
owners have either sold out or put their properties into productive use, there is still some degree of
land-banking at work in Ybor. Considerable amounts of property remain in the hands of the City
or the Community College and, in the words of one developer who has observed the scene for
many years, the City "is looking for a major play; a home run." With the knowledge, the owners
of other large parcels are playing a similar waiting game.
Thus, after five years of events that clearly outdid the expectations of even the wildest
neighborhood supporter, Ybor City finds itself at a turning point. Neither a public nor a private
entity, it represents an ad hoc collaboration. The plans that underpinned the initial forays into
redevelopment have been all but relegated to the shelf, but nothing substantive has taken their
place. The consensus at this point is that new, private-sector residential development is not going
to occur; that leaves the City and various agencies with at least 11 blocks of vacant land to fill.
This is much more space than any single developer would undertake, yet, the City is reluctant to
apportion space in half- and quarter-block increments for fear of getting in the way of a future
project.
South of Seventh Avenue, where many of the older buildings were not razed, there is potential for
smaller infill residential development projects, but the zoning permits myriad uses, many of which
are considered higher and better uses than housing. In addition, early investors have managed to
tie up significant portions of this land, thereby excluding the smaller one-and two-unit developer.
Parking has reached a critical juncture. Every available surface lot is occupied on a good weekend
night, but clearly the economics is not there for constructing a structure, for either the private or
public sector. In the interim, people continue to come to Ybor to party, but while they do, they
worry about vandalism to their vehicles.
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access to almost $25 million in funding for the rail project. Ground is to be broken for the first rails as
early as late 1996, with an active system in place by sometime in 1997.
Chapter VI Conclusions
The four cases presented herein represent four different approaches to in-town neighborhood
redevelopment as it is currently found in Sunbelt cities. Unlike older, pre-automobile cities such as
Boston or Philadelphia, Sunbelt cities generally lack the tight, dense, multi-family environments
that typified many of the earliest urban redevelopment programs and proposals. These are cities
built around auto-accessibility and easy mobility throughout the metro region. The claim,
therefore, that mere proximity to the Central Business District automatically confers some
locational advantage generally does not hold true in these suburbanized environments the way it
might in an older city.
In Tampa, as in many metro areas throughout the country, the average daily one-way work
commute is 22 minutes. Without breakdowns or other incidents, it is possible to get from the CBD
to the nouveau-riche Tampa Palms master planned community at the northern edge of the City in
25 minutes. Avila, another highly-touted gated community and home to both a championship polo
field and General Norman Schwarzkopf, is also about 25 minutes from the downtown. Pinellas
County with its beaches is only a bit further away.
Closer in, the golf-course neighborhood of Palma Ceia and the waterfront community of Daivis
Islands are less than five minutes from the CBD; the waterfront homes of Beach Park, Sunset Park
and Culbreath Bayou are all only fifteen minutes away. In short, the claim of proximity alone
confers little value, particularly since the potential buyer will still need a car in order to traverse the
numerous trips that are not a direct home-work-home commute.
As the case of Hyde Park indicates, given an extensive collection of architecturally interesting, if
not significant, buildings set in a "traditional" pre-War neighborhood with over a mile of publicly-
accessible waterfront and myriad shopping opportunities, all located less than five minutes from
the CBD, the potentials for gentrification are extensive. As one of the oldest settlements in the
area, Hyde Park was an early victim of the "new is better than old" mentality that swept the
country in the 1950s and 1960s. The inherent real estate values of product and location, however,
never went away, and with the coming of age of a younger generation in the 1970s, coupled with
the energy crisis and impending traffic concerns, it was a easy pick for transformation.
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Today, Hyde Park is experiencing further development, the selective "densification" that optimizes
values, replacing undervalued single-family homes with two- and three-family alternatives.
However, several factors mitigate against overly-intensive development. With the exception of
some parcels on Bayshore Boulevard, most of Hyde Park is zoned as single-family or medium-
density multi-family. A town-house developer, looking to include a two-car garage in each unit
generally cannot go much above 20 dwelling units to the acre. Apartment developers, such as
Post, generally sacrifice some potential density in order to minimize parking costs and use surface
lots. In either manner, development generally peaks at less than 24 units to the acre.
Developers looking to exceed that density generally need some sort of structured parking, with the
concomitant cost implications. Several large sites along Bayshore Boulevard are ideally suited for
high-rise condo or apartment development; all, however, have languished for over a decade, as a
combination of soft-markets, consumer preferences, financing problems and costs all mitigated
against their development. Unlike the South Beach area of Miami Beach which has both the
precedents and the overall density for high-rise residential development, typical Sunbelt urban
neighborhoods tend to be overwhelmingly low- to medium-density environments.
Even within easy proximity, what works for one neighborhood might not work in another. Given
some of the same conditions as Hyde Park, Tampa Heights languishes. Devastated by the earliest
examples of Federally funded public housing and sitting at the confluence of two major interstate
highways, the neighborhood was transformed in the post-War period from an elegant, albeit
shabby, collection of Victorian wood-frame houses, into an over-crowded barrio filled with
converted boarding houses and a relative lack of commercial and retail options. The advent of the
drug culture in the 1970s and '80s hit Tampa Heights very hard, leaving the City of Tampa few
alternatives to literally bulldozing structures in order to eradicate drug dealing.
A stick-frame, one-story bungalow in Hyde Park can cost well over $250,000. A similar house, in
somewhat worse repair, can be had for $50,000 in Tampa Heights, implying locational value of
nearly $200,000 per unit. Certainly, given the ostensibly residential character of both
neighborhoods, crime and safety concerns are paramount in explaining the difference. Despite the
crackdown on drugs in the past few years and the very real and dramatic improvements seen in
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Tampa Heights, most potential buyers regard the neighborhood with considerable trepidation. The
1989 Planning Commission study clearly articulated the concerns of downtown workers with
respect to the area. Given the alternatives available -Hyde Park, Davis Islands, Palma Ceia, etc.-
all within reasonable proximity, there is very little call for those downtown workers who make
$50,000 and above to consider pioneering in Tampa Heights.
Within the next level of workers -those making between $35,000 and $50,000-Tampa Heights
represents an option, but when given the enormous amount of new housing available at the edges
of the city, ranging in price from $85,000 to $150,000, there is little wonder than Tampa Heights is
left out. This leaves two sources of population for the area. Those who work in and around the
downtown who make less than $35,000 and who are looking for an urban environment but cannot
afford to live in Hyde Park or a similar environment, and those indigenous residents of Tampa
Heights and surrounding neighborhoods, who have always regarded the area as home and who are
happy to see it on the upswing.
In either case, extensive amounts of capital are not forthcoming. However, with programs such
as the City's Challenge Fund to help guarantee loans and through the efforts of city agencies,
volunteer groups and non-profits such as Tampa Preservation, Inc., very real redevelopment
progress has been occurring in recent years. Slowly and steadily, this progress promises to
continue, possibly bolstered by catalyst events such as the eventual redevelopment of the current
Police headquarters property or the spinoff of the projected highway expansion.
Hyde Park and Tampa Heights represent the tried-and-true approaches to redevelopment; the high-
road and the low-road. Harbour Island represents an essentially anomalous case, but one that will
be increasingly visible in future years as large institutional holdings are divested and become
available to private (or public) sector developers. Held by a single entity and sold on the open
market, Harbour Island was 177 acres of vacant land a stone's throw from the CBD. In other
cities, railroad yards, industrial properties, and military facilities represent similar potentials,73
particularly if current EPA cleanup requirements are relaxed in the future.
73 Albert Whitted Airport, for example, in downtown St. Petersburg, is an under-functioning general
aviation airport, owned by the City. It is also 80 acres of waterfront property, and has caught the eye of
many developers. Currently, the downtown land market in St. Petersburg is somewhat depressed; as it
improves, however, expect proposals for the airport property to come in abundance.
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Several key lessons can be drawn from the example of Harbour Island. First, and foremost, the
project indicates that if the product is right, there certainly is a market for medium- to high-density
downtown housing in a Sunbelt environment. Done properly, this "unsellable" commodity can
even be developed at a premium. On the other hand, real estate development as a diversification
tactic is probably not the best way to achieve the full potential of a site, nor does it make sense to
develop an ostensibly urban situation as a xerox-reduced version of a suburban gated-community.
Despite the manifest benefits of being developed by a single owner, Harbour Island, in the end, will
bear witness to none of the potential benefits that such a situation confers. Rather than working as
a true urban neighborhood, one that has the added benefits of being a naturally gated enclave, it
will ultimately end up as a compacted collection of stand-alone sub-developments, albeit ones
whose residents are in the upper income brackets.
Given the idiosyncratic opportunities presented when a 177 acre island comes on the downtown
land market, the specific lessons of Harbour Island might not be immediately translatable to
another Sunbelt setting. The current interest in and research about the re-use of military facilities,
however, indicates that similar situations may not be uncommon in the future.
The fourth case study, Ybor City, represents a situation that can be found in many metro areas,
either as something that was once a distinct enclave such as the case here, or as a peripheral
location within the original downtown itself (as can be found in the Church Street Station area of
Orlando, for example).
Ybor City is not going to come back as it once was. While individual buildings can be seen as
preservation projects in a strictly architectural sense, functionally, formally and economically,
Ybor City is in the process of reinventing itself. Unlike Hyde Park or Tampa Heights, Ybor City is
going through a significant urban metamorphosis and, for all intents and purposes, no one is really
controlling the process.
Instead, redevelopment is occurring as a free-form public/private partnership with each side giving
and taking. Even the members of the CDC and City officials admit, now, that the so-called
masterplans for the neighborhood, produced in the 1970s and 1980s, have little connection to the
reality that is unfolding at present. Private sector interests similarly indicate a flexibility of
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approach. If a building won't work as a mixed-use store/office/apartment combo, maybe it can be
used as a bar with an upstairs music club; if that doesn't work, maybe a restaurant with loft space
above. Development, at present, in Ybor City is an on-going, full-size experiment in urban
regeneration.
In a discussion with members of the City and the CDC the subject of control and regulation was
raised. Instead of dictating uses for the vacant parcels of property, why not simply provide a set of
building regulations -setback lines, build-to lines, height limitations, materials, scales, proportions,
etc.-and then let the market decide what should actually go in the containers. The suggestion met
with no significant disapproval.
The real issue at hand in Ybor depends on the nature and scale of immediate future development.
With a few exceptions, most of the easily rehabilitated older structures have been renovated. One
or two significant projects remain -the Centro Espanol, for example-and there are still some
instances of land-banking, but the easy redevelopment has taken place. For the most part, there
has been relatively little new construction; several well-financed infill projects along Seventh
Avenue, a new office for the School Board, a small, two-story owner occupied mixed-use project.
A type of holding pattern has taken over, with each land-owner or developer waiting for the other
one to make the first move.
Several pressures are at work. There is still a vocal element, typically including long-time
residents and members of the art community, who argue, against economic logic, that Ybor should
attempt to re-assert its identity as a bohemian enclave. A slightly less ingenuous faction argues
that Ybor needs residential development in order to succeed, despite the considerable evidence that
neither the market nor the financial rationale for such development can be found.
City officials understand the sentiments of each of these other groups, but themselves would like to
see some sort of large-scale, mixed-use project get built. In the 1980s, there was talk of a 250,000
square foot design center. Later, ideas for movie complexes, sports arenas, hotels and mixed-use
entertainment complexes a la Coco Walk have been bruited about. No lesser a figure than the
Mayor is on record as saying that he would like to see something "really big74" happen in Ybor.
74 Tampa Tribune, Friday 28 June 1996.
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When pressed for details, he admitted that he had no particular idea in mind, just something that
would draw lots of people.
This relative inactivity can be interpreted as either a sign that the recent surge in Ybor City has
played itself out, or as a sign that a second, more mature round of redevelopment is about to begin.
The development of the past five years in Ybor City has been, with few exceptions, locally driven
by small developers and investors. The players being wooed at this point in time all represent
large, national if not international interests. According to Rebecca Gagalis of the CDC, over the
past five years, nearly $40 million has been invested in Ybor City; if all of the current projects
under discussion come to fruition, this number could double within the next year. Given that the
first $40 million turned a sleepy ethnic/artists enclave into a rip-roaring regional entertainment
venue, one wonders what an additional $40 million will lead to.
A primary issue mentioned repeatedly in all four of the cases is the necessity to enhance both the
perception and the reality of safety and security. Harbour Island actively touts its alarm systems,
gates, guard houses and security personnel. Hyde Park Builders has targeted a niche market for
whom these issues are critical and has created a very succesful product to meet the demands of this
market. In Tampa Heights, even the most ardent neighborhood champion admits that crime,
particularly drug activity, is an on-going presence and that extra precautions are necessary. In
Ybor, on a Friday or Saturday evening, as many as fifty police personnel will be stationed in the
neighborhood, more as a deterrent than in defense against any expected criminal activity. But, as a
further measure, officials recently committed nearly $40,000 of TIF money to improve street
lighting and to erect surveillance video cameras along Seventh Avenue. While this last move set
conspiracy theorists on edge, the City feels that the visible presence of these devices will deter
criminal activity, particularly during the active evenings and nights. "We really had no choice,"
notes Gagalis of the CDC. "There is an ongoing perception of Ybor as a dangerous place. It has
very real economic impacts on the neighborhood, and we've got to do everything we can to combat
that perception." To a greater or lesser degree, the same holds true for all of the redeveloping
neighborhoods.
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Roles for the Public Sector
The constraints facing the City of Tampa with respect to in-town revitalization and redevelopment
are similar to those found in most Sunbelt cities. Major development funds are tied up as bond
issues for traditional civic-scale projects, most of which are located in the downtown: Performing
Arts Center, Convention Center, Aquarium, Hockey Arena. Additional moneys are being
committed to the development of a headquarters hotel facility for the convention center. Clearly,
the City does not have the funds to finance or develop a major intervention in any of its in-town
neighborhoods.
At the same time that major sources of capital funding are tied up in a series of large civic projects,
the City is also getting pressure from the 100+ neighborhoods within the city limits, each of which
his looking for money for improvements and upgrades. The sentiment among some of the members
of THAN (Tampa Homeowners, an Association of Neighborhoods), is that Downtown, Hyde Park
and Ybor City get the lion's share of the funding75; the other areas are left to fend for themselves.
On the other hand, the City seems to have created a workable relationship with these neighborhood
groups, a most, if not all, realize the City's goal of establishing the downtown and immediate
surrounds as a regional, if not state or national, attraction. Nonetheless, the future role of the City
in the on-going redevelopment process, appears to be as a regulator, as a source of loan
guarantees, as a mediator, as a source of technical assistance and support, and as an oversight
agency. The example of Tampa Heights shows that increased police presence, attention to code
issues and physical appearances, combined with some fiscal oversight, can help create a situation
in which small-scale redevelopment efforts can burgeon. According to Noriega, the City clearly
intends to continue its efforts in this manner, but with the single exception of offering the vacant
police headquarters site for sale to the "right" developer, the City will not be initiating any projects
in this area.
75 The Ybor CDC and members of YEAA (Ybor Entertainment and Arts Association) are not unaware
of this complaint. Their rebuttal is that Ybor City is a city-wide resource and therefore merits more
attention than other neighborhoods. A legitimate claim, but one that is generally not well received by
other neighborhood associations.
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Other public sector entities have contributed to the redevelopment efforts, too. The county-wide
School Board is putting up a new magnet school just across the Hillsborough River from Tampa
Heights; the Federal government is building a courthouse in the CBD; the Customs Service has
leased a large office in Ybor City, and both the City and the Community College are holding
property in Ybor for future construction when the time is right. A combination of City, County,
State and Federal grant funds are being used to construct the 2.5 mile in-ground trolley link
between Ybor City and the downtown Convention Center. Federal funds generated through the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) are being used in Ybor City to move
structures currently sitting in the path of the proposed Interstate expansion. These buildings,
primarily wood-frame houses, will be transported from the north of the highway to the south,
where they will serve both as infill and to create a small compound of buildings dedicated to the
arts. At an estimated cost of $40,000 per building including transport and renovation, these
original structures will prove to be cheaper than new construction and may be able to spur some
new development at the northern edges of the neighborhood.
Clearly, for the time being, the public sector will not be engaging in many "home run" projects, and
will instead focus on myriad small ventures. Conventional, but necessary, capital improvements
such as new storm drainage for Ybor City and Hyde Park will occupy time and money, but will
enhance the livability of these neighborhoods. Streetscaping and sidewalk improvements similarly
create a residual sense of on-going restoration and renovation. In Ybor City, the CDC had decided
to use TIF moneys to improve security lighting and provide additional security measures.
Internally, the Tampa Police are working with donors and private interests to re-create their
equestrian patrol, to be deployed in Ybor City. The horse-mounted patrols are seen as both a
security enhancement and additional "character."
Fernando Noriega summarizes the City view of its role in the ongoing redevelopment efforts. "We
have to make people see that Tampa is the engine driving the entire metro area. We have to get
people to focus on the City, to understand how the city works, how the county works, how the
entire Bay area works together. We've got to stop all the competition." In short, the City is taking
a position that it is going to consciously work against the general trends for suburbanization and
dispersal.
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How is this to be accomplished? "Marketing. We've got to think the way a corporation does.
We've got good things here, but we've got to get the word out. First, we need to let everyone in the
City understand what is happening, get them to come downtown, visit Ybor, take a look around,
see the opportunities. Then, we've got to get the word out to the region; get people to come visit
and see what's happening. Maybe they'll be interested in working or living in some of these areas.
Finally, we need to try to capture the tourists and the out-of-state businesses."
Opportunities for the Private Sector
It has been argued by some that developers prefer working at the fringes of metropolitan areas
because these are the locations that are cheapest to buy and easiest to control; here is where it is
possible to create the suburbanized environments that the typical consumer wants and demands.
The rapidity of the growth at these fringes indicates at least some validity to these arguments, but it
does not convey the entire story of growth and development within the contemporary Sunbelt metro
environment. The fact that there is obvious demand for fringe "products" does not automatically
imply that there is no demand for in-town redevelopment. The success of Hyde Park, Harbour
Island and Ybor City in attracting both investors and customers indicates that demand can be found
(or created) for such redeveloped properties.
On the other hand, as the example of Harbour Island shows, given 177 acres of downtown
waterfront property, an ostensible market, and significant financial backing, it is still possible to
lose a lot of money. As the example of Hyde Park Builders shows, it is also possible to look at a
neighborhood that appears, for all intents and purposes, to be both thriving and built-out, and still
find opportunities to do profitable development. And, as the one- and two-man shops operating in
Ybor City show, it is possible to get into redevelopment from a commitment to a neighborhood and
then come of it with significant financial returns.
Even within an ostensibly devastated neighborhood, there is potential to create successful projects.
"People don't build in Tampa Heights," one is told, "because no one wants to live there." Yet, as
the volunteers at Tampa Preservation, Inc. have shown over the past five or six years, there is
demand for development within this in-town neighborhood. It's simply a demand that cannot be
fulfilled within the framework of current development delivery. The returns are too low for all but
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the smallest mom-and-pop contractor, and there are very real risks associated with marketing
property in this environment. While the City's Challenge Fund has mitigated some of these
problems through its loan guarantees, the point remains; a for-profit developer is not going to make
much, if any, money by working in Tampa Heights, yet.
Under the aegis of TPI, Habitat for Humanity, and the City, Tampa Heights was brought back
from the brink of total decay. Unlike a similar neighborhood in Cleveland, Philadelphia or Boston,
however, total decay in a Sunbelt environment is a much more malleable and tractable
phenomenon. With few exceptions, buildings stand-alone. Residences are predominantly single-
family houses, and the vast majority are built of wood. The original densities in the area were
considerably higher than a contemporary suburban subdivision, but much lower than those found
in Boston's West End, or North Philadelphia.
The ease of decay and destruction of the physical fabric and form of an Sunbelt neighborhood are
also the seeds of its rebirth. In Tampa Heights, old, deteriorated buildings were run over with a
bulldozer and hauled away to create instant development sites. Sound buildings in bad locations
were hauled to better sites and mounted atop concrete piers. For $20,000 and a piece of land, you
had a new home.
Unlike the thick, row-house neighborhoods of northern cities, in the Sunbelt, even the
neighborhoods closest to the central business district comprise low-rise, single family construction.
Such environments make modest demands on developers looking to purchase and rehabilitate, as
was seen in Hyde Park in the 1970s. For $40,000 and some sweat equity, a person could have an
original 1920 stick-frame house, two blocks from the water. The incentives in such a situation are
not for the large-scale developer or development company. Rather, they are for the mom-and-pop
companies, the do-it-yourself advocate, the architect looking to get into development, the contractor
looking to buy, renovate, sell and buy some more.
Each of the conditions presented in the four cases is representative of similar conditions in cities
throughout the United States. Within a gentrifying older neighborhood, opportunities exist to
create centralized focused mixed-use "centers" such as Hyde Park Village. Initial opportunities
exist in renovating significant structures; later potentials include replacing less significant
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structures with higher and better uses. For examples, small, half-block, two-story mixed-use
buildings are beginning to appear along Howard Avenue in Hyde Park. With some dispensation
from mandated parking requirements and setbacks, builders are able to get a one to three retail
spaces on the ground floor and 2,000 to 10,000 square feet of office space above. As with the
multi-family projects, these represent niche market opportunities and are generally the product of
small, local (if not neighborhood based) contractors and developers. Many times, these builders
are tapping into a market of small businesses that used to lease space and are now convinced of the
benefits of ownership.
Large tracts of institutionalized land represent ideal opportunities for large scale private sector
development; structured in the manner of a suburban master-planned community, these projects
will require increased density and a concomitant greater focus on public space, amenities and
communal features. However, to the degree that developers approach these projects as variations
on the suburban theme, they may be letting themselves in for a hard time. Even the support of
national companies need not guarantee a successful product; the Enterprise Corporation's
involvement in Harbour Island did nothing to help their unsuccessful marketplace concept.
In addition, many of these tracts of land are currently in the hands of the public sector, and
represent an enormous potential asset. To the degree that the public sector is looking to capitalize
on this asset, they will demand considerable rigor from their private sector counterparts, possibly
setting up the redevelopment projects as public/private partnerships, an area in which local
governments have developed considerable expertise over the past decades.
Transitional neighborhoods such as Ybor City represent the most interesting challenge for the
private sector. Too large and diverse to be "captured" by a single entity or to succumb to a single
master vision, Ybor is representative of in-town environments found in many cities. Bargains can
be had as far as individual properties go, but the success of the individual depends on the gradual
transformation of the entire neighborhood. Developers such as Harris Mullen of Ybor Square had
to hang on for nearly twenty years before they were able to realize any significant profits on their
projects. While the potentials are there, such forms of redevelopment are most opportune for
developers with long-term commitments. On the other hand, a handful of developers made
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commitments to Ybor City in the 1980s; they still hold many of their investments, but they have
also managed to extract profits along the way.
Of the four conditions, incumbent regeneration is probably the most tentative investment from a
private sector point of view. Unlike gentrification, regeneration occurs primarily from within the
capital resources already contained within the original context, with assistance from non-profits,
local governments and various other institutions. As noted, the notion that there is no demand for
housing in Tampa Heights, for example, is belied by the success of Tampa Preservation, Inc.
Rather, there is no demand, at present, for developer housing done under for-profit private-sector
conditions. On the other hand, as the examples of significant land-banking indicate, clearly some
private sector entities view a neighborhood like Tampa Heights as a profitable long-term
investment.
In summation, urban redevelopment represents an enormous opportunity within lower-density
suburbanized Sunbelt metro areas, albeit one that may require new strategies and approaches.
These, in turn, will imply new practices, typically involving close coordination of public sector and
private sector skills and abilities.
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